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EDITORIAL

Dear readers!

This issue of the journal Corporate Ownership and Control delivers to the reading audience the most
important issues of corporate governance, such as corporate governance and firm valuation, stock
options, internal audit, corporate ownership and performance, managerial ownership and firm
valuation, family ownership and performance, mergers and acquisitions, corporate law and regulation.
As a part of good tradition we have focused on a wide international representation of contributions. We
have contributions made by authors from many countries of the world both developed and developing.
These are papers by authors from Japan, the USA, Spain, Australia, Taiwan, Qatar, Brazil, Denmark.
In this issue we were fortunate in composing a section devoted to corporate governance in a particular
region with application to Japan. This is the first time for our journal to publish the special section on
corporate governance in Japan. This is a result of efforts undertaken by us to get and develop very good
and future-oriented relationships with corporate governance experts from Japan. I think you will enjoy
reading the papers on corporate governance in Japan.
In this issue of the journal we came back to the traditional issue of corporate governance – ownership
structure as a special section. Major attention is paid to the link between ownership structure and
performance. Our contributors were fortunate in generating new ideas and made new findings in this
way.
Our strategic purpose is to develop the new concepts and practices how to overcome the financial crisis
with the corporate governance toolkit including mechanisms, instruments and participants. Your
contributions on this issue would be very valuable for us.
We are open for your suggestions in the new fields the books could be written and hope for the new
contributions to the journal!
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РАЗДЕЛ 1
НАУЧНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ
И КОНЦЕПЦИИ
SECTION 1
ACADEMIC
INVESTIGATIONS
& CONCEPTS

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING:
BONDHOLDER TAKEOVER DEFENSES IN POISON PUTS
Ai-Fen Cheng*, Tao-Hsien Dolly King**
Abstract
Bondholder governance through the use of bond covenants and the interactions between shareholder
and bondholder governance mechanisms has been recently highlighted in the corporate governance
literature. In this paper, we study bondholder governance mechanisms through takeover-related bond
covenants (i.e., poison puts), confirm with agency theory on the characteristics of firms that are more
likely to use these covenants, and emphasize the importance of bondholder governance in the overall
structure of corporate governance. We find that poison puts are often bundled with asset sale, payout,
and financing restrictions, which is consistent with agency theory. We also find that high growth firms,
large, profitable, low-leverage firms are more likely to use poison puts. In addition, our results on free
cash flow, insider and institutional ownership provide support for agency explanation. Lastly, we find
that poor bond market performance and good equity market performance are likely to motivate the
incidence of poison put bond issuance. Volatility of interest rate and volatility of bond index returns
motivate more issues of poison put debt. Finally, greater market term and default premiums promote
the use of poison puts.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Bondholder Takeover Defense, Poison Put
*Department of Quantitative Finance, National Tsing Hua University, 101, Section 2, Kuang-Fu Road
Hsinchu, Taiwan 30013
Email: g946427@oz.nthu.edu.tw
**Department of Finance, The Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City
Boulevard, Charlotte, NC 28223-0001
Phone: 704-687-7652, Fax: 704-687-6987
Email: tking3@uncc.edu

I. Introduction
For the past several decades, corporate governance has
been a field that attracts many academic researchers,
practitioners, and policymakers. In the survey paper
by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), corporate governance
is broadly defined as the structure through which
capital suppliers make certain to obtain a fair return on

their investment. From this perspective, corporate
governance consists of mechanisms and structure
through which investors can align the incentives of
managers with their own goals. Current literature
suggests the following categories of governance
controls: (1) corporate governance mechanisms
include external bonding and monitoring by regulatory
and enforcement environment at the country/market
9
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level (Albuquerue and Wang (2008)) and internal
controls such as independent directors on the board,
corporate charters and by-laws, and bank monitors
(Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2005)); and (2)
financial contracting such as debt in capital structure,
executive compensation, and incentive contracts. On
the theoretical front, Albuquerue and Wang (2008) and
Dow, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2005) present
theoretical models on how imperfect corporate control
and agency conflicts affect asset pricing. On the other
hand, there has been an extensive strand of literature
on various governance controls on equity and bond
prices. For example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick
(2003) create a governance index of anti-takeover
defenses and other provisions and find that firms with
a stronger shareholder protection (a lower governance
index) have higher equity and firm values.
In a recent paper, Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007)
highlight the importance of bondholder governance
through the use of bond covenants and present the
interactions between shareholder and bondholder
governance mechanisms. More specifically, they focus
on three bond covenants that are closely related to
takeover defenses: net worth restrictions, leverage
restrictions, and poison puts. Their study is among the
first to show that bondholder governance is an
important element in corporate governance. Cremers,
Nair, and Wei (2007) suggest that bondholder
governance helps mitigates potential conflicts between
shareholders and bondholders and interactions
between shareholder and bondholder governance
affect bond prices. Thus, the net impact of the overall
governance structure (rather than a single element)
consisting of shareholder and bondholder governance
on management decisions and asset prices is an
important issue (King and Wen (2009)). In this paper,
we study bondholder governance mechanisms through
the takeover-related bond covenants and the
characteristics of firms that are more likely to include
these covenants in their bonds. In particular we focus
on poison puts and the triggers associated with the
puts, which are the covenants that are closely related
to takeover defenses. Our goal is to explore
bondholder governance through the use of
takeover-related defenses and to highlight the
importance of bondholder governance in the overall
structure of corporate governance.
Poison puts were introduced as a result of the
waves of corporate restructuring in the mid 1980s.
Poison put is designed to guard the bondholders
against takeovers, buyouts, and other events. Poison
put gives bondholders a right to redeem a bond,
usually at par value, when the takeover provision is
triggered. Triggers are clearly defined in the covenant
and often include leverage and net worth triggers. In
this study, we empirically examine poison puts and
their embedded triggers in U.S. corporate bonds. In
particular, we explore the following issues. First,
Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) show that there exists
evidence of correlation among covenants. We examine
if bonds with poison puts are more likely to be
10

bundled with certain types of covenants for
governance purposes. Due the option to exit, fewer
other covenants may be needed on a bond with a
poison put so as to design an efficient and effective
bondholder governance structure. Studies on
convertible bonds indicate that there are fewer
covenants in convertibles than in straight debt since
conversion option makes the convertible bond a
hybrid investment consisting of a debt and an equity
component. Due to the equity component, fewer
covenants are required to address the agency conflicts
between bondholders and equityholders. Kahan and
Yermack (1998) find that convertible debt issues have
virtually no covenants, suggesting that for high growth
firms the conversion feature is a more effective
contracting mechanism than restrictive covenants in
addressing
stockholder–bondholder
conflicts.
Anderson (1999) finds consistent evidence for
Brazilian debt. Therefore, design of bondholder
governance is an important issue to examine. We find
that poison puts are often bundled with asset sale,
payout, and financing restrictions, which is consistent
with agency theory. Firms with greater free cash
flows (Jensen (1986)) are more likely to over-invest in
negative NPV projects and therefore have higher
agency costs. In addition, firms with a higher credit
risk are more likely to have higher agency costs.
Therefore, to design an effective debt contract,
controls for agency conflicts should be strengthened
for firms with high agency costs that stem from
over-investment, credit risk, and takeover possibilities.
Second, we examine the characteristics of firms
that are more likely to issue bonds with poison puts.
Based on a comprehensive sample, we perform a
cross-sectional analysis of firm characteristics that
lead to the use of poison puts in bondholder
governance. We find that high growth firms, large,
profitable, low-leverage firms are more likely to use
poison puts.
In addition, firms with a higher
percentage of fixed assets have a greater probability to
issue poison put bonds. Free cash flow has a positive
impact on the inclusion of poison puts, which is
consistent with the agency prediction. Our findings on
insider and institutional ownership provide support for
agency explanation.
Third, we examine time series factors that affect
the use of poison puts. We find that bond market and
equity market performance has a significant impact on
the inclusion of poison puts. In particular, poor bond
market performance and good equity market
performance are likely to motivate the incidence of
poison put bond issuance. The better the performance
of bond market is, the less motivated the investors
demand poison put to protect them. On the other hand,
the better the equity market performance, the more
motivated the investors to demand for poison puts. We
also find that the volatility of interest rate and
volatility of bond index returns motivate more issues
of poison put debt. Finally, greater market term and
default premiums promote the use of poison puts.
Several recent studies link bondholder takeover
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defenses, e.g., poison puts, to corporate governance.
For example, Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) examine
the effects of shareholder governance mechanisms on
bondholders. They find that bondholder takeover
defenses reduce the credit risk associated with strong
shareholder governance. They suggest that, without
bond covenants, shareholder governance and
bondholder interests diverge. Hartley and Kendall
(2005) indicate that bondholder demands for poison
puts have increased after buyout deals showing losses
on covenant-free bonds. This trend has recently
extended to the sterling and euro corporate bond
markets. King and Wen (2009) examine how the
overall corporate governance structure consisting of
shareholder governance (measured by anti-takeover
provisions) and bondholder governance (measured by
bond covenants) affect management risk-taking
behavior.
Earlier studies on poison puts focus on the
pricing of these covenants by examining the yield
differentials between bonds with and without poison
puts (Crabbe (1991), Field, Kidwell, and Klein (1994),
and Torabzadeh, Roufagalas, and Woodruff (2000)).
Another strand of studies focus on the effects of
poison puts on shareholder and/or bondholder wealth.
Cook and Easterwood (1994) show that issuance of
poison put bonds affects existing stockholders
negatively and bondholders positively, whereas the
issuance of bonds without such covenants has no
effects. Bae, Klein, and Padmaraj (1994) on the other
hand show that the announcement effects on
shareholders are significantly higher for poison put
debt issuance than for straight debt issuance. They
suggest that firms with greater agency costs of debt
and smaller size would benefit most from poison put
debt issuance and therefore experience higher
abnormal returns at issuance.1 Roth and McDonald
(1999) find that poison puts have a negative impact on
shareholder wealth when management ownership is
low, and that firms with higher free cash flow are
more likely to issue debt containing poison puts.
This study makes the following significant
contributions to the literature. First, we explore an
important, but less-studied, internal controls in
corporate governance, namely, takeover-related debt
covenants. We examine the design of covenants by
showing that poison puts are often bundled with
payout and financing restrictions. Second, we show
the unique set of firm characteristics that motivates the
probability of including a poison put. We use a large
sample over a long time period and find very
interesting implications, which are mostly consistent
1

Bae, Klein, and Padmaraj (1997) examine the relationship
between firm characteristics and the likelihood of event risk
covenants in bond indentures. They suggest that the
likelihood of event risk covenants in bond indentures is
related to the agency costs of debt and the potential for
takeover. However, their results do not support the financial
distress costs hypothesis.

with the agency theory. Third, we show how
macroeconomic factors play a role in determining the
decision for an issuer to include a poison put in the
covenant structure.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section II describes the data sample. Section III
presents the empirical results. Section IV concludes.
II.

Data

In this study, we obtain the sample of bonds from the
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). FISD is the
most comprehensive and publicly available collection
of bond data on publicly offered U.S. Treasury, agency,
and corporate bonds. FISD reports detailed
information on debt issue characteristics, documents
over 50 different types of covenants, and includes
134,755 public issues from 1894 to 2003. Of the
134,755 issues, 5,113 bonds issues have poison puts.
We collect information on the issue and issuer,
including coupon, maturity, credit rating, put schedule,
industry codes, covenant information, and other
characteristics. In addition, we construct an overall
sample of corporate debt representing the population
of the corporate debt issues. To provide a complete
analysis on bonds with poison puts, we present the
poison put sample from the following aspects: bond
basic features, options and seniority, industry groups,
and frequency of issues. Table 1 reports the
descriptive statistics for the sample of 5,113 poison
put bonds issued from 1980 to 2003. In particular, we
present the descriptive statistics of the offering amount,
coupon, and original maturity on the bonds. Table 1
shows that the median offering amount is $160.00
million and median coupon rate is 9.63%. In general,
the debt issues are of intermediate maturity with an
average maturity of 10.00 years. Table 2 shows the
poison put by convertibility, seniority, industry, and
decade respectively. Panel A shows that the vast
majority (81.03%) of poison put bonds are
nonconvertible. In addition, poison put debt is evenly
distributed between senior (45.77%) and senior
secured (44.26%) levels, indicating that most poison
put bonds have the highest seniority level. This
finding provides evidence for the considerations in the
design of debt contracts and bondholder governance.
Panel B of Table 2 presents poison put bonds by
industry. The results show that 89.15% of the poison
put bonds are issued by industrial firms, the most
dominant industry group in the sample. Poison puts
are much less popular in the financial (7.35%) and
utility (3.03%) sectors. The reason may be that agency
conflicts is higher for industries that are not subject to
extensive regulations (industrial group) than for
industries
that
are
(utility
and
finance).
Consequently, the need for bondholders of industrial
firms to include poison puts in bondholder governance
to guard against such risks is great. Panel C of Table 2
presents the sample by decade. The panel shows that
poison put is a much recent invention with the issues
starting in 1985. As discussed earlier, the creation of
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poison puts is motivated by the RJR Nabisco buyout
event and other buyouts in the merger wave at the end
of the 1980s. It is interesting to see that a significant
portion (70.35%) of the poison put bonds is issued in
the 1990s. There also has been a quite active market
(24.83%) for poison debt issues in the early 2000s.
Based on all corporate debt issues from FISD
over the period from 1980 to 2003, we collect firm
characteristics on these corporate issuers from
Compustat. The resulting sample for our
cross-sectional analysis of firm characteristics
contains 12,486 valid firm-year observations.2 If an
issuer issues more than one bonds in a given year, we
summarize across the issues the decision to include a
poison put. If the issuer offers at least one poison put
bond in a given year, we classify this issuer in that
year as issuing poison debt. For the time series
analysis, we use 60,694 bond-year observations, i.e.,
each observation is on a bond-year basis rather than a
firm-year basis. We collect information on interest
rates from the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis
FRED database.
III.
Empirical Results
A.
Bondholder Governance Structure:
Poison Put and Other Covenants
Based on the agency theory of debt, there are potential
conflicts of interests between bondholders and
stockholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers
(1977) provide the pioneering work in this area. In
particular, there are four major sources of conflicts:
dividend payment, claim dilution, asset substitution,
and underinvestment. If the firm consistently pays an
unreasonably large dividend to stockholders, it might
dampen the firm‘s ability to meet its debt payments
and consequently negatively affect the bondholders‘
wealth. If the firm issues additional debt, it would
dilute the claim of the current bondholders. If the
management takes on projects of extremely high risk
after debt issuance, the value of the bonds decreases.
As the inherent risk of the assets increases, the coupon
rate on the debt set prior to the risk-taking behavior is
insufficient to compensate for the risk. In the case of
underinvestment, if accepting certain projects benefits
the bondholders, management may be motivated to
pass up positive net present value projects.
Based on the conflicts of interests between
shareholders and bondholders, and if we assume that
management acts in stockholders‘ interests,
bondholders would require protection against potential
events or actions by the management/shareholders.
Bond covenants in debt contracts are a way to control
these conflicts and reduce agency costs. A bond
covenant is a clause which restricts an issuer from
performing certain actions. Billett, King, and Mauer
2

We exclude 296 firm-year observations for issue in the
1970s from the sample used in earlier versions of this study.
The sample of 12,486 firm-year observations is an updated
sample used in this version.
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(2007) show there exists certain amount of correlation
among various covenants. In addition, Cremers, Nair,
and Wei (2007) suggest that the effects of shareholder
governance mechanisms on bond prices are related to
bondholder takeover defenses such as poison puts.
Thus, one can view bond covenants as an important
internal control. It is interesting to examine if the
poison put covenant is related to other covenants, from
a control design point of view. Covenant bundling
may exist due to firm characteristics for the purpose of
reducing agency costs. In other words, an effective
design of internal controls (i.e., takeover defenses and
other covenants) should include takeover defenses and
other covenants that are mostly related to agency
conflicts. We explore the relation between poison puts
(takeover defenses) and other covenants and provide
explanations from agency theory.
To examine the pattern of covenant bundling, we
perform two analyses. First, we examine the frequency
and percentage of various covenants in the poison put
bond sample. Table 3 presents the results. In particular,
we examine a total of 12 covenants to see if the
inclusion of the covenants relates to poison puts.
Negative pledge is a covenant that limits the issuer to
issue secured debt unless it secures the current issue
on a pari passu basis. Cross default is designed to
activate default in the issue if an event of default has
occurred in any other debt by the same issuer.
Dividends restriction limits payments (and
subsidiaries‘ payments) to shareholders or other
entities. Share repurchase restriction prohibits the
issuer from making payments (other than dividend
payments) to shareholders and other claimholders
using share repurchases or other cash distribution
methods. Indebtedness limits the total indebtedness
of the issuer and subsidiaries. Funded debt prohibits
the issuer and subsidiaries from issuing additional
funded debt. Senior debt issuance limits issuer‘s
ability to issue senior debt. Subordinated debt issuance
limits the issuer‘s ability to issue junior or
subordinated debt. Investments clause prohibits the
issuer from making risky investments. Asset sale
restricts the issuer‘s ability to sell assets or requires
the issuer to use proceeds to redeem the bonds. Sale
and leaseback restricts the issuer and subsidiaries to
the type or amount of property used on a sale
leaseback transaction. Stock issuance limits the
issuer‘s ability to issue additional common stock.
The results show that poison put bonds tend to
have the asset sale clause. In particular, 94.17% of
poison put bonds have an asset sale clause.
According to Billett, King, and Mauer (2007), asset
sale clause is one of the most frequently included
covenants in bonds with 64.50% of their sample
containing such a covenant. The much higher
occurrence of asset sale clause in the poison put
sample (94.17%) than that in the general corporate
bond sample (64.50%) indicates that there is possible
linkage between poison puts and asset sale. We also
observe that poison put debt tend to include covenants
related to indebtedness. Specifically, 71.68% of bonds
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with a poison put have the total indebtedness limit on
the issuer and it subsidiaries, which is much higher
than the percentage in the overall corporate bond
sample (30.4%). In addition, 70.58% of the bonds
with a poison put contain a clause limiting share
repurchases and 67.01% contains a clause limiting
dividends. For comparison, Billett, King, and Mauer
report that the general corporate bond sample has
22.60% with a share repurchase restriction and
27.00% with a dividend restriction. The significantly
higher percentage of poison put bonds containing
indebtedness, share repurchase restriction, and
dividend restriction relative to the general corporate
bond sample suggest that there is an efficient design of
covenants based on characteristics of issuers that
require takeover defenses like poison puts.
Table 3 also shows the Pearson correlation of
poison put and other covenants. The results provide
further confirmation to the results on the frequency
and percentage of covenants in the poison put sample
discussed above. In particular, we find that the
correlation coefficient between poison put and asset
sale is 0.53362. The indebtedness covenant is highly
correlated with poison puts with a correlation
coefficient 0.73093. Poison put is also highly
correlated with the share repurchase restriction
(correlation of 0.77322) and with the dividend
restriction (correlation of 0.76272). The correlation
between poison put and the remaining covenants is
relatively low, with most of the correlation
coefficients well below 0.50.
Overall, the result indicates that a majority of
poison put bonds are issued with an asset sale clause,
indebtedness, share repurchase restriction, and
dividend restriction. The results are consistent with
the agency theory that takeover defenses are bundled
with other covenants to prevent asset substitution. In
addition, takeover defenses are also more likely to be
combined with financing and cash payouts restrictions.
Firms with more growth opportunities (which require
more frequent financing) and/or greater free cash
flows have higher agency costs. Therefore, firms with
higher agency costs tend to issue debt containing
covenants that are designed in an efficient way to
reduce agency costs by including covenants on
financing and payout restrictions. Below we explore
firm characteristics of issuers of poison put bonds to
examine if the issuers have significant agency costs
compared to the other issuers in the corporate sector.
B.
Puts

Firm Characteristics and Poison

In this section, we explore the characteristics of
issuers that are more likely issue bonds with a poison
put. Following Bae, Klein, and Padmaraj (1997), we
examine the firm characteristics that are related to
growth opportunity, firm size, and agency cost. As
the growth opportunity increases, the firm is more
likely to take on riskier projects. Therefore,
bondholders require more protection in bond contracts

to guard such against risk-shifting events. We use
R&D expenditure and market to book ratio to measure
growth opportunity. We expect a positive relation
between R&D expense (or market to book ratio) and
the probability of including a poison put. We also
examine if firm size has an impact on the probability
of including a poison put. Finally, we test if the
inclusion of poison puts is related to the agency costs.
When the agency cost is high, the need to issue bonds
with poison puts in hopes to reduce the agency cost is
greater. We employ free cash flow, insider and
institutional ownership measure the level of agency
costs. In particular, we predict that the higher the
free cash flow, the higher the agency cost. In addition,
we expect that the lower percentage ownership of
insider, the greater the agency cost. Institutional
ownership is considered because institutional investors,
who are major players in the bond markets, usually
provide active monitoring of the issuers. This
monitoring activity is generally considered effective in
reducing agency cost. We expect a negative relation
between institutional ownership and agency cost.
Therefore, we employ the following model to
examine the characteristics of issuers that are more
likely to issue bonds with a poison put,
POISONPUT    1RD (or 1MV _ BV)   2SIZE  3 LEVERAGE   4 FIXA
 5 PROFIT   6 RATE   7 FCF  8 INSIDER  9 INSTITUTION  

(1)
The dependent variable (POISONPUT), a
dummy variable for the poison put covenant, equals
one if the bond includes a poison put covenant and
zero otherwise. As discussed above, we include the
following independent variables.
Research and
development expense (RD) is measured by the
research and development expenses dividing by total
sales. Market to book value ratio (MV_BV) is
measured by market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets, where market value of assets
equals the book value of assets minus book value of
equity plus market value of equity. Market value of
equity equals stock price per share times the number
of shares. Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the total
value of assets in million of dollars. We include
several firm characteristics that are related to capital
structure, fixed assets, and profitability as control
variables. First we include leverage (LEVERAGE)
measured by the book value of total debt divided by
market value of assets, where total debt equals total
long term debt plus debt in current liabilities.
Second, we use the percentage of fixed assets to total
assets (FIXA) and it is calculated by net plant and
property equipment divided by book value of assets.
Lastly, we measure profitability (PROFIT) by the ratio
of EBITA to book value of assets. For time series
effects, we use the level of interest rate to measure the
interest rate environment. Interest rate (RATE) is
measured by the yield on 6-month Treasury bills in
percent. Finally, we include three explanatory
variables to proxy for the level of agency costs as
discussed above. Free cash flow (FCF) is measured
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by the operating income before depreciation adjusted
for income taxes, change in deferred taxed, interest
expense, preferred dividends, and common stock
dividends. Insider ownership (INSIDER) is measured
by the percentage ownership of insiders including top
management and directors. Institution ownership
(INSTITUTION) is measured by the percentage
ownership of institutional investors. We use the
12,486 firm-year observations to perform the
cross-sectional analysis.
Table 4 presents the results of the logistic
regressions linking the inclusion of poison puts to
explanatory variables. We use four models that consist
of various combinations of explanatory variables. In
model 1, we find that R&D expense has a positive but
insignificant effect on the decision to add a poison put.
However, in model 2 through 4, we find that growth
opportunities measured by market to book ratio
(MV_BV) has a negative and significant effect on the
probability of including a poison put option in a bond.
Firms with more growth opportunities are more likely
to issue bonds with poison puts. This is consistent
with the previous prediction: firms with greater
growth opportunities are more likely to face riskier
projects and consequently bondholders would require
protection. Furthermore, across all models the results
suggest that issuers with a larger size (SIZE), lower
leverage (LEVERAGE), higher percentage of fixed
assets (FIXA), and more profitable (PROFIT) are
more likely to include a poison put. Contrary to our
expectations, firms that are considered ―safer‖ as
depicted by the characteristics of firm size, leverage,
fixed assets, and profitability are more likely to issue
poison put debt. This may be due to that large and
reputable firms are more likely to attract demands by
institutional investors to include the takeover defense
covenant. Empirical evidence suggests that large and
profitable firms tend to choose low financial leverage,
which is inconsistent with traditional capital structure
theories. The result on interest rate (RATE) shown in
model 3 and 4 suggests that the level of interest rate
has a negative and significant impact on the decision
to include a poison put. In other words, the lower the
interest rate, the higher the probability of including a
poison put. Lower interest rates can lead to more debt
issues in general and also controls for the buyout
waves. For agency considerations, we find interest
results that are generally consistent with agency theory.
Across all models, we find that free cash flow has a
positive and significant impact on the probability of
poison puts. This finding is consistent with the agency
theory prediction: agency conflicts stemming from
more free cash flows may lead to a greater need to
include a poison put. In addition, the model 4 result on
insider and institutional ownership provides support
for the agency explanation. In particular, insider or
institutional ownership is negatively and significantly
related to the probability of poison puts. In other
words, the lower the insider (or institutional)
ownership, the greater the agency cost and therefore
the higher the probability to include a poison put.
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Therefore, the result suggests that issuers with greater
agency cost are more likely to use poison puts to help
reduce the costs.
The
analysis
suggests
several
issuer
characteristics that are related to the probability of
poison puts on a bond. We find that high growth
firms are more likely to issue bonds with a poison put.
On the other hand, the results suggest that large,
profitable, and low leverage firms are more likely to
include poison puts. In addition, firms with a higher
percentage of fixed assets have a greater probability to
issue bonds embedded with poison puts. Finally, and
most importantly, we find evidence supporting agency
theory for the type of firms that are more likely to
include takeover defenses in their debt. In particular,
firms with a high free cash flow are more likely to
include poison puts in debt issues, which is consistent
with the prediction of agency theory. The negative
relation between inside (or institutional) ownership
and the inclusion of poison puts provides strong and
further support for the agency explanation.
C.
Time Series Factors on the
Decision to Issue Poison Put Bonds
In this section, we study the time series factors on the
decision to issue poison put bonds. We use
macroeconomic factors including bond market index
and volatility, equity market index and volatility,
interest rate level and volatility, slope of the term
structure, and market default risk premium. We use
the level and volatility of broad market indices of debt
and equity to proxy for the performance of these
security markets. For example, bond market index
provide market participants a benchmark for the
performance of the bond market. If the bond market
is performing well, investors have less desire to
require poison puts for protection against the drop in
bond value due to unfavorable events. We also include
the three main variables to describe the term structure
of interest rates: level and volatility of interest rate,
and the slope of yield curve. The structure of interest
rates is an important benchmark for economic
conditions. If the economy is going into a recession,
we would expect that bondholders are more likely to
prefer bonds with poison puts to bonds without. On
the other hand, if the economy is in a boom,
bondholders have less of an incentive demand poison
puts. Furthermore, if the volatility of interest rate is
relatively high, investors are motivated to buy bond
with poison puts to get better protection from market
uncertainty. The slope of the interest rates is included
as a control variable. It may be that future
expectations of interest rates reflected in the slope
have an impact on the decision to include poison puts.
Lastly, we examine if the general level of default risk
and the compensation demanded by the market have
an impact on the inclusion of poison puts. If default
risk premium is high, that means investors in general
are concerned about defaults and consequently are
asking for a higher compensation. Therefore, investors
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have a greater incentive to buy bond with poison puts
to guard against unfavorable credit events (e.g., rating
downgrades). To examine the time series factors that
motivate the issuance of poison put bonds, we use
following model.
POISONPUT    1 BONDINDX  2 VOL _ BINDX   3 EQUITYINDX
  4 VOL _ EINDX   5 RATE   6 VOL _ RATE
  7 TERMPREM  8 DEFAPREM  

(2)
The dependent variable (POISONPUT), a
dummy variable for poison put covenant, equals one if
the bond contains a poison put covenant and zero
otherwise. We include the following macroeconomic
factors as independent variables. Bond index return
(BONDINDX) is measured by the total monthly return
of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index.
Volatility of the bond index return (VOL_BINDX) is
measured by the standard deviation of BONDINDX
during the 12-month period immediately prior to bond
issuance. Equity index return (EQUITYINDX) is
measured by the monthly returns of various equity
indices. We use eight different equity indices
including the S&P500 (value- and equal-weighted),
NASDAQ (value- and equal-weighted), NYSE (valueand equal-weighted), and Amex (value- and
equal-weighted) index. Volatility of equity index
return (VOL_EINDX) is measured by the volatility of
EQUITYINDX during the 12-month period prior to
the issue date. Interest rate (RATE) is measured by
yield on the 6-month Treasury bill. Volatility of
interest rate (VOL_RATE) is measured by the
volatility of RATE during the 12-month period prior
to the issue date. Term premium (TERMPREM) is
measured by difference between the yield on the
10-year Treasury note and the yield on the 6-month
Treasury bill. Finally, default risk premium
(DEFAPREM) is measured by the yield differential
between AAA and BBB corporate bonds. We use the
60,694 bond-year observations to perform the time
series analysis.
We obtain similar results when different equity
indices are used to measure the return on equity index
(EQUITYINDX) and to calculate the volatility of
equity return (VOL_EINDX). Table 5 reports the
result based on the return on the S&P500
value-weighted index. The results suggest several
interesting implications. First, the incidence of poison
puts is negatively and significantly related to bond
index returns (BONDINDX). This result suggests that
issuers tend to include a poison put on its debt issues
when the bond market is performing poorly. Poor
performance of the bond market may convey a higher
risk inherent in bond investments, triggering a greater
demand to protection. To further strengthen our
argument, we find that the incidence of poison puts is
positively and significantly related to volatility of
bond index returns (VOL_BINDX). The more volatile
the bond market performance, the greater the need for
the bondholders to demand protection on the bonds.
For equity market variables, we find that the

equity index return (EQUITYINDX) has a positive
impact on the incidence of poison puts. The volatility
of equity index returns (VOL_EINDX), on the other
hand, does not have a significant effect. These
findings suggest that issuers are more likely to issue
poison put debt when the equity market is performing
well. The activities in the equity market may link to
the likely events in the market for corporate control
and therefore the inclusion of a poison put on debt
issues.
For term structure variables, we find that the
level of interest rate (RATE) has a negative effect on
the inclusion of poison puts. However, the parameter
estimate is not significantly different from zero. The
level of interest rate has been declining from the
mid-1980s where the buyout wave started to the late
1990s. Using the Treasury 5-year constant maturity
rates as a benchmark, the rate averages from 8.47%
during 1985-1989 to 6.75% in 1990-1994.3 It may be
that during the higher interest rate environment, the
need to include a poison put is less due to the higher
borrowing cost in the market for corporate control. It
is interesting to note that the volatility of interest rates
(VOL_RATE) has a significant and positive impact on
the incidence of poison puts. The term premium
(TERMPREM), on the other hand, has a positive and
significant effect. The results suggest that the
volatility of interest rates may motivate the demand to
include poison puts whereas the term premium has a
similar, but weaker, effect on the inclusion of poison
puts. Lastly, consistent with our expectation, default
premium (DEFAPREM) has a positive and significant
impact on the inclusion of poison puts. This result
suggests that general market sentiments toward default
risk, which is reflected in default risk premium,
promote the incentives for the use of poison puts.
Overall, we find that bond market and equity
market performance has a significant impact on the
inclusion of poison puts. In particular, poor bond
market performance and good equity market
performance are likely to motivate the incidence of
poison put bond issuance. The better the performance
of bond market is, the less motivated the investors
demand poison put to protect them. On the other
hand, the better the equity market performance, the
more motivated the investors to demand for poison
puts. Market volatility also has a positive and
significant impact on the inclusion of poison puts:
volatility of interest rate and volatility of bond index
returns motivate the use of poison puts. Finally, term
and default premiums promote the inclusion of poison
puts, protecting bondholders from interest rate and
credit risks.
IV.

Conclusion

As Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) point out the
importance of bondholder governance through the use
3

5-year Treasury constant maturity rates are obtained from
the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis FRED database.
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of bond covenants and the interactions between
shareholder and bondholder governance mechanisms,
the role of bondholder governance in corporate
governance is highlighted. Therefore, how the overall
governance structure consisting of shareholder and
bondholder governance (or investor protection) affects
management decisions and asset prices is an important
issue (King and Wen (2009)). In this paper, we study
bondholder governance mechanisms through the
takeover-related
bond
covenants
and
the
characteristics of firms that are more likely to include
these covenants in their bonds. In particular, we focus
on poison puts and the triggers associated with the
puts, which are the covenants that are closely related
to takeover defenses. We examine bondholder
governance through the use of takeover-related
defenses and emphasize the importance of bondholder
governance in the overall structure of corporate
governance.
In this study, we empirically examine poison puts
in U.S. corporate bonds. We present the following
interesting implications. First, we examine if bonds
with poison puts are more likely to be bundled with a
given set of covenants for governance purposes. Due
the option to exit and the characteristics of issuers,
certain covenant(s) may be included on a bond with a
poison put so as to design an effective bondholder
governance structure. We find that poison puts are
often bundled with asset sale, payout, and financing
restrictions, which is consistent with agency theory.
Firms with greater free cash flows (Jensen (1986)) are
more likely to over-invest in negative NPV projects
and therefore have higher agency costs. In addition,
firms with a higher credit risk are more likely to have
higher agency costs. The results suggest that, to design
an effective debt contract, controls for agency
conflicts are strengthened for firms with high agency
costs that stem from over-investment, credit risk, and
takeover possibilities.
Second, we examine characteristics of issuers
that are more likely to issue bonds with poison puts.
We perform a cross-sectional analysis of firm
characteristics that lead to the use of poison puts in
bondholder governance. We find that high growth
firms, large, profitable, low-leverage firms are more
likely to use poison puts. In addition, firms with a
higher percentage of fixed assets have a greater
probability to issue poison put bonds. Our findings on
free cash flow, insider and institutional ownership
provide support for agency explanation.
Lastly, we examine time series factors that affect
the use of poison puts. We find that poor bond market
performance and good equity market performance are
likely to motivate the incidence of poison put bond
issuance. We also find that the volatility of interest
rate and volatility of bond index returns motivate more
issues of poison put debt. Finally, greater market term
and default premiums promote the use of poison puts.
The structure of bondholder governance (or
protection) is an important area of study in corporate
governance. However, so far it has received limited
16

attention in the literature. Our study, following
Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) and Billett, King, and
Mauer (2007), provides findings that further
understanding of bondholder protection and its design.
Future research is needed to study the interactions
among bondholder, shareholder protection, and other
elements of corporate governance.
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Appendices
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Poison Put Bonds
The table presents the descriptive statistics on offering amount, coupon rate, and original maturity for the 5,113
bonds with poison puts. Stdev denotes the standard deviation of variable, Q1 is the first quartile, and Q3 is the
third quartile. Offering amount is presented in $ million, coupon rate in percent, and original maturity in years.

Bond Characteristics

Mean

Offering Amount ($million)
Coupon (%)
Maturity (year)

237.29
8.83
8.53

Poison Put Bonds (n=5,113)
Median
Max
Min
160.00
9.63
10.00

5,442.08
19.75
35.00

1.00
0.00
1.00

Stdev

Q1

Q3

282.07

100.00

275.00

3.51
2.04

7.50
7.00

11.00
10.00

Table 2. Poison Put Bonds by Convertibility, Seniority, Industry, and Decade
The table presents the frequency and percentage of 5,113 poison put bonds by convertibility, seniority, industry,
and decade.
Panel A. By Conversion and Seniority
No. of Bonds
970
4,143

% of Total No.
18.97%
81.03%

By Seniority
Senior Secured
Senior
Senior Subordinate

2263
2340
427

44.26%
45.77%
8.35%

Subordinate/Junior
Not Specified

25
58

0.49%
1.13%

By Conversion Option
Convertible
Nonconvertible
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Panel B. By Industry
Industry

No. of Bonds

% of Total No.

Industrial

4,558

89.15%

Financial

376

7.35%

Utility

155

3.03%

Miscellaneous

24

0.47%

5,113

100.00%

Total

Panel C. By Decade
Year

18

No. of Bonds

% of Total No.

1985-1989

246

4.81%

1990-1999

3,597

70.35%

2000-2003

1,270

24.84%

Total

5,113

100.00%
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Table 3. Poison Put Provision and Other Covenants
This table examines the frequency and percentage of various covenants in the 5,113 poison put bonds. We include a total of 12 covenants.
Negative pledge is a covenant that limits the issuer to issue secured debt unless it secures the current issue on a pari passu basis. Cross default
is designed to activate default in the issue if an event of default has occurred in any other debt by the same issuer. Dividends restriction limits
payments to shareholders or other entities. Share repurchase restriction prohibits the issuer from making payments (other than dividend
payments) to shareholders and other claimholders using share repurchases or other cash distribution methods. Indebtedness limits the total
indebtedness of the issuer. Funded debt prohibits the issuer from issuing additional funded debt. Senior debt issuance limits issuer‘s ability to
issue senior debt. Subordinated debt issuance limits the issuer‘s ability to issue junior or subordinated debt. Investments clause prohibits the
issuer from making risky investments. Asset sale restricts the issuer‘s ability to sell assets or requires the issuer to use proceeds to redeem the
bonds. Sale and leaseback restricts the issuer to the type or amount of property used on a sale leaseback transaction. Stock issuance restriction
limits the issuer‘s ability to issue additional common stock.

Table 4. Issuer Characteristics of Firms issuing Poison Put Bonds
The table reports the results of the logistic regression of the probability of including a poison put on its cross-sectional determinants. The
sample includes 12,486 firm-year observations that contained valid firm information from Compustat and issued from 1980 to 2003. The
dependent variable (POISONPUT) is a dummy variable for poison put covenant, equals one if the bond contains a poison put covenant and
zero otherwise. We include the following independent variables. Research and development expense (RD) is measured by the research and
development expenses dividing by total sales. Market to book value ratio (MV_BV) is measured by market value of assets divided by the
book value of assets, where market value of assets equals the book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity.
Market value of equity equals stock price per share times the number of shares. Leverage (LEVERAGE) is measured by the book value of
total debt divided by market value of assets, where total debt equals total long term debt plus debt in current liabilities. Fixed assets (FIXA) is
measured by net plant and property equipment divided by the book value of assets. Profitability (PROFIT) is measured by EBITA divided by
the book value of assets. Interest rate (RATE) is measured by the yield on 6-month Treasury bills in percent. Free cash flow (FCF) is
measured by the operating income before depreciation adjusted for income taxes, change in deferred taxed, interest expense, preferred
dividends, and common stock dividends. Insider ownership (INSIDER) is measured by the percentage ownership of insiders including top
management and directors. Institution ownership (INSTITUTION) is measured by the percentage ownership of institutional investors.
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Table 5. Time Series Analysis of the likelihood of Issuing Poison Put Bonds
The table reports the regression results of the probability of including a poison put and various time series factors. The sample includes 60,694
bond-year observations from 1980 to 2003. The dependent variable (POISONPUT) is a dummy variable for poison put covenant, equals one
if the bond contains a poison put covenant and zero otherwise. We include the following macroeconomic factors as independent variables.
Bond index return (BONDINDX) is measured by the total monthly return of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index. Volatility of the
bond index return (VOL_BINDX) is measured by the standard deviation of BONDINDX during the 12-month period immediately prior to
bond issuance. Equity index return (EQUITYINDX) is measured by the monthly returns of various equity indices. We use eight different
equity indices including the S&P500 (value- and equal-weighted), NASDAQ (value- and equal-weighted), NYSE (value- and
equal-weighted), and Amex (value- and equal-weighted) index. Volatility of equity index return (VOL_EINDX) is measured by the volatility
of EQUITYINDX during the 12-month period prior to the issue date. Interest rate (RATE) is measured by yield on the 6-month Treasury
bill. Volatility of interest rate (VOL_RATE) is measured by the volatility of RATE during the 12-month period prior to the issue date. Term
premium (TERMPREM) is measured by difference between the yield on the 10-year Treasury note and the yield on the 6-month Treasury bill.
Default risk premium (DEFAPREM) is measured by yield difference between AAA and BBB corporate bonds.
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Abstract
We examine the determinants and implications of Chinese corporate cash holdings in the 1993- 2006
period. Agency theories assert that firms with a large controlling shareholder have relatively large cash
holdings because of the greater ability of the controlling shareholder to extract private benefits from the
cash holdings. Our findings show a very strong inverse relationship between cash holdings and firm
valuation in high government ownership firms. Also, we find that in firms with high government
ownership, dividend payouts are highly valued. We conclude that Chinese investors see government
ownership as a factor that reduces firm value. They prefer relatively higher dividends from firms having
high government ownership. Conversely, investors assign much higher value to firms with relatively
low government ownership and they tend to be neutral about the dividends payouts of such firms. Also,
investors value highly the presence of foreign investors in Chinese firms and tend to be neutral about
dividend payouts of firms with high foreign ownership concentration.
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Introduction
The cash holding decision is a prominent theme in the
agency relationships between shareholders and
managers (Jensen, 1986). According to the agency
theory, controlling shareholders should focus on
increasing shareholders‘ wealth rather than taking
advantage of the minority shareholders. However,
when corporate governance circumstances are poor
within a firm, controlling shareholders can derive
substantial private benefits at the expense of minority
shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Nenova,
2003).
There are restively few accurate estimates of the
magnitude of private benefits obtained by controlling
shareholders. All of the evidence concerning this point
is indirect and is based on the assumption that
minority shareholders are better protected when
private benefits of control are curbed and financial
development is enhanced (La Porta et al., 1997).
Liquid assets can be converted into private
benefits at lower cost than other assets, since it will be
easy to use cash in non-value enhancing ways (Myers
and Rajan, 1998). It stands to reason that controlling
shareholders would tend to overinvest in liquid assets
(Dittmar et al., 2003; Kalcheva and Lins, 2004 and
Pinkowitz et al., 2006). If controlling shareholders do
not maximize firm value and hold more liquid assets

in countries in which it is easier to appropriate such
private benefits, then minority shareholders should
value liquid assets in those countries less than they do
in countries where it is more difficult for controlling
shareholders to do so (Pinkowitz et al., 2006). If
investors discount the value of cash holdings because
they expect controlling shareholders to partly consume
such holdings as private benefits, then they value
dividends in that country at a premium (Pinkowitz et
al., 2006).
Ownership of most listed companies in China is
heavily concentrated in government hands (Xu and
Wang, 1999). The Chinese government is usually the
controlling shareholder. Thus, being a large majority
shareholder in Chinese firms, the government can use
its controlling position to dictate its own agenda on
firm‘s managers. Cash holdings in Chinese firms
become a very important factor for the future
profitability of the firm, since Chinese financial
regulations require that firms raising capital from
outside sources (mainly by issuing new stock) need to
maintain a certain level of return on equity (ROE)
over the past three year period (Wang et al., 2006), it
would be easier for the firm to invest its own cash in
profitable projects without requiring to raise new
capital by selling new stock. However, cash can be
used also to serve the needs of the controlling
shareholder in non-value enhancing manners for the
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firm; examples include over-employment, acquisition
of other firms for no reasons, investment in
non-profitable assets, etc.
In this paper, we investigate 1) how agency
problems affect the level of cash holdings in listed
Chinese companies; 2) The effect of Chinese
corporate governance, in particular the presence of
majority government ownership, on investor valuation
of cash and dividends. To measure agency problems,
we use multiple governance measures of ownership
concentration (managerial ownership, government
ownership, institutional holdings, and percentage of
foreign shareholders). In addition, we investigate the
impact of Chinese ROE regulatory requirement on
cash holdings of Chinese firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 is the literature review of previous
studies related to equity offerings. Section 3 discusses
the regulatory characteristics of the Chinese market.
Section 4 covers the empirical hypotheses to be tested
in the paper. Section 5 reports the empirical results.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
The free cash flow hypothesis asserts that shareholders
will want to limit managers‘ access to free cash flow
in order to reduce agency conflicts over its use (Jensen,
1986 and Stulz, 1990). The primary tradeoff is
providing sufficient internal capital for managers to
efficiently fund all good projects, while not providing
excess internal capital which would allow managers to
fund projects and do perquisite consumption
benefitting managers to the detriment of shareholders.
If control is lacking, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
convince self-interested managers to allow cash
reserves to flow as benefits to shareholders.
Previous studies on cash reserves in the U.S.
provide mixed evidence about the impact of large cash
reserves on shareholders. Managers may hold cash as
part of a precautionary motive (Opler et al., 1999).
Similarly, Mikkelson and Partch (2003) find that large
cash holdings may enhance firm value; do not cause
poor performance and conflict of interests between
managers and shareholders. Alternatively, Harford
(1999) concludes that cash-rich firms are more likely
to make value-decreasing acquisitions. Dittmar and
Mahrt-Smith (2006) find that shareholders assign
lower value to cash reserves when it is likely that
significant agency problems will be present at the
firm.
Faleye (2004) finds that the presence of
significant excess cash reserves is more likely to lead
to proxy contests which subsequently result in
executive turnover followed by cash distributions to
shareholders. This evidence suggests that there is a
strong incentive for managers to avoid accumulations
of large reserve excess cash.
Dittmar, et al. (2003) find in a several-country
comparison that firms hold less cash in countries
where shareholders rights are greater and where there
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are relatively higher developed external capital
markets. This reflects the motivation of shareholders
to reduce the cash reserves subject to managerial
control when they have the power to do so. In
countries with low investor protection, it has been
found that minority shareholders value cash holdings
less (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2004). This is
consistent with the hypothesis that poor shareholder
protection enables management and controlling
shareholders to appropriate cash holdings for their
private benefit at the expense of minority shareholders.
Lins and Kalcheva (2004) study how country-level
investor protection affects cash holdings. They find
that firms with relatively weak shareholder rights hold
more cash which reinforces the thought that such
increased cash holdings can be abused by managers
and/or controlling shareholders.
Review of Chinese Stock Market
Regulations
Regulations on equity financing have continuously
changed since the Chinese stock markets were created
in the early 1990s. In December 1993, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued its
first regulatory document on rights offerings. Firms in
need of external financing could do so only by
employing the rights offering method. This meant that
firms in need of external financing gave their existing
shareholders the right to subscribe in the new equity
issue. Initially, in order to meet the rights offering
requirements, firms had to be profitable for two
consecutive years and could not have offered rights in
the past twelve months.
In 1994, the CSRC
increased the ROE requirement for rights offerings by
requiring that only firms with an average ROE of ten
percent or higher for the past three consecutive years
were qualified for rights offerings.
The ROE requirements set forth by the SRC may
provide incentives to firms to stockpile internally
generated cash in order to finance future investments.
Hypothesis Development
According to LaPorta et al. (1999), firms controlled by
large shareholders can encounter agency problems
which pit the controlling shareholder against other
minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder
attempts to maximize his welfare by influencing the
decision of management. When the controlling
shareholder‘s interests are perfectly aligned with the
interests of outside investors, then the outside
investors benefit when the controlling shareholder
takes actions which maximizes his welfare. However,
when the interests of the controlling shareholder and
outside investors are not perfectly aligned, then
agency problems arise causing the controlling
shareholder to maximize his welfare while at the same
time harming the interests of outside investors. The
benefits that the controlling shareholder extracts at the
expense of other investors are referred to as the private
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benefits of control. The level of such benefits is in
large part dependent on how well the interests of
outside investors are protected in the firm‘s country. It
should be noted that as a controlling shareholder
obtains more private benefits, the outside investors‘
assessment of firm value falls.
In China, the government is the large controlling
shareholder in large number of Chinese firms, thus we
hypothesize the following:
H1: The higher the level of government
ownership in firms, the lower the firm value since the
government will try to extract private benefits of
control based on its relatively large ownership of
firms.
In a world of perfect financial markets and no
contracting costs, firms invest in all available positive
net present value projects. They pay out the funds they
cannot invest in such projects to shareholders. Funds
paid to shareholders are funds that controlling
shareholders cannot employ to further their own self
interests. Controlling shareholders would alternatively
use these distributed funds to increase their own
personal wealth or to improve their controlling
position in the firm. Thus, controlling shareholders
prefer to keep funds in liquid assets because liquid
assets can more readily be converted to private benefit
of control. Liquid assets can immediately be invested
in projects that provide personal benefit to controlling
shareholders. As Myers and Rajan (1998) point out, it
is easier to make cash disappear than to make a plant
disappear. Therefore, we propose the following
hypothesis:
H2: The higher the degree of government
ownership in Chinese firms, the higher the likelihood
of holding relatively higher levels of cash.
According to LaPorta et al., (2000b) firms
experience greater pressure to pay dividends in
countries providing poor investor protection because
firm resources are more likely to be subject to
controlling shareholders‘ private benefit expectation.
In firms in a country with poor investor protection,
shareholders gain when the firm pays out liquid assets
in the form of dividends because such dividends can
then be invested at a rate outside the firm which will
be higher than the rate of return on the liquid assets
invested inside the firm. This is due to the fact that the
rate of return on assets invested inside the firm is
reduced when the controlling shareholder extracts part
of such assets in the form of private benefits of control.
From here, we hypothesize:
H3: Higher dividends payout will have positive
impact on firm value.
Data and Methodology
The sample of firms used in this study is comprised of
all the Chinese firms present in the CSMAR database
during the period 1993-2006. In our sample, we
excluded financial sector firms (banks, insurance
companies, etc.) since their cash policies and
accounting procedures differ from that of other

industrial sectors. The sample consists of 1164 firms
over a 14 year time span.
In order to investigate whether liquid assets are
valued more in firms with lower government
concentration or with higher concentration of foreign
ownership, and whether dividends are valued more, a
regression model is needed that reflects the
relationship between firm value and firm
characteristics. Fama and French (1998) develop a
valuation regression that performs well under different
testing procedures. This model is ad hoc in that it does
not specify a functional form resulting directly from a
theoretical model; however, it is well suited for our
purpose because it explains well cross-sectional
variation in firm values.
The basic regression
specification is as follows:
Vi ,t    1 Ei ,t   2 dEi ,t  3 dEi ,t 1   4 dNAi ,t  5 dNAi ,t 1   6 RDi ,t  7 dRDi ,t
 8 dRDi ,t 1  9 I i ,t  10 dI i ,t  11dI i ,t 1  12 Di ,t 
13dDi ,t  14 dDi ,t 1  15 dVi ,t 1  16 dLi ,t  17 dLi ,t 1   i ,t

(1)
Where, Xt is the level of variable X in year t divided
by the level of assets in year t; dXt is the change in the
level of X from year t − 1 to year t, Xt − Xt−1, divided
by assets in year t; dXt+1 is the change in the level of X
from year t to year t+1, Xt+1 − Xt, divided by assets in
year t; V is the market value of the firm as the sum of
the market value of equity, the book value of
short-term debt, and the book value of long-term debt;
E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest,
deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits; NA is
net assets defined as total assets minus liquid assets
and L corresponds to liquid asset holdings; RD is
research and development (R&D) expense I is interest
expense; and D is dividends defined as common
dividends paid. When R&D is missing, we set it equal
to zero.
We expect the change in liquid asset holdings to
contribute less to firm value in high government
ownership firms, so that β16 should be lower in the
subsample of such firms. Also, we expect the change
in dividends to have a positive impact on firm value in
high government ownership firms since higher
dividend payout ratios will result in less cash holdings.
This means that the Chinese government, as
controlling shareholder, will receive less private
benefits of control.
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the sample are contained
in Table 1 including the mean, median, standard
deviations of all the different variables used in the
study. The cash holdings variable, the primary variable
in the study, has a mean of 18.7%, a median of 14.2%
with a standard deviation of 9.4%. The sample has
little skewness. Government ownership is 21.4%
while insiders own an average of 2.8% of the
outstanding shares. The government ownership
variable is highly skewed because some of the
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Chinese listed companies have high government
ownership while others have very little. The board
independence variable reflects a mean of 54.7% and a
median of 81.4%. The average firm in the sample has
sales of approximately $4 billion Yuan; assets of
approximately $4.7 billion Yuan; a leverage ratio of
21.7%; market to book ratio of approximately 2.64;
cash flows to assets of approximately 17%; capital
expenditures to assets of about 5.1%; and acquisition
to assets of approximately 1.8%. The percentage of
revenue devoted to R&D is about 1.7% and the
percentage of the working capital from the total assets
is approximately 7.1%. The percentage of firms‘
shares owned by foreign investors has a mean of
11.7%. This variable is skewed since the median value
of foreign ownership percentage is 40.5%. In our
sample, the firms have a relatively low payout ratio
which is 2% on average. The average earnings per
share ratio is 2.6%.
Table 1 about here
Table 2 contains the correlation coefficients
between cash holdings, governance proxies, and firm
size. Cash holding is positively related to government
ownership and the companies‘ assets. Cash holding is
negatively related to insider ownership and board
independence. Insider ownership is negatively related
to government ownership while it is positively related
to board independence and firm size. Overall, a more
independent board, with higher insider ownership
tends to have lower cash holdings. High government
ownership firms tend to have low independence and
high cash holdings.
Table 2 about here
Multivariate Regression Analysis
Our study examines the relation between cash
holdings and various controls for firm specific
variables in a multivariate setting using cross-sectional
regressions. The dependent variable is cash holdings,
i.e. the log of cash to assets ratio. The independent
variables are governance-related variables and firm
specific factors affecting cash holdings. The
regression coefficients of the different variables
address the predictions of our hypotheses relating
governance to cash ratios.
Table 3 about here
Models 1 through 3 of Table 3 provide the
analysis of the relation between corporate cash
holdings and governance/company specific variables.
The results in Models 1 and 3 suggest that the
government ownership is positively and significantly
related to cash holdings. Higher government
ownership leads to larger corporate cash holdings.
Also, there is a negative relationship between the
board independence variable and the cash holdings
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which is consistent with our hypotheses; firms with
more independent board tend to hold less cash. The
results in Model 2 suggest that the firms with higher
future investments opportunities and lower cash flow
volatility tend to have higher cash holdings. We do not
find any significant relationship between the firm‘s
ROE level and its cash holdings, thus suggesting that
the regulatory requirement is not an important factor
in determining the level of cash holdings in Chinese
firms.
Table 4 about here
In Table 4, we examine the impact of corporate
governance variables and firm specific variables on
the firm valuation using multivariate cross-sectional
regressions. In all three models, the value of the firm
is defined as the sum of the market value of equity, the
book value of short-term debt, and the book value of
long-term debt. The results show that government
ownership has a negative effect on firm value;
investors value firms with high government ownership
levels at lower rates than firms with low government
ownership levels. The payout ratio has a positive
effect on firm valuation; investors‘ value firms higher
when the payout ratio in those firms is higher than
average. On the other hand, investors value firms
lower when the payout ratio in those firms are lower
than average. Both results are consistent with our
hypotheses. Also, we find a significant positive
relationship between the board independence variable
and firm valuation which is also consistent with our
hypotheses. The Model 2 results suggest that firms
with higher future investment opportunities and lower
cash flow volatility tend to have higher values. Finally,
we do not find any significant relationship between
the firm‘s ROE level and the firm value. This suggests
that regulatory impact is not as important as firm
specific variables in determining Chinese firm value.
Market Value of Cash Holdings
To further test our hypotheses and provide more
robust results, we estimate the regression model given
by equation (1). We deflate all variables by total assets
to control for heteroskedasticity. We follow Fama and
French (1998) and estimate equation (1) using
Fama–MacBeth (1973) regressions.
Table 5 shows our regression estimates based on
the Fama and French (1998) model. We use two
subsamples with the first divided by the government
ownership concentration. The 35% median value of
government ownership is the dividing point of the two
samples due to the large degree of skewness present in
the data. The second subsample is divided by the level
of foreign investors in Chinese firms. The median
value of 40% is employed as the dividing point.
Table 5 about here
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We find that cash contributes significantly more
to the firm value in firms with lower government
ownership and higher foreign investor concentration.
Our regression allows us to isolate the impact of a
change in cash holdings while keeping all other
variables in the regression unchanged. Consequently,
we can evaluate the impact of an increase in cash that
brings about an increase in total assets by the same
amount as opposed to an exchange of fixed assets for
cash. In high government concentration firms, a one
Yuan increase in cash holdings results in an increase in
firm value of 0.18 Yuan. In low government
concentration firms, a one Yuan increase in cash
holdings results in an increase of 0.86 Yuan. We find
that a one Yuan increase in non-cash assets is
associated with an increase of 0.34 Yuan in firm value
in high government ownership firms while the same
increase in the non-cash assets results in an increase of
0.68 Yuan in firm value for low government
ownership firms. The regression is consistent with a
greater discount for cash than for fixed assets for firms
with high levels of government concentration. A 1
Yuan of cash contributes 0.70 Yuan less to firm value
for high government ownership firms while a 1 Yuan
of fixed assets contributes 0.34 Yuan less. The
regression provides no evidence that earnings are
valued more in low government ownership firms.
The second regression reported in Table 5
divides the subsamples by utilizing the percentage of
foreign investors out of the total number of investors.
The results show that firms with relatively more
foreign investors show a stronger relationship between
changes in cash and firm value. We find that an
additional 1 Yuan of cash accumulated over the most
recent year results in a 0.21 Yuan change in firm value
for firms with low foreign investor concentration. The
same 1 Yuan change in cash accumulated over the
most recent year results in a change of 0.91 Yuan in
firms with high foreign investor concentration. Thus
we conclude that increases in other assets are
discounted less in countries with poor investor
protection than are increases in cash. However, in
contrast to the regression that uses the government
ownership, firms with higher foreign ownership are
valued more regardless of firm characteristics. In sum,
the two regressions displayed in Table 5 strongly
support hypotheses 1 and 2. Further, both regressions
in Table 5 support hypothesis 3. If cash is valued less
in high government ownership firms, we would expect
payouts to be worth more. In the regression utilizing
government ownership as the criterion, high
government concentration firms had a dividend payout
of 7.95 while low government concentration firms had
a dividend payout of only 3.44. The difference
between the two coefficients is significant at better
than the 1% level. In the regression using foreign
ownership concentration the dividend payout for low
foreign investor firms is 10.23 and only 5.12 for high
foreign investor firms.

Conclusions
In this paper, we examine factors affecting the cash
holdings of Chinese firms. We also examine the effect
of the Chinese government in its role as majority
stockholder, on private benefit extraction in firms it
controls and the effect such extraction has on firm
valuation. We test three main hypotheses. First,
minority shareholders value cash holdings less in high
government ownership firms. Second, high
government ownership negatively affects the firm
value. Third, minority shareholders value dividends
more in high government ownership firms. In order to
test for robustness, we also employed the foreign
investor concentration variable in testing hypothesis 3.
All three hypotheses are grounded in agency theories
that state that controlling shareholders will extract
more private benefits from firms they control if
investor protection is weak. Our results strongly
support all three hypotheses. We find that high
government ownership negatively affects firm value.
Investors discount the value of cash holdings in high
government ownership firms and prefer instead to
receive larger dividend payouts from those firms.
Conversely, investors assign higher value to cash
holdings in low government ownership firms and do
not prefer large dividend payouts when compared to
high government ownership firms. We also find
similar effect for the presence of foreign ownership
concentration in Chinese firms. Investors discount the
value of cash holdings firms with low foreign
ownership concentration and instead prefer to receive
larger dividend payouts from those firms. Conversely,
investors assign higher value to cash holdings in high
foreign ownership concentrated firms and do not
prefer larger dividends when compared to low foreign
ownership concentrated firms.
Overall, our results indicate a strong inverse
relationship between firm value and government
ownership concentration in Chinese firms. Also, our
results indicate that investors do not think that the
presence of large cash holdings in high government
concentrated firms will have positive impact on the
firm‘s future profitability, thus they require higher
dividend payouts from such firms. Our paper sheds
light on one of the most important aspects of corporate
governance i.e. the impact of government ownership
on firm valuation and its effect on minority
shareholders.
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Appendices
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table provides summary statistics for the sample. The dataset comprises 1164 firms covering the period from 1993 to
2006. The descriptive statistics include: ratio of cash to assets (Cash Holdings), equity ownership of the top five officers
(Inside Ownership), government ownership, ratio of independent directors on the board to total directors (Board
Independence, non-government representative), sales, total assets, firm leverage (Leverage), ratio of the market value to book
value of assets (Market-to-Book), ratio of cash flow to net assets (CF/Assets), ratio of net working capital to net assets
(Working Capital/Assets), standard deviation of cash flows for the past five years (CF Volatility), ratio of research and
development to sales (R&D/Sales), ratio of capital expenditures to net assets (CapEx/Assets), and ratio of acquisition to sales
(Acquisition/Sales), the percentage of the dividends distributed to the shareholders (Payout ratio), earnings before
extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits and investment credits (Earnings), the total assets minus cash (Net
assets), the interest expense, and percentage of foreign investors in the company (Foreign).
Mean
0.187
0.028
0.214
0.547
3,987
4,748
0.217
2.64
0.172
0.071
0.087
0.017
0.051
0.018
0.019
0.026
3,861
156
0.117

Cash Holdings
Inside Ownership
Government Ownership
Board Independence
Sales (Millions of Yuan)
Assets (Millions of Yuan)
Leverage
Market-to-Book
Cash Flow/Assets
Working Capital/Assets
CF Volatility
R&D/Sales
CapEX/Assets
Acquisition/Sales
Payout Ratio
Earnings
Net Assets
Interest Expense
Foreign

Median
0.142
0.351
0.351
0.814
1,587
1,684
0.197
1.95
0.157
0.057
0.062
0.001
0.048
0.001
0.030
0.036
2,917
67
0.405

Standard Deviation
0.094
1.681
2.374
0.184
11,471
15,369
0.157
1.32
0.145
0.139
0.041
0.127
0.042
0.043
0.034
1.136
10,524
127.34
2.361

Table 2. Correlations
This table provides data on the correlations between cash holdings, governance variables, and firm size. The dataset comprises
1164 firms covering the period from 1993 to 2006.
Cash Holdings

Inside Ownership

Inside Ownership
-0.141**
Government Ownership
0.214***
-0.028*
Board Independence
-0.057**
0.374**
Assets (Millions of YUAN)
0.236*
0.196**
*, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

Government
Ownership

-0.518***
-0.174*

Board Independence

0.241**
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Table 3. Regression Analysis – Cash Holdings
This table provides regression results of the determinants of cash holdings; three different specifications are used, the first
using only governance variables as the independent variables, the second using accounting variables, and the third using both
governance and accounting variables.
Cash Holdings
Intercept
0.069
Inside Ownership
0.014*
Government Ownership
0.041***
Board Independence
-0.015*
Sales (Millions of Yuan)
Net Assets (Millions of Yuan)
0.171***
Leverage
Market-to-Book
Cash Flow/Assets
Working Capital/Assets
CF Volatility
R&D/Sales
CapEX/Assets
Acquisition/Sales
ROE
Payout Ratio
*, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

Cash Holdings
0.051

0.185
0.0168**
-0.145*
0.251
0.051**
0.041*
-0.019**
0.0174
0.0185*
0.0391
-0.015
-0.271**

Cash Holdings
0.084
0.011*
0.032***
-0.021
0.019
0.0145**
-0.095*
0.341
0.044*
0.032*
-0.022**
0.084
0.036*
0.0486
-0.024
-0.317**

Table 4. Regression Analysis – Firm Value
This table provides regression results of the determinants of the firm value; three different specifications are used, the first
using only governance variables as the independent variables, the second using accounting variables, and the third using both
governance and company specific variables. The firm value is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of
debt.
Firm Value
Intercept
0.374
Inside Ownership
-0.250**
Government Ownership
-0.687***
Board Independence
0.269**
Sales (Millions of Yuan)
Net Assets (Millions of Yuan)
0.374**
Leverage
Market-to-Book
Cash Flow/Assets
Working Capital/Assets
CF Volatility
R&D/Sales
CapEX/Assets
Acquisition/Sales
ROE
Payout Ratio
*, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.

28

Firm Value
0.514

0.748
0.359**
-0.276*
0.354**
0.036**
0.011*
-0.344**
0.251
0.289
0.151
0.514
0.415***

Firm Value
0.611
-0.315**
-0.487***
0.614**

0.571***

0.817
0.698***
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Table 5. Fama and MacBeth (1973) Regressions
This table presents the regressions of firm value using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. Regressions are estimated
independently for each subsample. The firm value is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. The
firm value is found for two samples: government ownership concentration and foreign ownership percentage – government
ownership sample being divided by the median value of 35%; above 35% is high government ownership, below 35% is low
government ownership; foreign ownership being divided by the median value of 40%; above 40% is high foreign ownership
while below 40% is low foreign ownership.
High Government
Intercept

Et
dEt
dEt 1

dNAt
dNAt 1
RDt

dRDt
dRDt 1
It

dI t
dI t 1
Dt

dDt
dDt 1
dVt 1
dLt

dLt 1

0.81
(0.041)
2.36
(0.517)
-0.69
(0.421)
1.21
(0.621)
0.34
(0.024)
0.23
(0.051)
-4.05
(1.573)
7.23
(3.982)
5.31
(3.721)
-3.81
(0.854)
1.39
(0.597)
-1.36
(0.782)
7.95
(2.341)
-1.07
(0.674)
2.67
(0.841)
-0.23
(0.087)
0.18
(0.175)
0.28
(0.117)

Low
Government
0.84
(0.043)
1.96
(0.329)
-0.32
(0.205)
1.84
(0.241)
0.68
(0.084)
0.31
(0.071)
5.21
(0.841)
3.82
(2.373)
7.56
(2.043)
-2.63
(1.025)
-0.82
(0.769)
-2.86
(0.567)
3.44
(1.694)
0.87
(0.536)
1.76
(0.718)
0.12
(0.013)
0.86
(0.176)
0.71
(0.204)

p-value of
Difference
0.3841
0.3751
0.1241
0.2869
0.0041
0.4185
0.0000
0.1574
0.6521
0.0000
0.0023
0.0115
0.0011
0.0574
0.9517
0.1423
0.0004
0.0000

Low Foreign

High Foreign

0.62
(0.015)
3.15
(0.436)
-0.78
(0.308)
0.38
(0.284)
0.38
(0.251)
0.05
(0.076)
0.61
(0.712)
4.25
(1.527)
4.52
(1.814)
-0.68
(0.517)
0.51
(0.891)
-0.91
(0.668)
10.23
(2.188)
-2.57
(1.547)
4.52
(1.748)
0.04
(0.185)
0.21
(0.206)
0.31
(0.157)

0.79
(0.051)
4.02
(0.218)
-0.41
(0.119)
1.32
(0.145)
1.16
(0.173)
0.18
(0.048)
4.89
(0.887)
4.64
(1.387)
9.11
(1.402)
-3.07
(0.923)
-0.44
(0.499)
-2.17
(0.428)
5.12
(1.856)
0.65
(0.436)
-0.85
(1.188)
0.03
(0.041)
0.91
(0.185)
0.47
(0.138)

p-value of
Difference
0.0000
0.1574
0.0068
0.0001
0.0011
0.2958
0.0000
0.8194
0.0314
0.0004
0.1841
0.0602
0.0017
0.0024
0.0118
0.9053
0.0015
0.3984
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EVIDENCE THAT STOCK OPTIONS WORK FOR CEOS –
BUT NOT FOR INCENTIVE REASONS
Bruce A. Rosser*, Jean M. Canil*
Abstract
We document the first evidence of a structure of timing returns, award discounts/premia and CEO
dilution costs relative to shareholders set at award and before the CEO invests marginal effort. All
three factors affect CEOs’ effective exercise price and hence incentive to expend marginal effort.
Exercised options, which exhibit the highest CEO and shareholder returns, are characterized by CEO
acceptance of high dilution cost and high sensitivity to award premiums. CEO and shareholder
returns for lapsed options and annual/biannual awards show high dependency on the dilution cost
factor. Irregular awards are characterized by active pre-effort positioning by shareholders to reduce
CEO opportunism.
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Introduction
Meulbroek (2001) and Hall & Murphy (2000, 2002)
show that risk-averse and undiversified executives
exposed to total firm risk but rewarded only for the
systematic component of that risk value non-tradeable
stock options below their market (or Black-Scholes)
value, which is the opportunity cost of the option to
shareholders. A valuation divergence or ‗gap‘ impairs
stock options‘ effectiveness as incentive-aligning
devices, and also reduces their effectiveness relative to
stock ownership (see endnote 1). This gap widens as
the difference between the market value of these
granted instruments and the value executives place on
them as substitutes for cash compensation widens.
Using simulations, Hall & Murphy (2002) show that
awards (or grants) of at-the-money options maximise
incentive when stock options are an add-on to existing
compensation packages, while restricted stock is
preferred when awards are a cash-substitute.
Stock options create incentive by virtue of their
design, but as the gap widens, lose their effectiveness
relative to other forms of equity-compensation.
From the viewpoint of the CEO, any contractual
provisions that raise the effective exercise price, while
decreasing the cost to shareholders, depress
executives‘ own valuation and hence their
30

effectiveness in reducing agency costs of equity.
Provisions that potentially do this include awards of
premium options, exercise restrictions generally
(including vesting periods, hurdle prices and rationing
of volumes exercised) and lower dilution protection
relative to shareholders, as well as denial of the right
to reprice in the event of substantial stock price
declines. Given a valuation gap, it is important to
realise that granting or awarding options at-the-money
(using market value of Black-Scholes valuation as a
benchmark) is in effect an award of premium options
relative to executives‘ lower valuation. For analytical
purposes, incentive may be defined as the partial
derivative of the executive‘s value (V) with respect to
the stock price (P). Hence, any contracting provision
that raises (lowers) V P is an incentive
(disincentive).
In addition to these considerations, allowing
executives the right to time their awards allows
executives to take advantage of information
asymmetry. Even for annual awards there is some
scope for varying the award date by a few weeks or
months to precede anticipated stock price runups (see
endnote 2). Yermack (1997) infers ‗good‘ timing from
the tendency of US firms to time awards prior to
quarterly earnings increases, but interprets this as
‗bad‘ for shareholders because the options are
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effectively discounted which makes exercise more
likely, perhaps through luck. While this may be so,
discounted options also narrow the valuation gap and
therefore increase the efficiency of options as
incentive devices.
In this paper we report evidence on the trade-offs
or exchanges that take place at the time of award,
which has not hitherto been reported. Subsequent
risk-return exchanges that are contingent on stock
performance,
such
as
repricing
of
deep
out-of-the-money options, are excluded from the study
(see endnote 3). The trade-offs examined include
option premia, dilution protection, exercise restrictions
and award timing. All require exercise to be activated.
The extent of dilution protection relative to
shareholders‘ and any exercise restrictions are likely to
have been incorporated in the stock option plan when
first adopted by shareholders, but even so these
provisions remain part of the set of trade-offs for any
given award and are likely to influence option premia
and award timing. The actual cost of inferior dilution
protection accepted by executives is not known until
later capital changes (specifically, rights and bonus
issues and capital reconstructions) actually occur, so
executives necessarily accept this cost in anticipation
of such events. The structure of trade-offs identified at
award is then related to subsequent CEO and
shareholder returns in order to infer incentive
consequences. We are able to observe shareholder
(and CEO) returns over the life of option contracts
because Australian companies are required to disclose
comprehensive information about both awards (as in
the US) and outcomes (unlike the US), in many cases
enabling identification of the exercise date. In
common with the incentives literature we focus upon
stock options awarded to CEOs rather than the entire
board.
Our main findings are as follows. We document
evidence that exercised options are awarded
at-the-money (with some tendency to a discount),
have the lowest dilution protection (incentive
decreasing), and show no timing gains or losses. In
contrast, lapsed options are found to be granted at a
premium (incentive decreasing), but have the highest
dilution protection (incentive increasing relative to
exercised options) and show timing gains (incentive
increasing). Exercised and lapsed options are
important sub-groups because they represent cases
where the posterior probability of incentives having
worked is high and low, respectively. Of course,
exercise through good luck (noise) or private
information (affecting the prior probability of
exercise) cannot be ruled out. At-the-money awards
are predicted by Hall and Murphy (2000) because they

maximize pay/performance incentives for risk averse,
undiversified executives when stock options are an
add-on to their existing sources of compensation. If
they are right, then our observation of at-the-money
grants for exercised options implies that stock options
are add-ons and not cash substitutes. However, these
regularities do not mirror the valuation consequences.
Shareholder returns across both sub-groups are found
to be decreasing in both relative dilution protection
and award returns, with some substitutability between
the two according to the sub-group. Timing returns
and exercise restrictions have no impact. In other
words, shareholder returns are highest when dilution
protection is lowest and options are granted at a
premium (both incentive decreasing). Both effects are
opposite to those predicted by Hall and Murphy
because both factors would reduce executives‘
valuation of their granted options.
The only explanation that fits the data is that
exercised options have a higher prior probability of
exercise in the first place, and hence a higher
executive‘s valuation. Information asymmetry is
present to the extent that shareholders do not have
access to the same information as executives.
Although premium options and inferior capital
dilution protection are both incentive decreasing,
CEOs rationally will always prefer relatively lower
dilution protection to an award premium because the
cost to the CEO of inferior dilution protection is
contingent on the specified capital changes occurring
in the future, while a premium option locks in a higher
exercise price from the start across all states. We test
the proposition that CEOs accept lower dilution
protection when no capital changes are expected. An
absence of timing gains on exercised options is further
evidence in support of our conjecture that CEOs do
not need incentives when the prior probability of
exercise is already high. A major implication is that
CEOs value subsequently exercised options at higher
values than surmised (but not observed) by Meulbroek
(2001) and Hall & Murphy (2000, 2002).
By corollary, lapsed options (for which
shareholder returns are around zero) are those for
which the prior probability of exercise must have been
lowest. Although some lapsed options in our sample
were granted at higher premia (incentive reducing),
most were granted at-the-money and had higher
relative dilution protection and also exhibited ‗good‘
timing (both incentive increasing). If just
out-of-the-money or ‗marginal‘ lapsed options had a
higher prior probability of exercise than options
lapsing deep out-of-the-money, then CEOs may have
been expected to bargain for higher incentives. The
evidence (albeit thin, n=19) is exactly the opposite:
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‗marginal‘ lapsed options have lower dilution
protection and lower timing gains than deep
out-of-the-money lapsed options, suggesting these
disincentive effects may have been crucial in
contributing to the lapsation.
We conclude that stock options as incentive
devices do not work, although they remain effective
vehicles for delivering bonuses to CEOs. If stock
options are expected to be add-ons, as suggested by
Hall and Murphy (2002), then it also follows that most
exercised stock options represent wealth transfers to
CEOs from shareholders.
The paper is organised as follows. The next
section reviews the evidence, identifies opportunities
for exchanging risks at award (or earlier on adoption)
and defines the ensuing returns. Section II explicates
CEO and shareholder return measures. Section III
details the sample and provides descriptive statistics.
Analysis is performed in Section IV, which is followed
by summary and conclusions in the final Section.
I.

Review and Analysis

Evidence suggesting that stock options are effective in
aligning incentives is surprisingly sparse. DeFusco,
Johnson and Zorn (1990) document higher stock price
variance following adoption of stock option plans,
implying a wealth transfer from bondholders to
stockholders. Yermack (1997) documents increasing
abnormal stock returns following awards to CEOs,
which are linked to earnings improvements.
Successful incentives will generate these outcomes,
but so will ―good timing‖ where CEOs influence
awards to occur before good news known to
themselves. Yermack infers award timing from the
tendency in U.S. companies for awards to precede
quarterly earnings increases, which implies de facto
awards of discounted ESOs (see endnote 4).
Several competing explanations, including insider
trading, problems in writing compensation contracts,
taxation, CEO manipulation of news releases, and
out-of –the-money awards are dismissed on a priori
grounds. Jin & Meulbroek (2002) report that
long-dated stock options retain their incentive-aligning
power (through delta arguments) even in years when
stock indexes fall, provided volatility increases as
stock prices fall. A positive association between
voluntary liquidations and CEO stock/option
ownership reported by Mehran, Nogler and Schwartz
(1998) is consistent with the incentive-aligning
motivation of stock options.
Contrary evidence is more extensive. Lambert,
Lanen and Larcker (1989) report lower than expected
dividends after adoption of stock option plans, while
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Fenn and Liang (2001) find an inverse relation
between stock option holdings and dividend payouts
(but a positive association with stock repurchases).
In apparent contrast to Yermack (1997), Gerety, Hoi
and Robin (2001) document zero stock market
reaction to proposals for equity-linked incentive plans
for CEOs. There is also sporadic evidence of
executive compensation contracts appearing to
increase agency costs, including diversion of cash
windfalls to increase executive compensation
(Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994)),
lower than expected dividends after executive stock
option (ESO) adoptions (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker
(1989)), an inverse relation between ESO holdings
and dividend payouts but a positive association with
stock repurchases (Fenn and Liang (2001)), and lower
special dividend payouts for optioned versus
non-optioned firms (Hollis (2001)).
In this paper we focus on trade-offs observed at
or before award that impact on the effective exercise
price, X. The trade-offs or exchanges observed are:
option premia, timing returns, exercise restrictions and
protection against capital dilution relative to that of
shareholders. Premium (discount) options are created
when the exercise price exceeds (is less than) the
market price on the award date. Since exercise prices
are often set in relation to stock prices over the
preceding five trading days, some discounts (premia)
may be observed because stock prices in the preceding
week were below (above) the stock price at award.
However, in contrast to Lambert, Lanen and Larcker
(1989), there is such a wide distribution of award
discounts/premia in our sample (with a central
tendency of zero) that we are pressed to doubt a
‗prior-week‘
explanation
(see
endnote
5).
Discounts to market directly reduce the exercise price
or, equivalently, imply acquisition of underpriced
stock. Premium options have the reverse properties.
CEO timing returns are positive (i.e., timing
gains) when there has been a pre-award stock price
rundown. Conversely, a pre-award runup creates a
timing loss for the CEO. Timing gains are a
deadweight cost to shareholders when the CEO
expends no effort in return. Their existence would
imply that either CEOs are able to influence award
terms and conditions through their compensation
committees, or shareholders are willing to grant timing
rights in exchange for other concessions. Exercise
restrictions may also be costly to CEOs either by
prohibiting exercise outright until a hurdle stock price
is reached, or capping the quantity of options that may
be exercised per period, which amounts to deferral of
exercise with respect to some or all options that are
presently in-the-money (and may not remain so).
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However, while such restrictions limit take-home gains,
they do not impinge on the exercise price, and as a
consequence CEO incentive should be unaffected.
The level of CEO dilution protection relative to
shareholders‘ is specified in the stock option plan as
approved by shareholders, and applies to all
subsequent awards under the plan until varied by
shareholders. The return consequences depend on
whether capital changes for which protection is not
granted occur during the life of the awarded options.
When protection is afforded for all capitalization
changes, the CEO suffers no dilution on exercise vis à
vis shareholders. Inferior dilution protection always
reduces a CEO‘s return relative to shareholders.
When uninsured capitalization changes occur, the CEO
suffers a dilution cost (or negative return) that
effectively increases the exercise price or, equivalently,
requires the CEO to purchase overpriced stock. In
Australia, CEOs are typically afforded protection
against some or all of bonus issues, rights issues and
capital restructures, but not dividends.
Although contingent on exercise, timing and
award gains (losses) are potentially costly (beneficial)
to shareholders because they combine to reduce the
exercise price before marginal effort is expended.
Shareholders do not benefit when timing and award
gains do not induce extra CEO effort. Likewise, CEOs
would not accept up-front timing and award losses
because even full dilution protection and zero exercise
restrictions would not provide higher returns than
shareholders. Inferior dilution protection reduces the
payoffs of exercise, so equivalently increases the
exercise price and hence creates an incentive for a
CEO to invest marginal effort to ensure exercise: the
incentive is higher as the relative level of dilution
protection is lower.
In the absence of exercise restrictions,
shareholders face the risk of CEOs exercising their
stock options before tendering marginal effort, i.e., on
the first occasion the stock price peaks above the
exercise price. The risk is presumably highest for
awards made at a discount after a rundown and where
CEOs have full dilution protection. Shareholders can
limit the costs of early exercise by outright prohibition
or by setting hurdle prices, but such restrictions do
nothing to augment the incentive to tender marginal
effort. Our evidence suggests that lower dilution
protection relative to shareholders is the primary
mechanism used to boost CEOs‘ incentive to cause
exercise.

II.
Measurement of CEO and
shareholder returns
CEO and shareholder returns are measured directly.
To do this, we require full information on the terms
and conditions of an award, capital dilutions during the
currency of the options and the dates and prices at
which the options are exercised or lapse through expiry.
We use Australian data on stock options grants to
CEOs for which exercise dates are available. This
means that CEO and shareholder returns for both
exercised and lapsed (i.e., expired) options can be
directly measured, which provides a more complete
measure of valuation consequences than analysis of
cumulative abnormal returns around award
announcements, which as Yermack (1997, p. 457)
notes are often deferred until release of the next
earnings report.
The institutional and regulatory framework in
Australia is similar to those of both the United States
and the United Kingdom. In Australia, as in the United
States, shareholders must approve ESO plans put to
them by company compensation committees, usually
in Annual General Meeting. During the sample period,
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rule 10.14
prescribed shareholder approval by special resolution
for issues of securities to related parties (which include
CEOs) by way of employee incentive schemes. The
resolution must have been passed at a general meeting
held no earlier than the last annual general meeting of
the company. Issues of ordinary securities (the
American equivalent is common stock) or claims
thereon through such schemes and without ordinary
shareholders‘ approval were capped at 15% of
outstanding ordinary share capital (Listing Rule 7.1).
Irregular grants outside such schemes similarly
required shareholder approval (Listing Rule 10.11), but
the 15% cap did not apply. The Corporations Act (s.
205G) set a maximum period of 14 calendar days
within which a company was to notify the ASX of any
change, acquisition or disposal of company-issued
securities held by directors, including stock options.
A convenient source of announcements concerning
awards and ASX notifications was provided by
Huntleys‘ Dat Analysis service. Once shareholder
approval is given, the compensation usually has
discretion as to the frequency, size and timing of
awards, as well as determination of the exercise price.
CEOs are invariably not members of their
compensation committees, but this does not preclude
CEO influence over their deliberations (see endnote 6).
In Australia, ESO award plans tie CEO rewards
to the company‘s raw or non-risk-adjusted stock price,
but often with protection against dilution caused by
33

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
rights issues, bonus issues and capital reconstructions,
but not dividends. Some awards carry only partial
protection against capitalization changes (for example,
only reconstructions may be allowed for), so in these
cases fewer adjustments are applied. Anti-dilution
Timing return =

protection varies from the same level implicitly
enjoyed by shareholders (all three sources of dilution)
to zero protection. Three CEO returns and a
shareholder return are calculated. Two of the CEO
returns are determined at t 0 , the award date:

P 30  P0
, and
P0

Award return =

P0  X 0
.
P0

P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is
adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award.

P0 is the stock price at award, and X 0 is the

exercise price (see endnote 7). The timing return is an ex post measure of the opportunity for timing. The timing
return is positive (negative) when an award is made after a stock price rundown (runup). When an award is made
(day 0), the timing return is already ex post, but is included in the aggregation of CEO returns because it is
contingent on exercise along with the two other CEO returns. The award return is instantaneous and positive
when an award is made at a discount to the stock price ( X 0  P0 ), and negative when made at a premium
( X 0  P0 ).
A CEO‘s holding return accrues from the award
date until termination (through exercise or lapse). It is
the same as that accruing to shareholders over the
same period plus (minus) any option discount
(premium), but minus the costs of lower relative
dilution protection, both conditional on later exercise.
The CEO holding return is also reduced by exercise
restrictions. When dilution costs and exercise
restrictions are present, the CEO holding return is
likely lower than the shareholder return, unless timing
and award gains are offsetting. The shareholder return
over the same interval therefore reflects the wealth
increments resulting from tendered CEO effort, while
the CEO holding return yields insights into the
incentive structure generating these shareholder
returns.
A CEO‘s (ex post) holding return is measured as
the stock return accruing from award to the earlier of
exercise or lapse. Although exercise restrictions
potentially reduce the dollar value of take-home gains
available to a CEO, they do not impact on return
calculations. For instance, rationing of exercised
options to 25% per annum does not affect the return
per option; likewise, a hurdle price might prevent
exercise but it does not affect the CEO‘s holding
return. The CEO holding return is the same as the
shareholder return plus any award return and the effect
of lower dilution protection for CEOs relative to
shareholders, which we term the relative dilution cost
factor. The shareholder return incorporating CEO
dilution cost is given by

PT  XT ,
P0
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where PT is the stock price at the time of
exercise or lapse (T) and is adjusted for all
capitalization changes, and XT is the exercise price
at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and
capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan.
Deducting the award return yields the CEO holding
return:
PT  XT  (P0  X 0 ) .
P0
When CEOs have no dilution protection,

XT  X 0 ; but as the level of CEO protection rises
toward that of shareholders, XT  X 0 . Finally, the
shareholder return = PT  P0 .
P0

The CEO holding return is lower than the
shareholder return whenever CEO dilution protection
is less than shareholders‘. When shareholder returns
exceed CEO returns this means the relative dilution
disadvantage faced by CEOs more than offsets any
timing and award gains. A reverse inequality is
therefore caused by timing and award returns
outweighing CEOs‘ inferior dilution protection and
exercise restrictions. For instance, if there are no
capitalization changes during the CEO holding period
and no conditions placed on exercise, then total CEO
return will exceed shareholder return when timing and
award returns are net positive.
Although the level of CEO protection is set at or
before award, the effect on future CEO returns can be
assessed only by tracking capitalization changes
during the term of the options. To the extent CEOs are
able to anticipate these changes, the realized dilution
cost (relative to shareholders) matches its expected
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value. Since CEOs almost certainly have ready access
to private information, we proceed on this assumption.
The relative dilution cost factor is therefore the
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative
stock return accruing to the CEO, where the difference
is caused by the dilution factor as implied by an award
never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to
shareholders. The dilution cost factor is zero when
CEO dilution protection matches that of shareholders,
and positive (unbounded) otherwise.
III.

Sample and descriptive statistics

The sample consists of 207 awards made by 56
companies for fiscal 1985-1999; 158 awards were
made by industrially-listed companies and the
remainder by companies listed on the mining and oil
board (see endnote 8). Table I presents descriptive
statistics. Irregular awards (n = 151) dominate the
sample.
129

207

or 62.3% of all awards end up being

exercised, with the remainder lapsing unexercised.
The percentage exercised is more than double the
exercise rate commonly observed in the stock options
market generally. The percentage of cases with
exercise restrictions contained in award agreements is
highest for lapsed options (48.7%) and lowest for
exercised options (22.5%).
Unlike Yermack‘s (1997) sample, there is no
evidence of awards being timed to precede
earnings/investment increases. Earnings returns are
computed by dividing bottom-line half-year earnings
(which accrue to shareholders) by the market value of
the company‘s outstanding stock at the start of the
half-year period (see endnote 9). Award timing is
most likely to show up in irregular awards, but the
pre- to post-award earnings changes for this and all
other groups do not differ significantly from zero,
although the median pre-award earnings return is
lower than the preceding half-year earnings return for
two groups. Raw earnings changes (not reported here)
not standardized for the value of investment show a
small but also insignificant increase pre- to post-award.
To the extent that earnings revisions drive stock prices,
timing returns as measured by pre-award stock price
runups and rundowns are therefore expected to
average approximately zero as well. The median
intervals to exercise or expiry (measured in calendar
days) are closely similar, implying infrequent early
exercise.
Half-yearly, quarterly and monthly and 10 day
timing returns are reported in Table II. Recall that the

timing return
Pt  P0 ,
P0

where Pt is a company‘s closing stock price
adjusted for all capitalization changes t days
pre-award, respectively, and P0 is the stock price on
the award date (see endnote 10). Negative timing
returns (stock price runups) are observed for exercised
options and positive timing returns are observed (stock
price rundowns) for lapsed options. The [-10, -30]
differences are significant or nearly so for both
exercised and lapsed options, but the [-30, -90]
differences are not. The former difference appears
driven by market anticipation of at least some awards,
for the timing returns are increasing for exercised
options but decreasing before awards of lapsed options.
Since the timing returns for these groups do not differ
for day –90 and day –30, and the difference tests for
lapsed options suggest the day –180 returns are
becoming unstable, timing returns are hereafter
computed relative to the shorter period, viz., day –30.
Table III looks at CEO timing, award and
holding returns together with shareholder returns for
the whole sample and major sub-groupings. Relative
dilution cost is also reported. For the whole sample,
the median CEO holding return is 45.32% over a
median holding term of 1216 days, which works out to
a modest annualized return of 11.87%; for
shareholders the annualized return is 13.08%. Several
regularities are apparent. Timing returns tend to zero
across the whole sample, so at an aggregate level there
is no evidence of opportunistic timing of awards (see
endnote 11). However, small timing gains from
pre-award rundowns are indicated for lapsed options.
Award losses (exercise prices set at a premium to
market) are indicated for some lapsed options and
irregular awards; award discounts are absent. Thus,
there is no evidence of opportunism, where CEOs
receive ―good deals‖, viz., award discounts after a
stock price rundown. CEO holding returns are
negative only for the lapsed group and strongly
positive elsewhere; the negative returns are lost to
CEOs through non-exercise that is also in
shareholders‘ interest. The association of lapsed
options with pre-award stock price rundowns is
consistent with the market already anticipating
declining returns for this group, which has a
shareholder return of –19.33% from award to expiry
(more than three years). Option awards in this group
appear to make little or no difference to this trend.
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This is, of course, the scenario in which incentives are
most needed, but at the same time the CEO may
rationally have decided that extra effort will not alter
the outcome (as already anticipated by the market).
Options awarded annually/biannually are, on average,
awarded at market with no timing gains (see endnote
12). Not surprisingly, ex post selection guarantees that
exercised options have the highest CEO holding and
shareholder returns and lapsed options the lowest.
None of the returns for annual/biannual versus
irregular awards differ significantly (difference tests
are not reported).
Relative dilution cost is at a maximum (median
-.1635) for exercised options, and lowest for
annual/biannual awards (-.0519), closely followed by
lapsed options (-.0695). In other words, holders of
exercised options accept the least dilution protection,
while holders of annually/biannually awarded options
have the highest dilution protection relative to
shareholders. Table IV indicates that pre-effort
bargaining is unevenly distributed across large and
small issuing companies. CEOs of large companies
accept much less dilution protection than small
companies (in terms of median cost, -.1998 versus
-.0013). There is some evidence of pre-award stock
price falls for some small companies, which appear to
be more than offset by award premiums. Exercise
restrictions for large companies occur at about twice
the rate for small companies. A similar inequality is
observed for below-median award size vis à vis
above-median award size. In contrast, relative award
size is not a major source of differences. The strongest
result from Table IV is that CEOs of large companies
accept less dilution protection and bear more exercise
restrictions, both of which serve to lower CEO holding
returns. Since, as indicated, Top 100 companies have
about half the total risk of non-Top 100 companies,
this inequality is in the right direction.
IV. Analysis
Tables V and VI look at interactions between risk and
award attributes. Table V partitions all returns into
high and low risk categories, according to above- and
below-median standard deviations of stock returns for
one year pre-award (see endnote 13). The CEO
holding and total returns together with the shareholder
return are higher for the high risk group than for the
low risk group, which is an expected result.
However, the relation breaks down for timing and
award returns. Since there are more lapsed options in
the high risk group (exercise rate = 60.6% versus
64.1% for the low risk group), the results presented
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here are consistent with those for lapsed options in
Table III, which possibly have a higher prior
probability of non-exercise than awards in general.
However, Table VI shows that group standard
deviations (all of which differ significantly from zero)
do not differ between exercised/lapsed options and
regular/irregular awards. At this stage, risk differences
appear not to be a major cause of return differences
between these groups.
Table VII relates CEO holding returns to the
pre-effort arguments. Exercise restrictions are
excluded from the set of explanatory variables because
they affect only realized or ―take-home‖ returns and
not CEO holding returns. All regression parameters
are highly satisfactory. For the whole sample, CEO
holding returns are decreasing in award returns but
increasing in relative dilution cost. Award discounts
therefore reduce CEO holding returns, while award
premiums increase CEO holding returns. Thus, award
discounts (which may be seen as leverage of CEO
holding returns) appear to reduce rather than increase
CEO incentive. Likewise, as relative dilution
protection falls, i.e, the cost to the CEO of inferior
dilution cost is higher, the observed CEO holding
return rises. Both results suggest a more general
finding: up-front award discounts and relatively high
dilution protection do not enhance CEOs‘ incentive.
By corollary, lower dilution protection induces more
effort if the CEO is to exercise. The CEO holding
return is lower if the issuing company is in the Top
100, as suggested earlier by the results of Table IV.
The sum of the standardized coefficients on the three
returns determined at award is positive (.555) for all
groups, which reflects the incentive potential of stock
options and can be interpreted as an incentive index.
In summary, holding returns are increased when CEOs
have lower dilution protection and are awarded
options at a premium.
The structure of pre-effort exchanges varies
across option outcomes and award frequency. For
exercised options, CEO holding returns respond more
positively to an award premium (three times the
sample average) but show less response to lower
relative dilution protection (coefficient 3.749 vs.
5.773). The incentive index value for exercised
options at .227 is the lowest for all groups, which at
first sight is surprising given the highest relative
dilution cost borne by CEOs in this group, as reported
in Table III. However, our interpretation is that CEOs
in this group expect a lower stock return response
coefficient on their dilution cost bearing. In other
words, CEOs‘ payoff for bearing dilution risk is lower,
and hence so is their incentive for investing marginal
effort. In contrast, lapsed options show the highest
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return sensitivity for dilution cost (7.777), and a
higher incentive index value (.609 vs. .227). Given
that holders of lapsed options bear lower dilution risk
(refer Table III), the market places a higher reward per
unit of relative dilution cost that is borne, but
comparatively higher effort is required to generate a
sufficient return to guarantee exercise, so the options
lapse.
Annual/biannual
awards
are
almost
indistinguishable from lapsed options in an incentive
context.
For irregular awards, CEO holding returns are
decreasing in both timing and award returns and
increasing in relative dilution cost. The return
coefficient on dilution cost and the incentive index
value are similar to those for exercised options and the
award return sensitivity is close to the sample average,
but timing returns enter the set of pre-effort exchanges
for the first time. Here, pre-award stock price runups
are associated with higher CEO holding returns. In
general, from an incentive perspective, runups and
award premiums are mutually reinforcing, whereas
rundowns and award premiums are not. Irregular
awards suggest opportunism, implying that CEOs
have private information of future earnings increases.
Even if the market has partially anticipated this
information, it would still pay a CEO to accept an
award despite an upward trend in the stock price.
Hence, for irregular awards, we expect to observe
stock price runups. We argue that the same reasoning
does not extend to award premiums because award
returns are negatively signed across all groups; in
particular, lapsed options would seem to have the
lowest propensity for good news. The low incentive
index value (.264) reflects the lower payoff on bearing
dilution risk.
If early exercise is not prohibited, shareholders
run the risk that granted options will be exercised at
the first opportunity when the stock price peaks above
the exercise price without the CEO expending extra
effort. The risk is higher for awards made after a
rundown and at a discount and where CEOs have full
dilution protection. Shareholders can limit the costs of
early exercise by setting hurdle prices or prohibit early
exercise outright, but such restrictions are
incentive-weakening. Table VIII therefore explores the
relation between the returns on pre-effort exchanges
and CEO holding returns with and without exercise
restrictions in order to reveal the impact of exercise
restrictions. For this purpose the three pre-effort
returns are summed. Aggregate pre-effort returns are
found to be negative irrespective of exercise
restrictions, reflecting the dominance of inferior CEO
dilution protection. The negative correlation between
pre-effort returns and the CEO holding return remains

when exercise restrictions are absent, implying that
the positive incentive effect of inferior CEO dilution
protection is robust across an exercise restriction
switch. We conclude that exercise restrictions do not
materially impact on pre-effort exchanges.
Table IX shows the impact of timing and award
returns and relative dilution cost on shareholder
returns after controlling for possible intervening
factors. Zero CEO marginal effort is unlikely to
reduce CEO holding gains to zero as well because
profitable operations are likely to continue irrespective
of CEO quality, but high CEO holding gains are more
likely the result of extra CEO effort. CEO holding
returns that do not vary with CEO effort are most
likely to vary according to cross-sectional risk
differences. The standard deviation of pre-award stock
returns is therefore included in the regressions to
control for this effect. Variables are also included to
represent award size relative to outstanding capital and
Top 100 membership. Table IX shows that the
addition of intervening variables (particularly risk) do
not materially disturb the structure of pre-effort
exchanges identified in Table VII for CEO holding
returns, subject to an important exception. For
irregular awards, award returns do not influence
shareholder return, despite influencing the CEO
holding return (refer Table VII). For this group, we
infer that award premiums exist because future
earnings growth would make the options ―too easy‖ to
exercise without an award premium. Interestingly,
risk has significance only for exercised options,
implying the probability of exercise is increasing in
underlying risk, which is a standard result.
Somewhat surprisingly, award size is not a
consideration in any group, so if opportunism exists it
does not extend to the relative size of the award.
High CEO holding gains do not guarantee
exercise, for either the exercise price may be too high
or exercise restrictions may be invoked. Table X
presents logistic regressions on exercise (=1) in order
to assess the impact of exercise restrictions and
exchanges bargained at award. Regressions of CEO
holding returns alone on the exercise/lapse outcome
are also reported (see endnote 14). Overall, the
expectation is that the fit will improve as the realized
CEO holding return measured over [t0,T] is substituted
for the set of pre-effort exchanges at t0. For all awards,
the percentage of cases correctly classified increases
markedly (from 66.7 to 86.0) as the scenario moves
forward in time. At t0, the probability of exercise is
shown to be increasing only in the award return,
which is expected because award discounts directly
lower the exercise price. There is no indication that
pre-award stock price movements, i.e., award timing,
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relative dilution protection and exercise restrictions
affect the likelihood of exercise. The latter is result is
construed to mean that CEOs do not accept exercise
restrictions if there is any material likelihood of
exercise being affected.
The estimation for annual/biannual awards at
award is not successful, from which we infer that
exercise of annual/biannual awards is determined by
exogenous factors, such as changes in business and
financial risks. In contrast, irregular awards show
strong evidence of active pre-effort bargaining. For
these awards, pre-award runups increase the likelihood
of exercise, as does lower dilution protection, i.e.,
higher relative dilution cost. Again, exercise
restrictions do not affect the likelihood of exercise.
V.

Summary and conclusions

This paper documents a structure of timing returns,
award returns and relative dilution costs at award.
The structure varies according to option outcomes and
award frequency. CEO holding returns generally are
found to be decreasing in award returns and increasing
in relative dilution cost. Award discounts (premiums)
reduce (increase) CEO holding returns, from which
we infer that award discounts (which may be seen as
leverage of CEO holding returns) reduce rather than
increase CEOs‘ incentive. As relative dilution
protection falls, i.e, the cost to the CEO of inferior
dilution cost is higher, CEO holding returns increase.
We conclude that up-front award discounts and
relatively high dilution protection lower CEO
incentive. By corollary, lower dilution protection
induces more effort if the CEO is to exercise. With
the lone exception of irregular awards, timing returns
(pre-award stock price runups/rundowns) do not
impinge on shareholder returns. Thus, we do not
corroborate the suggestion by Yermack (1997) that
CEOs influencing their awards to occur before
earnings increases are acting opportunistically. The
CEO holding return is lower if the issuing company is
in the Top 100, which we attribute to lower
uncertainty rather than less incentive.
For exercised options, CEO holding returns
respond more positively to an award premium but
show less response to lower relative dilution
protection, which we interpret as CEOs expecting a
lower stock return response coefficient on their
dilution cost bearing. In other words, CEOs‘ payoff
for bearing dilution risk is lower, and hence so is their
incentive for investing marginal effort. In contrast,
lapsed options show the highest return sensitivity for
dilution cost. Given that holders of lapsed options
bear lower dilution risk (refer Table III), the market
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places a higher reward per unit of relative dilution cost
that is borne, but comparatively higher effort is
required to generate a sufficient return to guarantee
exercise, so the options lapse. Annual/biannual awards
are almost indistinguishable from lapsed options in an
incentive context. However, for irregular awards,
award returns do not influence shareholder return,
despite influencing the CEO holding return. For this
group, we infer that award premiums exist because
future earnings growth would make the options ―too
easy‖ to exercise without an award premium. The fact
that exercise restrictions do not impact on exercise
suggests that CEOs do not accept restrictions if they
are at all likely to impede exercise. It appears that
inferior CEO dilution protection may substitute for
exercise restrictions, which is logical because
capitalization changes are automatically insured
against as they occur, whereas exercise restrictions are
absolute and hence a relatively inefficient mechanism
to achieve the same end.
In summary, our evidence is that award returns
and relative dilution cost combine to influence CEO
incentives and, as a consequence, shareholder returns
and hence exercise. Timing returns and exercise
restrictions have comparatively minor and zero impact,
respectively. Contrary to popular belief, award
discounts do not act as incentives, so the implicit
leverage does not work. Exercised options have the
highest relative dilution cost factor and the highest
sensitivity to award returns: specifically, an award
premium adds more value for shareholders in this
group than in any other. In contrast, lapsed options
have a low dilution cost factor and a less sensitive
response to award premiums. The comparatively flat
structure of pre-effort exchanges for annual/biannual
awards suggests low shareholder intervention in
setting the terms and conditions of awards. This
contrasts with evidence of higher shareholder
intervention with respect to all other awards. For
lapsed options, we conclude that the pre-effort
exchanges were not able to affect CEO incentive
sufficiently to lead to exercise; in many cases we
suspect that no amount of up-front bargaining can
reverse a stock price decline. We interpret runups
prior to irregular awards as reflecting shareholders‘
intention to elicit more CEO effort in the face of
impending good news. Restrictions on pre-effort
bargaining are likely to lower the probability of
exercise and harm shareholders‘ interest. It would
therefore be informative to see if agency problems
suggested by investment and financing regularities
observed for optioned firms are positively related to
flat pre-effort exchanges possibly caused by outside
restrictions on pre-effort bargaining.
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Appendices
Table I.

Descriptive statistics

An earning return is bottom-line half-year earnings divided by the market value of the company‘s outstanding stock at the start
of the half-year period, and is not annualized. Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually.
Exercise restrictions include hurdle prices and yearly limits on the portion of an award that may be exercised.
All awards

Annual/

Irregular

options

biannual

awards

207

129

78

awards
56

151

47.8
44.0

48.8
43.4

46.2
44.9

50.0
41.1

47.0
45.0

Percentage of cases with options
exercised

62.3

100.0

0

66.1

60.9

Percentage of cases with exercise
restrictions

32.3

22.5

48.7

25.0

35.1

Pre- to post-award change in
half-year earnings return
mean
t statistic
median
Wilcoxon Z statistic

.0066
.725
-.0015
-.114

.0162
1.645
-.0009
-.429

-.0094
-.531
-.0016
-.316

.0326
1.592
-.0001
-1.371

-.0030
-.311
-.0015
-.630

12 months‘ prior to 6 months‘
prior change in half-year
earnings return
mean
t statistic
median
Wilcoxon Z statistic

-.0039
-.478
-.0016
-1.626

-.0061
-.657
-.0019
-1.723*

-.0003
-.021
-.0009
-.449

-.0287
-1.410
-.0065
-2.272**

.0053
.648
-.0008
-.530

Calendar days from award to
post-award
earnings
announcement date:
mean
median

74
63

82
63

63
45

69
71

77
60

Calendar days from award to
option termination:
mean
median

1193
1216

1148
1202

1269
1257

1088
1019

1233
1311

Observations
Percentage of cases with
increases in half-year earnings
return:
pre- to post-award
12 months to 6 months
pre-award

**
*
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denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10

Exercised

Lapsed options
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Table II.
Half-yearly, quarterly, monthly and ten-day pre-award timing returns
Timing return = Pt  P0 , where Pt is a company‘s stock price at the close of trading (t) 180, 90, 30 and 10 calendar days
P0

before the ESO award date, respectively, adjusted for all capitalization changes.
Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually.

P0 is the stock price on the award date.

Base day for timing return
day-180

day –90

day –30

day –10

All awards (n=207)
Mean
t statistic
median
Wilcoxon Z statistic

.0027
.143
-.0318
-1.283

.0148
1.023
.0000
-.693

.0133
1.125
.0000
-.075

.0164
1.627
.0034
.669

Annual/biannual
awards
(n=56)
Mean
t statistic
median
Wilcoxon Z statistic

-.0064
-.172
-.0476
-1.150

.0117
.429
-.0201
-.297

.0143
.860
.0000
-.602

.0031
.246
.0113
.916

Irregular awards (n=151)
mean
t statistic
median
Wilcoxon Z statistic

.0060
.278
-.0318
-.785

.0159
.932
.0000
-.682

.0129
.861
.0000
-.236

.0214
1.642
.0000
.911

-.0240
-1.142
-.0480
-1.742*

-.0205
-1.523
.0000
-1.918*

-.0170
-1.709*
.0000
-1.452

-.0009
-.118
.0033
.151

Exercised options (n=129)
mean
t statistic
median
Wilcoxon Z statistic
mean difference
t statistic
median difference
Wilcoxon Z statistic
Lapsed options (n=78)
mean
t statistic
median
Wilcoxon Z statistic
mean difference
t statistic
median difference
Wilcoxon Z statistic
**
*

.199

.325

1.773*

.933

.413

1.248

.0468
1.331
-.0229
-.088

.0732
2.428**
.0028
1.307

.0632
2.454**
.0071
2.124**

.0452
1.944*
.0049
1.289

1.581

.483

1.771*

1.914*

.314

1.595

denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10
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Table III.
Timing return

CEO timing, award and holding returns, relative dilution cost and shareholder returns by option
= P30  P0
P0

outcome and award frequency
, and award return = P0  X 0 . P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of
P0

trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before
award. P0 is the stock price at award, and X 0 is the exercise price at award. Relative dilution cost is the
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO
dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum
value of the factor is zero. CEO holding return = PT  XT  (P0  X 0 ) , where PT is the stock price at the time of
P0

exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all capitalization changes, and XT is the exercise price at T
adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan. The award
gain or loss ( P0  X 0 ) is necessarily subtracted. Shareholder return = PT  P0 . Returns are not adjusted for
P0

differing intervals. Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually.
Timing return
[t-30, t0]

Award return
[t0]

Relative
dilution cost
[t0,T]

CEO holding
return
[t0,T]

Shareholder
return
[t0,T]

.0133
1.125
.0000
-.075

-.0726
-2.390**
.0064
.110

.1650
12.397***
.1072
11.074***

.8409
7.618***
.4532
7.565***

.8967
8.001***
.5062
8.803***

Exercised options
(n=129)
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

-.0170
-1.709*
.0000
-1.452

.0280
1.260
.0081
1.639

.1883
11.646***
.1635
8.937***

1.2451
10.499***
.8787
9.707***

1.3059
10.830***
.8873
9.752***

Lapsed
options
(n=78)
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

.0632
2.454**
.0071
2.124**

-.2390
-3.517***
.0000
1.716*

.1264
5.610***
.0695
6.567***

.1726
.879
-.2095
-3.821***

.2198
1.104
-.1933
-3.252***

Annual/biannual
awards (n=56)
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

.0143
.860
.0000
.602

.0145
.314
.0117
1.239

.1669
5.187***
.0519
5.512***

1.195
4.351***
.5331
3.606***

1.2819
4.530***
.5331
3.630***

Irregular
awards
(n=151)
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

.0129
.861
.0000
.236

-.1049
-2.784***
.0050
.517

.1643
11.836***
.1191
9.624***

.7096
6.409***
.4467
6.607***

.7538
6.810***
.4987
7.146***

All awards (n=207)
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01.
** denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10
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Table IV.

Cross-tabulations of relative dilution cost, timing and award returns and exercise restrictions by
issuer and award size

Relative dilution cost is the cumulative CEO stock return minus the cumulative shareholder stock return, where
the difference is caused by a CEO dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor
applicable to shareholders; the maximum value of the factor is zero. Timing return = P30  P0 and award return =
P

P0  X 0
P0

, where P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading 30 calendar0 days before the ESO
award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award. P0 is the stock price at award, and

X 0 is the exercise price at award. Inclusion of a company in the Top 100 means the issuing company‘s total
assets at book in a given year are large enough for inclusion in this group. Relative award size is the number of
options awarded divided by the number of outstanding ordinary shares. The standard deviation of pre-award stock
returns is calculated from adjusted weekly returns for one year prior to award.

Irregular stock option awards are

all awards not made annually or biannually.
Top 100 membership

n
Relative dilution cost
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

Top 100

Non-top 100

Above-median

Below-median

104

103

103

104

-.2310
-11.272***
-.1998
-8.768***

-.0098
-6.882***
-.0013
-6.792***

-.1526
-8.275***
-.0840
-7.374***

-.1773
-9.232***
-.1210
-8.284***

difference:
t
Mann-Whitney U
Timing return
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

-5.303***
2510.0***

-.0107
-1.336
-.0011
-.567

difference:
t
Mann-Whitney U
Award return
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

.928
4598.0*

.0374
1.695*
.0000
.678

.0362
1.674*
.0000
.913

-2.048**
4867.0

.0115
.815
.0064
.399

difference:
t
Mann-Whitney U
Percentage of awards with
exercise restrictions

Relative award size

1.941*
4809.5

-.1575
-2.701***
.0050
.759

-.1008
-1.885*
.0000
.094

2.817***
5194.5
41.35

-.0094
-1.021
-.0011
-.846

-.0447
-1.528
.0071
.531

-.921
5352.0
23.30

24.27

40.78

Standard deviation of
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pre-award returns
mean
median

.0354
.0279

difference:
t
Mann-Whitney U

.0680
.0527

.0559
.0483

5.206***
1954.0***

Table V.

.0474
.0360

1.280
3800.0***

CEO timing, award and CEO holding returns and shareholder returns by risk

Timing return = P30  P0 , and award return =
P0

P0  X 0
P0

.

P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of

trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before
award. P0 is the stock price at award, and X 0 is the exercise price at award. CEO holding return =
PT  XT  (P0  X 0 ) , where P is the stock price at the time of exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all
T
P0

capitalization changes, and XT is the exercise price at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital
reconstructions as specified in the award plan. The award gain or loss ( P0  X 0 ) is necessarily subtracted.
Total CEO return is the sum of timing, award and CEO holding returns, and shareholder return = PT  P0 .
P0

Returns are not adjusted for differing intervals. The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns was estimated
from weekly returns for one year prior to award.
(1)
Timing return
[t-30, t0]

(2)
Award return
[t0]

(3)
CEO holding
return
[t0,T]

(4)
= (1)+(2)+(3)
Total CEO
return
[t-30, T]

(5)
Shareholder
return
[t0,T]

1.1189
5.902***
.5331
5.541***

.9987
5.166***
.5331
4.767***

1.1849
6.160***
.6259
5.784***

.0105
.620
.0078
.793

.5603
5.275***
.3695
5.317***

.5624
5.340***
.4038
5.399***

.6056
5.625***
.4557
5.718***

2.767**
5188.5

2.571**
4817

1.982**
4896

2.628***
4775

Above-median pre-award standard deviation of stock
returns (n=104); percentage exercised = 60.6
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

.0347
1.529
.0000
.592

-.1549
-2.714***
.0000
.599

Below-median pre-award standard deviation of stock
returns (n=103); percentage exercised = 64.1
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z

-.0084
-1.563
-.0011
-.902

Above- less below-median group return
t
Mann-Whitney U

1.840*
4748

*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01.
** denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10
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Table VI.

Risk of pre-award stock returns by option outcome and award frequency

Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or biannually.

The standard deviation of

pre-award stock returns was estimated from weekly returns for one year prior to award.
All awards
n
Standard
deviation
pre-award stock returns
mean
median

Lapsed options

207

Exercised
options
129

Irregular awards

78

Annual/
biannual awards
56

.0516
.0397

.0470
.0396

.0593
.0427

.0487
.0355

.0527
.0385

of

Irregular
less
annual/biannual awards
t
Mann-Whitney U
Exercised
less
options
t
Mann-Whitney U

151

.735
3947

lapsed
-1.507
4407.5

Table VII. OLS regressions on CEO holding returns by option outcomes and award frequency
Timing return = P30  P0 , and award return = P0  X 0 . P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of
P0

P0

trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before
award. P0 is the stock price at award, and X 0 is the exercise price at award. CEO holding return =
PT  XT  (P0  X 0 ) , where P is the stock price at the time of exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all
T
P0

capitalization changes, and XT is the exercise price at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital
reconstructions as specified in the award plan. The award gain or loss ( P0  X 0 ) is necessarily subtracted.
Total CEO return is the sum of timing, award and CEO holding returns, and shareholder return =

PT  P0
P0

.

Returns are not adjusted for differing intervals. The relative dilution cost factor is the cumulative shareholder
return minus the cumulative CEO holding return, where the difference is caused by a CEO dilution factor as
given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum value of the
factor is zero. Inclusion of a company in the Top 100 means the issuing company‘s total assets at book in a
given year are large enough for inclusion in this group. Relative size of an award is the number of options
awarded divided by the number of outstanding ordinary shares at the award date. Irregular stock option awards
are all awards not made annually or biannually. The numbers below coefficients are t statistics.
All awards

Exercised
options

Lapsed options

207

129

.8409***
.4532***

Percentage of cases with
options exercised
Adjusted R2

n
Dependent variable:
CEO holding returns
mean
median

Irregular awards

78

Annual/
biannual
awards
56

1.2451***
.8787***

.1726
-.2095***

1.195***
.5331***

.7096***
.4467***

62.3

100.0

0

66.1

60.9

.433

.306

.740

.560

.346

151
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F

40.364***

15.122***

55.664***

18.465***

20.844***

Constant

.185
1.410

.944
5.928***

-.874
-5.051***

.182
.754

.180
1.125

[t-30, t0] Timing return

-.927
-1.644

-.410
-.448

-.501
-.956

1.461
.954

-1.343
-2.286**

-.513
-2.331**

-1.516
-3.727***

-.821
-3.969***

-.936
-1.740*

-.518
-2.134**

[t0, T] Relative dilution cost

5.773
12.368***

3.749
6.391***

7.777
14.482***

6.828
8.146***

4.961
8.710***

Top 100 (=1)

-.640
-3.565***

-.722
-3.382***

-.207
-.903

-.468
-1.076

-.553
-2.723***

.555

.227

.609

.642

.264

[t0] Award return

Sum
of
standardized
coefficients on significant
return variables

*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01.
** denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10
Table VIII.

Relationship between bargained gains and CEO holding returns with/without restrictions on

exercise
Timing return = P30  P0 , and award return = P0  X 0 . P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading
P0

P0

30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award. P0
is the stock price at award, and X 0 is the exercise price at award. The relative dilution cost factor is the
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO
dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum
value of the factor is zero. CEO holding return = PT  XT  (P0  X 0 ) , where PT is the stock price at the time of
P0

exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all capitalization changes, and XT is the exercise price at T
adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan. The award gain
or loss ( P0  X 0 ) is necessarily subtracted. Exercise restrictions include hurdle prices and yearly limits on the
portion of an award that may be exercised.

Exercise restrictions (n=67)
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z
Correlation between pre-effort
exchange and CEO holding
returns
No exercise restrictions (n=140)
mean
t
median
Wilcoxon Z
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(1)
Timing return
[t-30, t0]

(2)
Award return
[t0]

(3)
Relative
dilution cost
[t0, T]

(4)
=(1)+(2)-(3)
Total
[t0]

(5)
CEO holding
return
[t0,T]

.0128
1.489
.0116
1.498

-.0195
-1.824*
.0064
.161

.5306
2.345**
.1072
6.510***

-.6260
-.2723***
-.1316
-4.801***

.7575
3.415***
.1561
3.492***

-.859***

.0135
.794
-.0006
-.790

-.0549
-1.588
.0073
.331

.1615
10.821***
.1062
8.979***

-.2029
-6.645***
-.1516
-6.379***

.8807
7.078***
.5147
6.709***

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
Correlation between pre-effort
exchange and CEO holding
returns
Exercise restrictions
exercise restrictions
t
Mann-Whitney U

less

-.337***

no
-.033
4077.5

.787
4490

1.628*
4622.5

-2.569**
4665.5

-.483
4123

*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01.
** denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10
Table IX. OLS regressions on shareholder return by option outcomes and award frequency
Timing return = P30  P0 , and award return = P0  X 0 . P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of
P0

P0

trading 30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before
award. P0 is the stock price at award, and X 0 is the exercise price at award. CEO holding return =
PT  XT  (P0  X 0 ) , where P is the stock price at the time of exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all
T
P0

capitalization changes, and XT is the exercise price at T adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital
reconstructions as specified in the award plan. The award gain or loss ( P0  X 0 ) is necessarily subtracted.
Total CEO return is the sum of timing, award and CEO holding returns, and shareholder return = PT  P0 .
P0

Returns are not adjusted for differing intervals. The relative dilution cost factor is the cumulative shareholder
return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO dilution factor as given
by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the minimum value of the factor is
zero. Inclusion of a company in the Top 100 means the issuing company‘s total assets at book in a given year
are large enough for inclusion in this group. Relative size of an award is the number of options awarded divided
by the number of outstanding ordinary shares at the award date. Irregular stock option awards are all awards not
made annually or biannually. The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns was estimated from weekly
returns for one year prior to award. The numbers below coefficients are t statistics.
All awards

Lapsed options

207

Exercised
options
129

Irregular awards

78

Annual/
biannual awards
56

.8967***
.5062***

1.3059***
.8873***

.2198
-.1933***

1.2819***
.5331***

.7538***
.4987***

Percentage of cases with
options exercised

62.3

100.0

0

66.1

60.9

Adjusted R2

.444

.364

.747

.542

.359

28.412***

13.200***

38.793***

11.839***

14.975***

.142
.441

.131
.681

-.708
-3.335***

.012
.022

.096
.462

[t-30, t0] Timing return

-.910
-1.596

.094
.100

-.565
-1.073

1.348
.814

-1.315
-2.245**

[t0] Award return

-.420
-1.786*

-1.260
-3.084***

-.864
-3.857***

-.916
-1.560

-.396
-1.558

6.032
12.641***

4.106
6.532***

7.903
14.647***

7.050
7.799***

5.167
8.787***

n
Dependent
variable:
Shareholder return
mean
median

F
Constant

[t0, T] Relative dilution cost

151
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Top 100 (=1)

Standard
deviation
pre-award stock returns
Relative size of award

of

-.667
-3.511***

-.432
-1.843*

-.291
-1.225

-.443
-.902

-.546
-2.552**

2.323
1.161

14.077
3.119***

-.662
-.401

3.393
.372

2.385
1.250

-10.720
-1.199

-.431
-.038

-13.702
-1.219

24.238
.239

-4.669
-.552

*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01.
** denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10

Timing return

= P30  P0
P0

Table X. Logistic regressions on exercise by award frequency
, and award return = P0  X 0 . P30 is the company‘s stock price at the close of trading
P0

30 calendar days before the ESO award date, and is adjusted for all capitalization changes made before award. P0
is the stock price at award, and X 0 is the exercise price at award. The relative dilution cost factor is the
cumulative shareholder return minus the cumulative CEO stock return, where the difference is caused by a CEO
dilution factor as given by the award never exceeding the dilution factor applicable to shareholders; the maximum
value of the factor is zero. CEO holding return = PT  XT  (P0  X 0 ) , where PT is the stock price at the time of
P0

exercise or lapse (i.e., expiry) and is adjusted for all capitalization changes, and XT is the exercise price at T
adjusted only for bonuses, rights issues and capital reconstructions as specified in the award plan. The award gain
or loss ( P0  X 0 ) is necessarily subtracted. Irregular stock option awards are all awards not made annually or
biannually. The numbers below coefficients are Wald statistics.
All awards
(n=207)

Percentage
of
correctly classified

cases

Cox & Snell R2

2
Constant

[t-30, t0] Timing return

Annual/biannual awards
(n=56)

Irregular awards
(n=151)

66.7

86.0

64.3

66.1

69.5

88.1

.116

.145

.092

.057

.150

.233

25.440***

32.528***

5.424

3.284

24.592***

40.007***

.454
3.881**

.038
.051

.921
2.512*

.302
2.542

.149
.270

-.203
.923

-2.205
2.330

-.934
.118

-3.323
3.033*

1.329
7.031***

2.141
2.092

1.026
3.324*

[t-30, T] Relative dilution
cost

1.443
2.519

-.326
.063

3.154
5.235**

Exercise restrictions (=1)

-.228
.494

-.592
.837

-.281
.511

[t0] Award return

[t-30, T]
return

CEO holding

.857
18.818***

*** denotes two-tailed significance for   .01.
** denotes two-tailed significance for .01 <   .05
* denotes two-tailed significance for .05 <   .10
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.376
1.366

1.550
22.740***
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Endnotes
1

In this paper we do not explore the substitutability between stock ownership and stock options. A recent survey of the
theoretical literature is provided in Henderson (2001) and further insights are offered by Hall and Murphy (2002).
2
although CEOs rarely sit on their compensation committees, this is not to suggest they do not influence committee
deliberations. This would seem especially so for founder CEOs.
3
This issue is addressed in a number of papers in the special issue of Journal of Financial Economics devoted to ESOs (a
Symposium on Executive Stock Options, July 2000).
4
Yermack (1997) infers award timing with respect to quarterly earnings announcements. Three-day abnormal returns on
earnings announcements are significantly positive when an award is made in the preceding week, but not otherwise. As well as
post-award stock price runups, Yermack also documents significant pre- to post-award quarterly earnings increases, whether
measured as earnings surprises (more than two standard deviations from the mean analyst forecast) or changes in
earnings/investment. Awards made at irregular intervals attract higher post-award runups than annual awards.
5
Another possibility is that discounted options may be awarded after successful CEO effort as a risk-free reward. We consider
this less likely than bonuses or other non-contingent benefits because both are less risky means of delivering rewards than
options.
6
Yermack (1997) cites two examples of companies acknowledging management CEO influence over the terms and conditions
of CEO awards, but no such instances were observed during collection of our sample.
7
The choice of day –30 for the base price is justified in the next section.
8
Where portions of an awarded tranche of ESOs are exercised on different dates or lapse, each portion is counted as an award for
the purposes of this study,
9
The earnings returns are therefore not annualised.
10
Intervals less than 30 days pre-award were not considered because some awards may have been anticipated, which would tend
to show runups even where the stock price had been declining since day –90.
11
The results are closely similar when timing returns are recalculated using day –90 as a starting point.
12
Total CEO returns (defined as the sum of timing, award and holding returns) and shareholder returns are highly positively
correlated for all groups, with the lapsed options having the lowest r at .907, with p=.000.
13
The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns was calculated from adjusted weekly returns for one year prior to award.
Weekly returns were preferred to daily returns in order to eliminate the effect of very short term price fluctuations.
14
The standard deviation of pre-award stock returns, relative award size and Top 100 were initially included as an explanatory
variables, but are omitted from our reported results owing to lack of significance in all cases.
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GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Marion Hutchinson*, Mazlina Mat Zain**
Abstract
This study explores whether the relation between internal audit quality and firm performance is
associated with firm characteristics of information asymmetry and uncertainty (growth opportunities)
and certain governance controls (audit committee effectiveness). The results from this preliminary
study of 60 Malaysian companies show that the association between internal audit quality and firm
performance is stronger for firms with high growth opportunities and that this positive association is
weakened by increasing audit committee independence. These findings demonstrate the internal
auditors conflicting roles and question the governance recommendations that require all members of
the audit committee to be non-executive directors.
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1. Introduction
This paper explores the role of internal audit quality
on firm performance in a sample of Malaysian firms.
It extends prior research on the role of internal audits
(e.g., Carcello, Hermanson, and Raghunandan, 2005;
Jensen and Payne, 2003; Nagy and Cenker, 2002),
including whether the role should be outsourced (e.g.
Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000). The study is
motivated by three factors. First, prior research
suggests that internal audits can have a positive
influence on corporate governance, including
reporting quality and firm performance (e.g. Gramling,
Maletta, Schneider and Church, 2004). Despite
widespread acceptance of the benefits of internal
auditing, there is relatively little documented empirical
research on the role of internal auditing on firm
performance. Further, it appears that the quality of
the internal audit department is more important than
the existence of an internal audit department. For
example, Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent
(2005) find no significant association between
voluntary establishing an internal audit function and a
reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. This
finding suggests that merely establishing an internal
audit does not control managers‘ incentives to manage
earnings. Second, organizational theory and
contracting theory suggests that only certain types of
50

organizations with particular firm characteristics could
benefit from internal audit quality (IAQ).4 According
to organizational contingency theory, linkages
between specific management control systems and
firm performance are likely to depend on contextual
and environmental factors (Chenhall, 2003). Similarly,
according to contracting theory the relationship
between management control systems and firm
performance depends on the costs of writing and
enforcing contracts which may vary depending on
firm characteristics (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).
In this study we draw on contracting theory to
investigate whether growth opportunities and audit
committee independence affect the relationship
between IAQ and firm performance. Third, while
several studies have focused on internal auditing
issues in developed countries, such as the USA and
4

SAS 65 (AICPA 1991) describes internal audit quality
characteristics as comprising of competence (i.e. educational
level, certification and prior experience), objectivity (e.g.,
reporting relationship, party responsible for appointment and
termination of internal auditors), and quality of work
performance (e.g., adequacy of audit programs). Likewise,
the IIA standard 1210 on internal auditor‘s proficiency
specifies that the internal auditors should possess the
knowledge, skills and other competencies needed to perform
in order to ensure audit effectiveness. In our study, we focus
on
internal auditors‘ competence, proxied by auditing
experience and certification of the internal audit staff.
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UK, there is little evidence from emerging markets
such as Malaysia. Malaysian firms are of interest to
this area of research because during this period it was
mandatory for listed Malaysian companies to have an
audit committee 5 while forming an internal audit
function was voluntary.6 Therefore, establishing an
internal audit department is a relatively recent
phenomenon in Malaysian companies.7 In addition,
the necessity for stringent corporate governance in
Malaysia is demonstrated by the alleged accounting
fraud at Technology Resources Industries Berhad (see
Fadzil, Haron and Jantan, 2005). In this paper we
provide some insights on whether internal auditing as
a monitoring/control mechanism is linked to firm
performance in Malaysian firms.
The first objective of this paper is to determine if
there is an association between internal audit quality
and firm performance. The professional literature
identifies both accounting qualifications and prior
auditing experience of the internal audit staff as
important ingredients for an effective internal audit
function (e.g. the Research Committee of the Institute
of Chartered Accountants of Scotland in McInnes,
1993). However, the relation between IAQ and firm
performance is unlikely to be straightforward since
both organizational theory and contracting theory
suggests that only certain types of organizations with
particular firm characteristics could benefit from IAQ.
5

In August 1994 the Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) Listing
Requirements made it mandatory for all public listed
companies to have an audit committee. Further, to enhance
the effectiveness of the audit committee, the BMB Listing
Requirements amended its listing rules in 2001 requiring
public listed companies to include the Audit Committee
Report in their Annual Reports. The ten mandatory
requirements for the Audit Committee Report are: (1) the
audit committee should comprise of at least three members,
(2) the majority of the audit committee should be composed
of independent directors, (3) at least one of the audit
committee members is financially literate, (4) the chairman
of the audit committee must be an independent director, (5)
no alternate director of the audit committee is appointed as a
member, (6) there are written terms of reference, (7) the
number of meetings should be noted, (8) the majority
attending the meeting should be independent directors, (9)
there should be a summary of audit committee activities and
(10) a summary of internal audit activities should also be
produced.
6
Although it is not mandatory to establish an internal audit
function, an interesting issue is the revamped Bursa
Malaysia Berhad Listing Requirements (Previously know as
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) in particular Para 15.27
(b) states that a listed issuer must ensure that its board of
directors includes in its annual report as a ―statement about
the state of internal control of the listed issuer as a group‖.
7
During the year 2000, the Finance Committee on
Corporate Governance in Malaysia approved the Malaysian
Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). In contrast with
the BMB Listing Requirements, the MCCG BB VII in Part
2 Best Practice Provision specifically recommends the board
establish an internal audit function and maintain a sound
system of internal control to safeguard shareholders‘
investments and the company‘s assets.

Since, prior evidence drawn from contracting theory
suggests that growth (or investment) opportunities is
likely to affect firm performance (see Smith and Watts,
1993; Baber et al. 1996) we us also examine if growth
opportunities affects the linkage between IAQ and
firm performance. Contracting theory suggests that
firms with high growth opportunities are associated
with high information asymmetry and managers of
these high growth firms are more difficult to monitor
(Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993;
Baber et al. 1996). Therefore, the role of IAQ is
expected to be more beneficial for such firms. This
study seeks to determine whether the link between
IAQ and firm performance is dependent on the level
of growth opportunities of the firm.
As audit committees are also part of the internal
control system of a firm, the second objective of this
paper is to determine whether audit committee
independence has an impact on the association
between IAQ and the performance of growth firms.
Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003) suggest that the role
of the auditor is one of preeminent monitoring and
reporting to the board on the effectiveness of
corporate governance. They foresee a possible conflict
between the role of the internal audit function and the
role of the audit committee and these tensions could
affect organizational outcomes 8 . Together with
Gramling et al (2004), they suggest that we need to
understand how the internal audit function interacts
with the audit committee, management, and the
external auditors to achieve quality corporate
governance. By examining the interaction between
IAQ and audit committee independence on the
performance of growth firms we shed some light on
this question.
The data for this study of Malaysian firms is
obtained from two sources. The first source is a survey
of Malaysian firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia
Berhad 9 to obtain data on internal auditing. The
second source is the annual reports of the firms
responding to the survey. The data on firms‘ growth
opportunities, audit committee and profitability is
collected from the 2003 financial reports. Prior studies
of Malaysian firms have examined the internal control
practices of the internal audit function but not the
implications on firm performance. Research of
Malaysian firms demonstrate the importance of the
internal audit by showing that management relies on
internal audits to provide assurance on matters relating
to internal control such as the provision of an
independent review of efficient operations (Ernst and
Young, 2005; Fadzil et al., 2005). Recent research by
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) examines the impact of
corporate governance mechanisms on the value of
8

The issue of the potential for tension between the internal
audit department and audit committees is also raised by the
Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation (2005).
9
The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) changed its
name to the Bursa Malaysia Berhad (BMB) on April 20,
2004.
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Singapore and Malaysia firms (as measured by Tobin's
Q). The only significant association they find is a
negative relationship between board size and firm
value. They fail to find any significant association
between either audit committee size or the proportion
of independent directors on the audit committee and
firm value. The evidence provided in this study
suggests links between the performance of firms
adopting a growth strategy and the quality of the
internal audit function. Further, this study
demonstrates that these associations are moderated by
audit committee independence. Using observations
from 60 Malaysian firms, this paper provides
preliminary evidence that there is a positive
association between IAQ and firm performance for
firms with high growth opportunities, but not for firms
with low growth opportunities. Further, we also show
that, in the presence of an independent audit
committee, the positive association between IAQ and
performance for high growth firms disappears,
suggesting a conflict effect between IAQ and audit
committee. These preliminary findings suggest that
focusing attention on the composition of the audit
committee ignores the essential skills required for an
effective AC. ―Overemphasis on monitoring and
control risks non-executive directors seeing
themselves, and being seen, as an alien policing
influence….. An overemphasis on strategy risks
non-executive directors becoming too close to
management… (Higgs Report 2003:27). An effective
AC attains the appropriate balance between internal
and independent directors; a great proportion of either
can swing the balance in the wrong direction and
cause conflict with the role of the IA.
This paper contributes to the literature in several
ways. First, this study provides evidence from an
emerging economy, Malaysia. Given the globalization
of business, there is increasing interest in accounting
and control issues in these countries. Second, this
study demonstrates that research can successfully
utilize both survey methodology and accounting data
to study management control issues. Third, the
results of this study are consistent with the notion that
internal audits provide higher levels of control and
monitoring that are associated with performance.
However, this association is dependent on the firm‘s
growth opportunities. Our results imply that it may
not be economically efficient to establish an internal
audit function in the absence of growth opportunities.
Fourth, this study demonstrates the contingent nature
of IAQ and how IAQ is related to other corporate
governance controls, such as audit committee. The
results of this study question whether firm
performance is enhanced when internal audits are
expected to serve as a resource to the audit committee
and management, placing the internal auditor in a
situation of possible conflict. Finally, this paper
contributes to the literature by integrating
management control and corporate governance theory
in terms of the role of IAQ and audit committees and
shows that such integration provides a deeper
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understanding of how and why these variables interact
to affect firm performance. This evidence is not
available in the extant literature.
2. Background and hypothesis
development
An increasing number of earnings restatements along
with allegations of financial statement fraud
committed by high profile companies have eroded
public confidence in corporate governance, the
financial reporting process, and audit functions
(Rezaee, et al., 2003). Subsequently, the firm‘s
internal control environment is under scrutiny. As
part of the overall internal control environment, the
internal auditor and the audit committee have a
responsibility to provide oversight on the reliability of
financial reporting. The Institute of Internal Auditors
(2000) suggests that the internal audit function should
bring a systematic approach to evaluating and
improving the effectiveness of risk management,
control and governance processes. This is likely to
lead to increased responsibilities placed on the internal
audit function and audit committee of companies that
previously did not have or outsourced the internal
audit function. Consequently, the internal audit
function has greater responsibilities for supporting
management and the audit committee.
2.1 Internal auditing and firm
performance
One of the roles of the internal auditor is to provide
management with an independent and objective
assurance that the organizations internal control
system is effective, adequate and reliable (IIA, 2000).
In addition, the IA provides consulting on operational
skills that focus on risks, evaluate the efficiency of
operations and stimulate organizational actions
(Hermanson and Rittenberg 2003). In response to
regulatory, environmental and technological change,
IA is required to do much more than compliance work.
The IA must have a thorough knowledge of how their
work contributes value and links to organizational
strategies and achievement (Hass, Abdolmohammadi,
and Burnaby, 2006). Therefore, internal auditing is
designed to add value and improve the organizations
operations (Carcello et al., 2005). Research on
auditors‘ assessment of the criteria of IA competence
includes IA training programs, with an emphasis on
professional certifications (Brown, 1983), and IA
experience (Messier and Schneider, 1988).
Prior studies also suggest that the auditor should
have professional qualification and prior experience if
they are to lead a good quality audit (e.g. Brody et al.,
1998). Boo and Koh‘s (2004) study indicates that audit
team quality and attributes relate to their ability to
suggest improvement to internal control systems;
operational efficiency; risk management; and financial
matters. Prior experience is important for internal
auditors as many oversight judgments are subjective
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and managerial action may have pervading effects.
Therefore, in the absence of objective criteria, internal
audit staff
not possessing prior experience in
auditing (or less experience), may not understand the
wide range of existing and potential problems nor
possess problem-solving skills (DeZoort, 1998).
Consequently, an IA with greater training and
experience is more able to provide assurance of the
effectiveness and efficiency of oganisational controls
in aligning with organizational strategies. Research by
Fadzil et al (2005) supports this notion by finding that
IAQ 10 significantly influences the quality of
monitoring the internal control system. Mat Zain et al
(2006) find that internal auditors contribute more to
financial statement audits when they have a greater
proportion of IA staff with prior experience in
accounting and auditing. Research also finds that
effective internal audits are more likely to detect and
prevent fraud (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and
Lapides, 2000; KPMG Peat Marwick, 1999).
The redefinition of internal control as risk
management emphasizes the links to strategy
formulation which is supported by the internal
controls of the organization. All risks experienced by
organizations have potential financial implications and
so too does the risk management responsibility of the
IA. Further, the internal audit helps to maintain
cost-efficient contracting between owners and
managers. Thus, the internal audit has the potential
to augment the external audit function and reduce the
overall monitoring costs. For instance, research by
Felix et al (2001) find that the contribution of IA to
financial statement results in cost saving related to
audit fees paid by the firm to their external auditors.
Taken together, these preceding factors suggest that
greater IAQ is associated with greater firm
performance. However, it is likely that the relation
between IAQ and firm performance varies with
organizational characteristics.
Despite increasing
attention on IAQ, little is known about factors that
influence the association between IAQ and firm
performance. Why would higher IAQ be associated
with better firm performance for some firms and not
for others? There are a myriad of factors that could
influence the association between IAQ and firm
performance. Given the role of the IA as monitoring
and managing risk, we examine whether the
association between IAQ and firm performance is
dependent on uncertain investment opportunities and
the independence of the audit committee.

agency costs associated with high growth
opportunities means that high growth firms have high
levels of inherent risk11. Subsequently, high growth
firms are more likely to benefit from higher IAQ,
which means better financial performance. The
reasons for this proposition follow the research by
Gaver and Gaver (1993) and Smith and Watts, (1992).
Low growth firms are valued independently of the
firm‘s future investment opportunities while high
growth firms are valued based on the firm‘s future
discretionary investment decisions. As low growth
firms are pre-committed to a certain course of activity,
shareholder/manager conflict is low which minimizes
agency costs. In contrast, high growth firms incur
greater agency costs because managers‘ actions are
less discernible as the value of growth opportunities
depends on further discretionary expenditures by
managers12. The subsequent information asymmetry
means that growth firms adopt particular strategies to
monitor managers, including creating internal audit
departments. Carcello et al. (2005) suggest that
greater information asymmetry increases the need for
greater investment in IA to bond or monitor 13 agents.
Further, high growth firms are more likely to
encounter problems with internal control requiring
greater monitoring and assistance from internal
auditors (Carcello et al., 2005; Maletta and Kida,
1993). However, it is not simply the existence of IA
that is important, as demonstrated by Davidson et al.
(2005), but the quality and effectiveness of the internal
audit department that is important for firms with
uncertain investment opportunities. The IA must
have the training and experience that links the
evaluation of the risks associated with uncertain
growth opportunities to the firm‘s strategies that
achieve positive outcomes.
In the high-risk
conditions of high growth opportunities, internal audit
quality is a primary factor that influences internal
audit
contribution
to
firm
performance.
Consequently, we expect a positive association
between IAQ and firm performance for high growth
firms. The preceding discussion leads to the first
hypothesis:
H1: A combination of high quality internal audit
(X1) and high levels of growth (X2) will have a
positive impact on firm performance (Y).
2.3 Audit committee
Audit committee oversight includes financial reporting,
internal controls to assess risk and auditor activity

2.2 Growth opportunities
11

Firms need to establish internal controls that manage
risk effectively. Risk has been defined as the
possibility of loss as a result of a combination of
uncertainty and exposure flowing from an investment
decision or a commitment (Boritz, 1990). The
10

IAQ also refers to the management of the internal audit
department, professional proficiency, objectivity and review.

Inherent risk relates to the type of business and
environment in which the firm operates.
12
Discretionary expenditures include capacity expansion
projects, new product lines, maintenance and replacement of
existing assets.
13
Internal auditing is a bonding cost incurred by agents to
signal to the principal they are acting responsibly, while
monitoring costs are incurred by the principal to protect their
economic interest (Adams, 1994)
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(DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed,
2002). 14 The audit committee, as a governance
mechanism, reduces information asymmetry between
stakeholders and managers and therefore mitigates
agency problems. Research finds that firms without
audit committees are more likely to have fraudulent
financial reporting (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny, 1996)
and earnings overstatement (DeFond and Jiamnalvo
1991).
To fulfill the oversight role, the audit
committee must be independent from management,
thus giving rise to the recent governance
recommendations and regulations demanding an
independent audit committee.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates that
the audit committees of listed companies consist
entirely of independent directors and the recent
amendments to the Bursa Malaysia corporate
governance framework, which was introduced in 2008,
requires all members of the audit committee to be
non-executive directors.
Research also provides evidence of the
importance of audit committee independence (ACI).
Krishnan (2005) find that independent audit
committees and audit committees with financial
expertise are significantly less likely to be associated
with the incidence of internal control problems 15 .
Likewise, Abbott et al. (2004) find that audit
committees consisting of all independent members
and with at least one member with accounting or
related expertise are negatively associated with
financial restatements. Beasley et al. (2000) find firms
that commit fraud are likely to have less independent
audit committees.16
14

In Malaysia the audit committee is required to prepare a
summary of the principal internal audit activities and
functions. These activities include audit of financial
management and human resource operations and security
controls. The reports should also mention that the audit
committee has approved the internal audit program at the
beginning of the year and the chief internal auditor has
submitted regular reports on audit work and activities prior
to the committee meeting. In addition, the audit committee
must be satisfied that the internal auditors have worked
closely with external auditors to resolve issues raised by the
external auditors in relation to the control issues in the
organization (Haron, Jantan and Pheng, 2005, p. 193).
15
They investigated two levels of seriousness in internal
control problems: reportable conditions and material
weaknesses. The data on internal controls is acquired from
the reports from companies changing auditors. These
companies are required to disclose any internal control
problems that are pointed out by the predecessor auditors
16
Based on reputational capital enhancement theory, past
studies argue that independent audit committees are more
likely to demand a higher quality audit in order to protect
their reputation as experts in decision making (Abbott &
Parker 2000; Carcello & Neal, 2000). Further Abbott &
Parker (2000, p.56) argue that while an ―audit committee
service may increase directors‘ reputation as a monitor, it
also exacerbates the potential reputational damage should
the misstatement occur while the director serves on the audit
committee‖. In addition, Baysinger and Butler (1985) find
that independent audit committees are more willing to
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One of the main objectives of establishing an
audit committee is to strengthen the board‘s ability to
monitor the performance of managers. However,
studies testing the association between ACI and firm
performance are inconclusive. Erickson et al. (2005)
find a positive relationship between ACI and firm
performance while Klein (1998) and Hsu (2008) find
no significant association. Mak and Kusnadi (2005)
fail to find any significant relationship between either
audit committee size or the proportion of independent
directors on the AC and firm value. Failing to
account for environmental uncertainty faced by the
firms, such as uncertain investment opportunities, and
interrelations between governance controls such as
IAQ and ACI may have led to the conflicting results.
An optimal internal control system is associated
with the environment and the context in which the
system operates. It is posited in this paper that a
positive association between IAQ and firm
performance is contingent on the level of risk faced by
the firm, that is, high, but uncertain, growth
opportunities17. Further, Klein (2002) finds that audit
committee independence declines as growth
opportunities increase. This result is consistent with
her expectation that managers demand for internal
directors with expertise increases with the
complexities and uncertainties of growth opportunities.
Klein (2002, p.436) also suggests that firms tailor
audit committee composition to suit their economic
environment. Subsequently, the level of growth
opportunities of the firm has the potential to influence
the association between the IA and AC and
subsequently, firm performance. Previous research
has found that high growth firms prefer an insider
dominated board to integrate the practical activities of
the firm around its strategies (Bathala and Rao, 1995;
Hutchinson, 2001). As growth opportunities are firm
specific, subject to managerial decisions, inside
directors have an essential role to play in providing
valuable information to the AC about the firm‘s
activities. Donaldson and Davis (1994) suggest that
inside directors make superior decisions, having
access to corporate information and the ability to take
a long-term view.
Codes, regulations, and various best practice
guides stress the importance of the internal audits‘
relation with other parties responsible for corporate
governance. However, research on the relations
between internal audits and the audit committee is
limited, focusing only on the association between
audit committee characteristics and the internal audit
(e.g. DeZoort, Friedberg, and Reisch, 2000). Internal
audits have a dual role to play in the corporate
governance of the organization, which places the
internal auditor in a position of possible conflict.
disagree with management and are more likely to insist on
high quality audit.
17
Of course there are other risks that may be affect the
association between IAQ and firm performance, such as
audit risk, operating risk, financial risk, etc.
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Hermanson and Rittenberg (2003, p. 34) suggest that
there are
―significant differences in functions and skill
sets required when trying to serve audit
committee needs, as opposed to meeting the
needs of strategic and operational management.
Management wants the internal auditor to
provide both assurance and consulting based on
broad operational skills that address risks,
evaluate the efficiency of operations, and
stimulate organizational action. On the other
hand, the audit committee is more interested in
assurance regarding controls.‖
Prior research demonstrates the complex and
contingent nature of the association between internal
audits and the audit committee. The internal auditor
in many firms reports directly to the CEO and the
head of the audit committee rather than management
because the audit committee‘s role is to monitor and
report on the effectiveness of corporate governance
(Krell, 2003). However, Nagy and Cenker (2002),
find, when interviewing internal audit directors,
management primarily determines the role of the
internal auditor, thus placing the IA in a position of
potential conflict. Raghunandan, Read and Rama
(2001) find that the audit committee independence 18
and expertise 19 is associated with their ability to
influence internal auditors via access to the chief
internal auditor and their ability to review internal
audit activities. Hence, an independent audit
committee places greater demands on internal audits.
However, good corporate governance should be
promoted without stifling entrepreneurial drive or
impairing competitiveness. The business advisory
group‘s to the original OECD principles states:
―Entrepreneurs, investors and corporations
need the flexibility to craft governance
arrangements that are responsive to unique
business contexts…..‖ (OECD, 1998, p.34).
Subsequently, audit committee independence
(ACI) may inhibit the performance of growth firms as
the internal auditor focuses on the compliance
requirements of the audit committee rather than
assisting management with assessing the potentially
profitable risks of uncertain investment opportunities.
Thus, ACI affects the strength of the relationship
between IAQ and the performance of high growth
firms. No research is found that addresses these
associations. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: A combination of both high quality internal
audit (X1) and audit committee independence
(X3) have a negative impact on firm
performance (Y) for high growth firms (X2).

18

The proportion of independent directors on the audit
committee.
19
The proportion of committee members with an
accounting or finance background.

3. Data
Data on internal audit quality is collected though a
mail questionnaire survey of public listed companies
in Malaysia during 2003. Five-hundred and four
questionnaires were sent to the head of the internal
departments of public companies listed on the Bursa
Malaysia Berhad. A total of 101 (20.03 percent)
responses were received of which 60 (12 percent)
were useable responses. Of the 41 non-useable
responses, 30 were eliminated due to the companies
having fully outsourced and co-sourced their internal
audit functions, thus information relating to the
quality of internal audits was unavailable. The
remaining responses were excluded due to incomplete
information. While the original questionnaire
contained several questions, the two questions of
interest in this paper deal with the auditing experience
and accounting qualification of the internal audit
staff. The relevant questions of the survey instrument
on the internal audit function are reported in the
appendix. Other information on firm performance,
audit committees and growth opportunities is
obtained from the annual reports of the respective
firms (year-ending 2003) responding to the survey.
3.1 Dependent variable
The internal audit function includes risk management
and better internal controls which should manifest in
better firm performance. The dependant variable, firm
performance is measured as the firm‘s return on assets
(ROA). We use this accounting based measure
because internal audits and the audit committee are
concerned with, among other things, providing
assurance regarding the integrity of financial
information, that is, that the firm‘s performance is
accurately reported. Hence, we would expect to see a
positive association between IAQ and firm
performance.
3.2 Independent variables
The measure of internal audit quality is separated into
two variables to capture the auditing experience
(PSAPA) and accounting qualifications (PSAQ) of the
internal audit staff. PSAPA is the proportion of
internal audit staff with prior work experience in
auditing to the size of the internal audit function while
PSAQ is the proportion of internal audit staff with an
accounting qualification to the size of the internal
audit function. These measures also control for the
size of the internal audit team since they are
proportions of the total number of staff in the internal
audit department. Prior research and legislation
suggests that audit committee effectiveness is
dependent, in part, on the extent to which the
committee is independent and suggest that the audit
committee should consist of a majority of
non-executive or independent directors (e.g.
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Raghunandan et al 2001)20. Our measure of audit
committee independence (ACI) is an indicator
variable of audit committee effectiveness (the
proportion of independent members to the total
number of members in the audit committee). The
measure of growth adopted in this study, the
market-to-book value of equity, is used extensively in
prior research (e.g. Smith and Watts, 1992) and is
obtained from the annual reports of the firms
completing the usable responses to the questionnaire.
Following Govindarajan and Fisher (1990) and
Gul and Chia (1994) we adopt the multiplicative
model for testing our hypotheses. The model requires
transformation of the independent variables into a
point-scale for the analyses. The three point-scales
for PSAPA and PSAQ are determined following
assessment of the distribution of the variables. Table 1
reports the distribution of the proportions for PSAPA
and PSAQ. The scores for each of the variables are
converted to a three-point scale. PSAPA is a
three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit
staff with auditing experience: 1 if the proportion is
<= 0.5; 2 if the proportion is > 0.5 and < 1; and, 3 if
the proportion = 1. PSAQ is a three-point scale of
the proportion of internal audit staff with an
accounting qualification: 1 if the proportion is <= 0.5;
2 if the proportion is > 0.5 and < 1; and, 3 if the
proportion = 1. The measure of audit committee
independence (ACI), the proportion of independent
members to the total number of members in the audit
committee is: 0 if the proportion is < 0.7; 1 if the
proportion is >= 0.7 and <= 1. The cut-off point is
based on the distribution of the proportions.

variables are likely to impact on firm risk. These
variables are measured as: INV/TA – inventory
divided by total assets; and, AR/TA – account
receivable divided by total assets.
4. Method
4.1 Multiplicative model
The multiplicative model (Althauser, 1971;
Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990), used extensively in
contingency-type research, is adopted for testing the
interactive effects of internal auditor quality (IAQ),
growth (market-to-book value of equity) and audit
committee independence (ACI) on firm performance
(ROA) in hypothesis one and hypothesis two. This
involves using the following multiple regression
equations:
Y = a 0 + a 1 X1 + a 2 X2 + a 3 X1 X2 + 
(1)
Y = b 0 + b 1 X1 + b 2 X2 + b 3 X3 + b 4 X 1 X2 + b 5 X1 X3 +
b 6 X2 X3 + b 7 X1 X2 X3 + 
(2)

Agency theory suggests that increased leverage
controls agency costs by reducing the amount of cash
available to managers for discretionary investments.
Hence, managers are constrained in making
sub-optimal decisions from the debt-holders
perspective. Leverage and liquidity also impact on
the firm‘s ability to generate profits. We use two
measures of debt (total debt and long-term debt)
which are included as control variables as they
represents an external corporate governance control
which is likely to impact on firm performance.
Leverage is measured as: Leverage = current and
non-current borrowings divided by total equity. This
ratio indicates how firms choose to finance operations.
The lower the ratio, the greater the protection for
lenders, who rank before shareholders. A measure of
long term debt is included and is measured as NCL =
net current liabilities divided by total assets. The
liquidity ratios, inventory ratio and accounts
receivable ratio, are included in the model as these

Where Y
= Firm performance (ROA); X1 =
Internal auditor quality proxies using a three point
scale for the proportion of internal audit staff with
prior work experience in auditing to the size of the
internal audit function (PSAPA) and proportion of
internal audit staff with accounting qualification to the
size of the internal audit function (PSAQ); X2 =
Growth is measured as the market-to-book value of
equity; X3 = Audit committee independence using an
indicator variable for the proportion of independent
members to the size of the audit committee); X1 X2 , X1
X3 , X2 X3 , X1 X2 X3 = Interaction of X1 , X2 and X3.
The regression models test whether the
interactive effects of the independent variables are
important in explaining variations in firm performance.
If a3 and b7 are significant, this is equivalent to saying
that the corresponding incremental R2 is statistically
significant at the same probability level (Southwood,
1978, p.1168; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan., 1990, p.22;
Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Hartmann and Moers, 1999).
This means that the introduction of the term X1 X2 in
equation (1) and X1 X2 X3 in equation (2) add
significantly to the variance explained. However, this
provides no information on whether the posited
relationship is monotonic 21 . In order to test for a
monotonic relationship, the partial derivatives from
the above regression equations are examined
(Southwood, 1978; Schoonhoven, 1981).
For
example, in testing whether the relationship between
IAQ and ROA depend on the level of a firm‘s growth
opportunities (MBE) (hypothesis one), we take the
partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to X1, as
below:

20

21

Insert Table 1 here
3.3 Control variables

Bursa Malaysia recently prohibited executive directors
from being part of the audit committee.
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For a discussion on monotonic and non-monotonic effects,
see Schoonhoven (1981).

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009

Y /  X1 = a1 + a3 X2
(3)
The partial derivative of the impact of internal
auditor quality (X1) on firm performance (Y) in
equation (3) depends on the level of growth (X2). If the
value of Y /  X1 in equation (3) is always positive or
always negative over the entire observable range of X2,
the relationship between Y and X1 would be regarded
as monotonic; otherwise, it would be regarded as
non-monotonic. Similarly, the partial derivative of
equation (2) with respect to X1 is examined, as below:

positively and significantly associated with firm
performance (ROA) for the two proxies of internal
auditor quality (p < 0.05 for PSAPA and PSAQ)23. The
coefficients in Equation A and B suggest that a
positive association between IAQ (in terms of
accounting backgrounds or prior experience of the
staff) and firm performance is contingent on the level
of growth opportunities.
Insert Table 4 here
The partial derivatives of Equation A and B in
Table 4 over different internal auditor quality proxies
give the following results:

Y /  X1 = b1 + b4 X2 + b5 X3 + b7 X2 X3

Equation A: Y /  X1 = -0.0347 + 0.0380X2
(4)
(6.1)

Equation (4) illustrates that the relationship
between Y and X1 depends on both the level of growth
and audit committee independence. If audit committee
independence (X3) is a constant, equation (4) can be
re-arranged as:
Y /  X1 = (b1 + b5 X3) + (b4 + b7 X3) X2
(5)
In this way, the effect of growth on the
relationship between internal auditor quality and firm
performance can be examined conditional on the
independence of the audit committee.
5. Results
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.
The average ROA is 4.7 percent while the average
market-to-book ratio of equity (growth) is 1.51.
Leverage is 41 percent, the long term debt ratio is 14.5
percent and the liquidity ratios average between 13
and 14 percent.
Insert Table 2 here
The correlations between the dependent
variable ROA and the independent variables are
shown in Table 3. The only variable that is positively
and significantly correlated with ROA is the measure
of growth opportunities. The long-term debt ratio is
negatively and significantly correlated with ROA.
Insert Table 3 here
Table 4 and 5 provide the results of the multiple
regression models performed to test the various
hypotheses22. As reported in Table 4, the interaction
terms between internal auditor quality and growth are
22

The statistical analyses and interpretations of the results
followed the approach adopted by Govindarajan and Fisher
(1990) and Gul and Chia (1994).

Equation B: Y /  X1 = -0.0181 + 0.0298X2
(6.2)
Equation A and B will be zero when X2
(growth) has a value of 0.9132 and 0.4548
respectively, which are known as the inflection points
(i.e. where the change in the direction of the relations
occur). In other words, the association between IAQ
and performance (ROA) are positive (negative) when
growth is above (below) the inflection points, as
shown in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 here
These inflection points are within the range of
observable values for X2 (1 - 5, see Table 1) for the
above equations. Therefore, the above results show
that for firms with a higher level of growth, internal
auditor quality is positively associated with better firm
performance in terms of ROA, and the reverse is true
for firms with a lower level of growth, consistent with
hypothesis one.
Table 5 reports the results of testing hypothesis
two. Similar to the above analysis, it is found that the
three-way interaction terms are negative and
significant for the two proxies for internal auditor
quality (p < 0.05 for PSAPA and p<0.01 for PSAQ)24.
To examine the effect of audit committee
independence on the relation between growth, internal
auditor quality and firm performance, the partial
derivatives of Equation A and B in Table 5 over
23

An equivalent test, as suggested in Cohen and Cohen
(1983), is to test the statistical significance of the
incremental R2 with the addition of the interaction term.
Unreported results show that the increases in R2 are
statistically significant with the interaction term included in
the regression (For example, R2 increases from 19 percent to
29 percent in the case of PSAPA).
24
Unreported results also show that the addition of the ACI
variable significantly increases the explanatory power of the
models.
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internal auditor quality are analyzed as follows:
Equation A: Y /  X1 = -0.0592 + 0.0527 X2 + 0.0733
X3 – 0.0626 X2 X3
(7.1)
Equation B: Y /  X1 = -0.0792 + 0.0603 X2 + 0.1446
X3 – 0.0970 X2 X3
(7.2)
Equations A and B suggest that the effect of
internal auditor quality on firm performance is a
function of both the level of growth and audit
committee independence25. Govindarajan and Fisher
(1990: 274) suggest that the values and significance of
the unstandardised coefficients will change when the
origin points of the independent variables change, but
a change in the origin points of the independent
variables will have no impact on the value or
significance of the unstandardised coefficients of the
three-way interaction term. Therefore, apart from the
three-way interaction term (b7) the coefficients for
Equation 2 in Table 5 are not interpretable since they
can be altered by shifting the origin points of X1, X2,
and X3. Consequently, the purpose of Equation 2 is
to provide information on the interaction of X1, X2, and
X3 on Y, not on the main effects. In addition,
multicollinearity is not an issue with Equation 2 as
multicollinearity is eliminated by manipulating the
origin points of the independent variables and the R2
to zero which does not affect the significance of b7
(Govindarajan and Fisher 1990).
Inset Table 5 here
In order to analyze the relationship under low
audit committee independence, ACI (X3) is set to 0.
The above equations are then expressed as follows:
Y /  X1 = -0.0592 + 0.0527 X2
(8.1)
Y /  X1 = -0.0792 + 0.0603 X2
(8.2)
The inflection points are 1.123 and 1.313
respectively. On the other hand, the equations are
expressed as follows if ACI is set to 1:
Y /  X1 = 0.0141 - 0.0099 X2
(9.1)
Y /  X1 = 0.0654 – 0.0367 X2
(9.2)
The inflection points will be 1.424 and 1.782
respectively. These points are illustrated in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 here
25

The subsequent interpretation followed the approach
adopted by Govindarajan and Fisher (1990).
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It is shown that for firms with fewer
independent directors on the audit committee, the
equations will be positive when X2 is high (above the
inflection points), meaning that there is a positive
effect of internal auditor quality on firm performance
for high growth firms with more executive directors
on the audit committee. Interestingly, for firms with
more non-executive directors on the audit committee,
the equations are negative when X2 is above the
inflection points, suggesting that the effect of internal
auditor quality on firm performance is negative for
high growth firms with independent audit committees.
This provides evidence of conflict between internal
audit quality and audit committee independence in
terms of their effects on firm performance, consistent
with hypothesis two26.
5.1 Robustness tests
We conducted three additional tests to assess the
robustness of our results. First, we included industry
dummies in all the regressions to control for the
confounding effects of industry differences. Second,
we included size (log of total assets) in all the
regressions with and without the industry controls.
Regression analyses with controls (dummy variables)
for the 8 industries with and without the size variable
did not change the qualitative nature of the results.
Finally, we also used return on equity (ROE) as
another measure of firm performance and the
qualitative nature of the results, in general, remain
unchanged.
6. Conclusion
In the current legislative environment, many
organizations are considering implementing an
internal audit function, or are taking actions to
improve IAQ, such as appointing more personnel with
auditing and accounting qualifications in the internal
audit department. However, the extant literature
provides little guidance as to which governance
characteristics should be improved if an organization
desires to increase IAQ and, subsequently, its
performance. Monitoring internal control is the result
of actions by, and interactions between, management,
the internal auditor, the external auditor and the audit
committee (Krishnan, 2005). This paper provides an
insight, albeit preliminary, into the role of internal
audits and the impact on firm performance and
explores the inter-relationships between firm and
governance factors. Primarily, our results show that
effective governance, in terms of internal audits and
the audit committee is contingent on the risks
associated with the firm‘s environment. In this paper
26

Other than analyses on partial derivatives, Hartmann and
Moers (1999) suggests that an alternative test of
non-monotonicity is by means of sub-group linear
regressions. This analysis has not been done in view of the
small sample size of the study (N = 60).
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the risks are those associated with the firm‘s
investment opportunities.
The findings are subject to a number of
limitations. Cross-sectional studies such as this can
establish associations, but not causality. Given the
paucity of research into the association between
internal audits and the audit committee and contingent
factors affecting corporate governance it is difficult to
identify pervasive themes. There are many different
types of internal control systems, we have only
considered two. Future research could also consider
the role of the board in the interplay between IAQ and
ACI. Another factor that may affect these results is the
method of data collection, a mail survey, which is
subject to response bias. The results are obtained from
a small subset of firms that responded to the internal
audit survey questionnaire. The results could have
been different if other firms that did not respond to the
survey are included in the sample. This research
project provides preliminary results and a more
comprehensive, national industry association-backed
study which increases the sample number and number
of participating firms in Malaysia would add to the
validity of the results. Finally, our data is from
Malaysia and the findings may not be germane to
other countries.
The main thrust of our result support the notion
that firms need to establish an internal control system
to manage risk effectively. An audit committee with
a majority of non-executive directors may constrain
the efficiency of internal audits which impacts firm
performance. That is, not all firms benefit from ACI,
for some firms it is imperative that the AC has
firm-specific knowledge about operations when
assessing risks. This understanding can only be
acquired from insider knowledge. Thus, it is more
important for the IA to align with management rather
than the AC when operating in an uncertain
environment such as high investment opportunities.
What is important is that there should be a fit between
the oganisations' operating environment and the
monitoring and control functions of the IA and AC.
Therefore we encourage future research that considers
alternate models of factors that may influence IAQ and
enhance corporate governance. Notwithstanding these
limitations, the results of this study have implications
for policy setters and regulators. The negative impact
of ACI on the association between IAQ and
performance for growth firms suggests that it is
inappropriate to mandate specific AC composition;
attention should be focused on firm-specific
requirements. Studies of this nature are useful to
organizations trying to improve the quality of their
internal audit, as evaluated from the perspective of the
firm‘s growth opportunities and their audit committee.
By maintaining the right mix of governance
mechanisms, overall governance and hence
performance may be improved.
Finally, the results of this study question the
recently released key amendments to the Bursa
Malaysia corporate governance framework in 2008

which require all members of the audit committee to
be non-executive directors (Mondovisione News,
2008). The key amendments of the Listing
Requirements (LR) and MESDAQ Market Listing
Requirements (MMLR) are aimed at raising the
standards of corporate governance for companies
listed on Main Board, Second Board and MESDAQ
Market and increasing investor confidence 27 .
However, the results from this study demonstrate that
an insider dominated audit committee may cause
conflict for the internal auditor which, in turn, has an
adverse effect on firm performance. This suggests that
the important thing is not the independence of the
audit committee, but rather having the right mix of
members with the necessary skills to evaluate the risks
faced by the firm. The key amendments to the Bursa
Malaysia corporate governance framework may need
to be adjusted, for example, to an audit committee
composition which reflects a simple majority of
non-executive directors (with a non-executive chair).
This will allow for representation of inside directors
who possess the firm-specific knowledge necessary to
properly assess risk especially in high-growth
opportunity firms. Consequently, this will allow for
the balance necessary between the "agent" and
"principal" representation. The trend towards
legislating
for
non-executive/independent
representation (where there was often little or none on
boards) is not slowing. However, this does not mean
that the public policy pendulum cannot be adjusted
back somewhat.
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Appendix
Extract of Internal Audit Survey 2003 relating to in-house internal audit arrangements.
Question 5. How many staff are there in your in-house audit section/unit?
___________________
Question 6. How many of the staff in your internal audit department have
i)
an accounting qualification?__________________________
ii)
prior work experience in auditing?_____________________

Table 1. Distribution of the variables
PSAPA
N

scale point

1

2
3

proportion<=0.1
0.1<proportion<=0.2
0.2<proportion<=0.3
0.3<proportion<=0.4
0.4<proportion<=0.5
0.5<proportion<=0.6
0.6<proportion<=0.7
0.7<proportion<=0.8
0.8<proportion<=0.9
0.9<proportion<=1.0

1
2
2
2
12
2
4
3
1
31

PSAQ
N

19

10
31
60

1
1
0
5
10
3
3
3
2
32

17

11
32
60
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ACI
N

scale point
0.4<=proportion<0.5
0.5<=proportion<0.6
0.6<=proportion<0.7
0.7<=proportion<0.8
0.8<=proportion<0.9
0.9<=proportion<1.0

0

1

1
2
30
18
2
7

33

27
60

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (N = 60)

Variables

Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

ROA

0.047

0.057

0.253

-0.265

PSAPA

2.200

3.000

3.000

1.000

PSAQ

2.250

3.000

3.000

1.000

ACE

0.450

0.000

1.000

0.000

Growth

1.151

0.803

4.262

0.229

Leverage

0.407

0.378

1.000

0.006

INV/TA

0.133

0.069

0.990

0.000

AR/TA

0.141

0.104

0.510

0.000

NCL

0.145

0.075

0.790

0.000

Notes: The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the
proportion of internal audit staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit
function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the
proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 1
if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – indicator variable of audit committee
effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in the audit committee),
0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and
non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account
receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by total assets.
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Table 3. Spearman Correlation Matrix

Variable

ROA
PSAPA
PSAQ
ACI
Growth

ROA

1

PSAPA

0.064
1

PSAQ

0.083
0.738***
1

ACI

Growth

0.003
-0.055
-0.104

0.569***
-0.213
-0.079

1

-0.067
1

Leverage
INV/TA
AR/TA
NCL

Leverage

-0.280**
0.234*
-0.176
-0.105
0.099
1

INV/TA

AR/TA

NCL

-0.020
-0.268**
0.266**
0.197

0.188
-0.113
0.233*
0.191

-0.362***
0.250*
-0.181
-0.125

-0.271**
-0.027
1

-0.014
0.200
0.437***
1

0.062
0.538***
-0.258**
-0.195
1

Notes: *, **, *** two-tailed statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. The variables are defined as
follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have prior work
experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if
proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting qualification to the size
of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI – indicator variable of
audit committee effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in the audit
committee), 0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and
non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided
by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by total assets.
Table 4. Regression of Firm Performance on Internal Auditor Quality and Growth

VAR

Intercept

Equation A

Equation B

IAQ = PSAPA

IAQ = PSAQ

Coefficients

Coefficients

0.102**

0.051

IAQ (X1)

-0.030*

-0.007

Growth (X2)

-0.022

0.000

IAQ*Growth (X1 X2)

0.028**

0.018*

Leverage

-0.047

-0.039

INV/TA

-0.028

-0.052

AR/TA
NCL

0.087**

0.078**

-0.133**

-0.154**

Adj.R2

0.291

0.276

F. Value

4.455***

4.206***
.

Notes: *, **, *** one-tailed statistical significance of white-corrected t values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit
staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if
0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting
qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1;
Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage - current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA –
inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by
total assets.

63

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
Table 5. Regression of Firm Performance on Internal Auditor Quality, Growth and Audit Committee Independence
Equation A

Equation B

IAQ = PSAPA

IAQ = PSAQ

VAR

Coefficients

Coefficients

Intercept

0.167**

0.186***

IAQ (X1)

-0.053**

-0.064***

Growth (X2)

-0.059*

-0.071**

ACI (X3)

-0.178**

-0.304***

IAQ*Growth (X1 X2)

0.044***

0.049***

IAQ*ACI (X1 X3)

0.063**

0.123***

Growth*ACI (X2 X3)

0.160***

0.206***

IAQ*Growth*ACI (X1 X2 X3)
Leverage

-0.062***

-0.085***

-0.082

-0.054

INV/TA

-0.002

-0.054*

AR/TA

0.090**

NCL

0.069*

-0.079

-0.080

Adj. R2

0.302

0.383

F. Value

3.322

4.333

Notes: *, **, *** one-tailed statistical significance of white-corrected t values at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively.
The variables are defined as follows: ROA - return on assets; PSAPA - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit
staff who have prior work experience in auditing to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if
0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; PSAQ - three-point scale of the proportion of internal audit staff who have accounting
qualification to the size of the internal audit function, 1 if 1 0.5<= proportion, 2 if 0.5<proportion<1, 3 if proportion=1; ACI –
indicator variable of audit committee effectiveness (the proportion of independent members to the total number of members in
the audit committee), 0 if proportion<0.7, 1 if 0.7<=proportion <=1; Growth - market-to-book value of equity; Leverage current and non-current liabilities divided by total equity; INV/TA – inventory divided by total assets; AR/TA – account
receivable divided by total assets; NCL – net current liabilities divided by total assets.
Figure 1. Partial Derivatives of Firm Performance (Y) with respect to Internal Auditor Quality (X1) on Firm‘s Growth (X2)
Panel A: Internal audit staff with prior work experience in auditing. (X1 = PSAPA)
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Panel B: Internal audit staff with accounting qualification. (X1 = PSAQ)
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Figure 2. Partial Derivatives of Firm Performance (Y) with respect to Internal Auditor Quality (X1) on Firm‘s Growth (X2), for
Different Levels of Audit Committee Independence (ACI) (X3)
Panel A: Internal audit staff with prior work experience in auditing. (X1 = PSAPA)
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This study analyzes whether the mandatory bid rule has an impact on firm valuation, liquidity and
volatility. Using data from Brazilian firms that have voluntarily granted the bid rule, we provide
evidence of a positive relation between bid rule, firm valuation and liquidity. In contrast, the bid rule
does not decrease firm volatility. Our results support the hypotheses that the bid rule strengthens the
protection for minority shareholders.
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1. Introduction
Corporate governance has attracted considerable
attention following recent corporate scandals in
developed countries. One key aspect of corporate
governance is the degree of protection provided to
minority shareholders. When investor protection is
weak, conflicts of interest may arise between the
controlling shareholder and outside shareholders due
to the potential expropriation of private benefits by
controlling shareholders.
Our aim in this paper is to analyze the role of a
specific regulation related to control benefits, namely,
a mandatory bid rule. This rule implies that the
acquirer of a control block is also obliged to offer
minority shareholders the same (or partially the same)
price for their shares. Despite its simple definition, the
mandatory bid is one of the most controversial and
debated rules developed to protect minority
shareholders, because it presents several pros and cons
(see Bebchuk (1994), Bergstrom, Hogfeldt, and Molin
(1997), Bebchuk and Hart (2001), Burkart and
Panunzi
(2004),
Carvalhal
da
Silva
and
Subrahmanyam (2007), and Sepe (2008)).
On one side, the mandatory bid rule protects
minority investors because all shareholders are treated
equally, share any control premium, and have an exit
right in the event of a change of control. On the other
side, the mandatory bid rule has been subject to severe
criticism, because it fails to protect minority
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shareholders adequately, and does not prevent the
extraction of private benefits. By raising the cost of
acquisitions, the mandatory bid rule is likely to
prevent value-increasing transactions, and reduce the
value of the firm.
This paper examines the effect of the bid rule on
firm valuation, liquidity and volatility in Brazil. Brazil
offers a unique case study given the presence of a
large number of firms that have voluntarily decided to
grant the bid rule for their minority shareholders. Our
results indicate a positive relation between bid rule,
firm valuation and liquidity. In contrast, the bid rule
does not decrease firm volatility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2
presents a brief review of literature on the bid rule.
Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section
4 contains the results of the event studies. Section 5
discusses our findings and concludes.
2. Literature Review
The mandatory bid rule has been vastly studied in the
literature (Bebchuk (1994), Bergstrom, Hogfeldt, and
Molin (1997), Bebchuk and Hart (2001), Burkart and
Panunzi
(2004),
Carvalhal
da
Silva
and
Subrahmanyam (2007), among others). This rule can
be defined as the obligation imposed on the acquirer
of the control of a company to make an offer to all or a
part of the holders of all or a part of the securities
issued by the company for a determined price.
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There are two strong arguments in favor of the
mandatory bid rule. First, all shareholders should be
treated equally and share any control premium that is
paid to controlling shareholders. Second, all
shareholders should have an exit right in the event of a
takeover.
From these arguments, the mandatory bid rule
would protect minority shareholders from value
expropriations by opportunistic buyers, which would
increase minority share value, and reduce the firm‘s
cost for raising equity capital.
Carvalhal da Silva and Subrahmanyam (2007)
show that the mandatory bid rule strengthens the
protection for minority shareholders in event of a
takeover. This result is particularly relevant if the
takeover increases private benefits of the controlling
shareholders rather than all the shareholders' wealth
(Bigelli and Mengoli (1999), Bae, Kang, and Kim
(2002), and Shleifer and Vishny (2003)).
On the other side, the economic literature has
pointed out that the mandatory bid rule may prevent
value-increasing sales of control. Burkart and Panunzi
(2004) show that the mandatory bid rule eliminates
inefficient control transfers at the cost of discouraging
more efficient control transfers in firms with a
dominant shareholder (Bebchuk (1994)). Further, the
benefits but not the costs of the mandatory bid rule
tend to disappear when control is consolidated via
dual class shares or pyramids. They conclude that the
mandatory bid rule strengthens minority shareholder
protection at the expense of promoting efficient
control transfers.
On balance of all pros and cons, we hypothesize
that the bid rule offers enough benefits that outweigh
its costs, because its justifications seem more
compelling than its criticisms regarding minority
shareholder protection.
3. Data and Methodology
Our sample includes 75 firms listed on Sao Paulo
stock exchange (Bovespa) that voluntarily granted the
bid rule for voting and/or non-voting shares. We
exclude companies with incomplete or unavailable
information and firms without share liquidity. Most of
the data come from the Economatica, a financial
database that contains a wide coverage of Brazilian
stock market data.
We perform an event study to determine the
impact of the bid rule on the stock return, liquidity,
and volatility. The event study methodology requires
the precise identification of the event date. In the case
of the bid rule, it is difficult to identify precisely the
event date, because firms may discuss over time the
possibility of voluntarily granting the bid rule for
voting and non-voting shares.
Since the voluntary adoption of the bid rule must
be written on the company charter, we consider two
events: the date on which the call for the shareholders‘
meeting becomes publicly available, and the date on
which the shareholders approve the inclusion of the

bid rule on the company charter.
To be included in the event study, the company
must have trading activity during the 250-day window
before the voluntary adoption of the bid rule.
Furthermore, the adoption of the bid rule must be the
only relevant event approved by the shareholders‘
meeting.
After imposing these constraints, we exclude 52
companies that do not have the necessary data to
conduct the event study. Our final sample consists of
23 firms, which can be divided as follows: 19 firms
granting the bid rule for voting shares, and 23 firms
granting the bid rule for non-voting shares. Note that
most of the excluded companies have voluntarily
granted the bid rule since their IPO, so there was no
trading activity before their going public.
To calculate the abnormal returns, we estimate
the market model using the Sao Paulo stock exchange
index, and a 250-day estimation window from trading
day –255 to –6 relative to the event date (t=0). On a
particular day t, the abnormal return ARt is defined as
the return in excess of its expected return calculated
from the market model. Cumulative abnormal returns
over days -1 to +1 (CAR [-1,+1]), -5 to +1 (CAR
[-5,+1]), and -5 to +5 (CAR [-5,+5]) are calculated
around the event date. To assess statistical significance,
we use the traditional t-test for abnormal returns. Due
to event clustering and possible event-induced
volatility, we compute a bootstrap p-value (see
Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), Aktas,
DeBodt, and Roll (2004), and Elayan, Pukthuanthong,
and Roll (2005)).
In order to analyze the effect of the bid rule on
firm liquidity (trading volume relative to the total
market value) and volatility (annualized standard
deviation of daily returns in the last 250 trading days),
we run regressions in which the liquidity (volatility) of
share i in day t depends on the liquidity (volatility) of
share i in day t-1, and on the liquidity (volatility) of
the market index in day t. We run the models using a
501-day window from trading day –250 to +250
relative to the event date (t=0). The following
regressions are specified:

where Liqi,t is the liquidity of firm i in day t, Liqm,t is
the liquidity of the market index in day t,
Voli,t is the volatility of firm i in day t, Volm,t is the
volatility of the market index in day t, Bidi,t
is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm i
voluntarily grants the bid rule in day t,
e and u are error terms.
4. Results
The results of the event study for the relation between
stock returns and voluntary adoption of the bid rule
are reported in Table 1. The abnormal returns for
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voting shares are positive (ranging from 0.03% to
1.96%) during both events, and most of them are
statistically significant. When the bid rule is for
non-voting shares, they also present positive abnormal
returns, but the statistical significance is lower when
compared to that of voting shares.
Table 1
Overall, our results provide some evidence of
positive abnormal returns when the firm announces or
approves the bid rule in the shareholders‘ meeting. We
can note that the market reacts to both the call for the
shareholders‘ meeting and the shareholders‘ meeting
itself.
Although the call for a shareholder‘s meeting
does not necessarily mean that the bid rule is going to
be approved in the shareholders‘ meeting, it conveys
information about the probability of the approval.
The results for liquidity are shown in Table 2.
The current share liquidity depends strongly on the
previous share liquidity and on the current market
liquidity. Most importantly, there is a strong increase
in the liquidity when the firm calls and approves the
bid rule in the shareholders‘ meeting.
Table 2
Table 3 reports the results for volatility. We see
that the current share volatility depends on the
previous share volatility, and on the current volatility
of the market, but is not affected by the adoption of
the bid rule.
Table 3
Overall, the event studies and provides evidence that
the bid rule is positively associated with firm
valuation and liquidity, but is not related to volatility.
Our results support the hypothesis that the bid rule
strengthens the protection for minority shareholders.
5. Conclusions
This paper analyzes whether the adoption of the bid
rule has an impact on firm valuation, liquidity and
volatility. Brazil offers a unique case study given the
presence of a large number of firms that have
voluntarily granted the bid rule for their minority
shareholders. Our analysis shows that firm valuation
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and liquidity tends to increase when the firm
voluntarily grants the bid rule for minority
shareholders. In contrast, firm volatility does not
decrease after the adoption of the bid rule. Overall, our
results support the hypothesis that the bid rule
strengthens the protection for minority shareholders.
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Abstract
This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm
performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S&P 500 firm in 2005.
The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample
compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interest,
and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by
management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in the previous studies. Managerial
ownership also drives the capital structure as a nonlinear shape, but with a direction opposite to the
shape of firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects
capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Capital structure is endogenously determined by
both firm value and managerial ownership; while managerial ownership is not endogenously
determined by the other two variables.
Keywords: managerial ownership, capital structure, firm value, nonlinear
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1 Introduction
The effects of managerial ownership on firm value
have been of particular research interest in corporate
finance (Denis and McConnell, 2003). The literature
generally agrees that managers‘ and shareholders‘
interests are not fully aligned. The interest conflict
between management and shareholders produces
agency problem, which in turn reduce firm value.
Thus, an increase of managerial ownership from a low
level can help to connect the interests between insiders
and shareholders, and also lead to better decisions,
producing higher firm value. However, when the
equity owned by management reaches a certain level,
this increase in managerial ownership may give
mangers greater freedom to pursue their own interests
without considering a resulting decrease of firm value.
Only when managerial ownership approaches a

considerably high level, can the agency problem be
mitigated, and the firm value maximized. Therefore,
we hypothesize that managerial ownership and firm
value have a nonlinear relationship.
A series of researches examines the relationship
between managerial ownership and firm value. The
literature provide evidence to support the nonlinear
relationship hypothesis. Morck et al. (1988) conducted
pioneering work, in which they used piecewise linear
regressions to estimate the relationship between
Tobin‘s Q and the shareholdings of the board of
directors for 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They
found a nonlinear association between managerial
ownership and firm value. McConnell and Servaes
(1990) confirmed the nonlinear relationship in their
investigation of the firms listed in either NYSE or
AMEX in 1976 and 1986. Similar evidence of the
nonlinear relationship was detected by Short and
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Keasey (1999) in UK firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange for the period 1988 to 1992, and by Miguel
et al. (2004) on Spanish companies listed on the
Madrid Stock Exchange.
Further research shows that agency relationship
between managers and shareholders has the potential
to influence financial decision making, which in turn
impacts on firm value. Equities held by management
could motivate managers to make financial decisions
that are either only in their own interests, or happen to
coincide with shareholders‘ benefit, thereby leading to
lower or higher firm value. Cho (1998) applied a
cross-sectional data set of Fortune 500 manufacturing
firms in 1991 to explore the relationships among
ownership structure, investment and corporate value.
He found that insider ownership affected investment,
which in turn influenced corporate value. Davies et al.
(2005) reached a similar conclusion with research on
publicly listed UK companies, asserting that
investment decision making is a function of
managerial ownership and accordingly, determines
firm performance.
Leverage choice is another important financial
decision in addition to investment policy, and has
various effects on firm value. Since the inaugural
literature by Modigliani and Miller (1963), the
relationship between capital structure and firm
performance has prevailed as a discussion topic in
finance theory. It is often predicted that financial
leverage influences agency costs and thereby affects
corporate value because better leverage setting could
help mitigate agency costs by the threat of acquisition
and financial distress, which causes personal losses to
managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc.
(Williams, 1987) This has been proved by Ross (1977)
and Myers (1977) with respect to a signalling
hypothesis and Jensen‘s (1986) free cashflow
hypothesis.
Evidence about how managerial behavior arose
from equity holding influences the choice of capital
structure directly and indirectly has been put forward
since the end of last century. Friend and Lang (1988)
examined whether managerial entrenchment induced
by insiders‘ equity holding ―at least in part‖ motivates
capital structure decisions. Berger et al. (1997) applied
cross-sectional analysis and found evidence that firm
leverage is affected by the degree of managerial
entrenchment. Entrenched managers seek to avoid
debt, and therefore protect themselves and the
company from external threat. In an Australian sample,
Brailsford et al. (2002) found a nonlinear relationship
between the level of equity stake owned by
management and the capital structure measured by a
debt/equity ratio. However, the prior referenced
literature usually focused on the relationships between
either managerial ownership and firm value (Morck et
al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), or between
managerial ownership and investment decision and
firm value (Cho, 1998; Davies et al., 2005 etc.), or
between managerial ownership and capital structure
(Friend and Lang, 1988).
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In contrast, our research is conducted from a new
angle. Based on investigations of the relationships
between managerial ownership and firm value, and
managerial ownership and capital structure, we
detected interactive effects among the three proxies.
We also employed a relatively recent data set
comprising S&P 500 firms observed in 2005. We
examined whether the early findings by Morck et al.
(1988) and Cho (1998) using Fortune 500 data could
be verified by using S&P 500 data in a relatively
recent market environment.
We obtained the following new findings. First,
we used OLS regression, we replicated the nonlinear
relationship between managerial ownership and firm
value, which are discussed in research by Morck et al.
(1988) and Cho (1998). However, we found that the
turning points of managerial ownerships with respect
to the firm value had moved upward. For example, the
turning points in Morck et al. (1988) were 5% and
25%, and in Cho (1998) at 7% and 38% respectively.
By contrast, in our regression results, they were 17%
and 67%. We therefore argue that managers need more
ownership to control the firm for their own benefit, or
need motivations to align with shareholders‘ interest.
Second, we found that managerial ownership
drove the capital structure as a nonlinear shape — also
due to managerial entrenchment. However, we also
found that the directions of the nonlinear shapes for
managerial ownership and firm value, and for
managerial ownership and capital structure, were
oppositely related. Finally, the direct influence of
managerial ownership on firm value became
insignificant when capital structure was taken into
consideration. The results from simultaneous
regressions show that managerial shareholding
significantly impacts capital structure, which in turn
imposes effect on firm value. The results of
simultaneous equations also demonstrate that capital
structure is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical predictions
about the relationships between managerial ownership,
debt policy, and firm value. Section 3 explains the data
sample and interprets the statistics. Section 4 describes
the empirical specifications and results, and also
discusses the methodology and models employed in
this study. Section 5 concludes this research.
2 Theoretical predictions
Much of the literature indicates that managerial
ownership affects corporate value because equity
holding by management could motivate managers to
make financial decisions in their own benefit or for
shareholders‘ interest, thereby leading to decreased or
increased firm value (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell
and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999; Miguel et
al., 2004), and according to Davies et al. (2005), ―The
effectiveness of these incentives is potentially a
function of the level of managerial ownership in the
firm‖. When low levels of managerial ownership exist,

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
external discipline and internal monitoring dominate
management behavior to promote maximization of
corporate value, so we would expect a positive
relationship between managerial ownership and firm
value. At intermediate levels of managerial ownership,
with greater power coming from greater ownership,
managers may pursue their personal wealth at the
expense of corporate value. As managerial ownership
reaches a certain level, management interest converges
to that of shareholders, which produces a positive
relationship between managerial ownership and firm
performance.
Also important is the issue of how managerial
ownership affects corporate value. Brailsford et al.
(2002) argue that corporate managers and external
block owners are two key groups of shareholders with
a powerful influence on the decisions in a firm‘s
resource allocation. Cho (1998) found that managerial
ownership affects firm value because shareholding
motivates management to make investment decisions
to their own or to the shareholders‘ benefit, which
consequently affects firm performance. Leverage
choice is another important financial decision, and has
various effects on firm value. Debt increases the
bankruptcy risks of a firm, and self-interested
managers have incentives to reduce corporate debt to a
level that is less than optimal. However, from the
managerial perspective, the capital structure decision
is not only determined by the basic concerns of risk
and controls — the values, goals, preferences and
desires of managers are also important inputs in
finance decision making.
At low levels of managerial ownership,
managers have limited voting power and influence;
while external related beneficiaries, such as block
holders and creditors, have the ability to monitor and
restrict opportunistic behavior by managers.
Managerial ownership is negatively related to a firm‘s
debt ratio because of managers‘ risk averting
possibility. However, with high levels of managerial
ownership, external related beneficiaries may not have
the ability to prevent self-interested managers from
indulging in non-maximizing behavior. Debt is
increased as managers begin to use leverage as an
entrenchment tool to avert being acquired or
purchased. Thus, we would expect a positive
relationship between capital structure and managerial
ownership in this interval. With managers having
effective control in terms of a very high proportion of
managerial shareholding, they seek to reduce their
risks by decreasing the use of debt. Brailsford et al.
(2002) provide empirical evidence for this scenario in
their documenting of a nonlinear relationship between
the level of equity stake owned by managers and
capital structure measured by debt/equity ratio, which
supports the findings of Friend and Lang (1988) and
Berger et al. (1997).
Many variables related to financial decision, firm
value and managerial ownership are likely to be
determined simultaneously, which may result in an
even more complex relationship. The previous

discussions propose that managerial ownership affects
capital structure choice, and the capital structure is
determined by many other factors. The resultant
leverage affects how ownership is structured. Hence,
questions arise over the possible endogeneity of
ownership (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Cho, 1998). Cho
(1998) used OLS regressions to test whether insider
ownership affects investment, and therefore, corporate
value. However, simultaneous regressions reveal that
investment affects corporate value which, in turn,
affects managerial ownership, but not vice versa. In
contrast, Berger and Patti (2006) employed a
simultaneous equation model to study the possibility
of reverse causality from firm value to capital
structure in the banking industry.
On the basis of theoretical analyses and
empirical evidence, the following hypothesis are
discussed in this study:
H1: A nonlinear relationship exists between
managerial ownership and firm value, where: firm
value first increases and, after a certain breakpoint,
decreases, and then increases again as managerial
ownership rises.
H2: A nonlinear relationship exists between
managerial ownership and capital structure, where:
capital structure first falls, then rises, and finally
continues to fall as managerial ownership increases.
H3: Managerial ownership affects capital structure,
which in turn, affects firm value. Managerial
shareholding and leverage choice are endogenously
determined.
3 Data and statistics
The sample was constructured from S&P 500 firms in
2005. We extracted the data of board ownership from
the RiskMetrics database. The financial structure and
other data are collected from the database of
COMPUSTAT North America. After rejecting firms
with insufficient data items for our modeling, the final
sample consisted of 353 S&P 500 firms. In the
robustness test, we used the one-year lagged variables
of managerial ownership in 2005 to study its effect on
in 2006. There is not any missing value of calculating
Tobin‘s Q and capital structure for the 353 sample
firms in 2005.
We mainly applied Tobin‘s Q as the measure of
firm performance, which is the ratio of firm‘s market
value to the book value of total assets (Kaplan and
Zingales, 1997). The market value of assets was
calculated as the book value of assets plus the market
value of common stock, less the sum of book value of
common equity and deferred taxes. Holderness (2003)
investigated the US evidences on equity ownership by
insiders and blockholders, where insiders are defined
as the officers and directors of a firm. Cho (1998)
defines ―insider ownership as the fraction of shares,
not including options, held by officers and directors of
the board.‖ Davies et al. (2005) use the managerial
ownership stake of all board members to represent
managerial shareholding. After a considered reading
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of the various definition, we‘ve decided to use the
ownership stake of all board members as a proxy for
managerial ownership.
Table 1 describes managerial ownership, Tobin‘s
Q, and capital structure for the sample of 353 S&P
500 firms in 2005. The mean combined ownership of
all board members is 4.6%. The median ownership,
however, is only 1.3%, suggesting that the distribution
is skewed. The Tobin‘s Q values in 2005 range from
0.878 to 13.024, with a mean of 2.199. Capital
structure ranges from nearly zero leverage ratio of
0.084 to an over-leveraged ratio of 1.153. The mean
capital structure is 0.572; that is, almost the same as
the median value of 0.575.
[Table 1 here]
Table 2 reports the distribution of the number of firms,
values of Tobin‘s Q and capital structure, as classified
by different ranges of managerial ownership.
―MANA‖ indicates the proportion of managerial
ownership. The distribution of firm number in the
sample is skewed towards low levels of managerial
ownership. In 282 firms, comprising 80% of the
sample firms, board members owned less than 5% of
the firms. In 28 firms, total board holdings constituted
an equity in the range of 5% to 10%. In 13 firms (4%
of the sample firms) board members had ownership
levels in of between 10% and 15%. However, the
managerial holdings did span a wide range in the
remaining 25 firms. This distribution is consistent
with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and
Morck et al. (1988), ―suggesting the prevalence of
significant management ownership in the US‖ (Cho,
1998).
[Table 2 here]
Table 2 also suggests that there is a nonlinear
relationship between levels of managerial ownership
and Tobin‘s Q. The mean Tobin‘s Q increases from
2.14 in the first range of managerial ownership to 2.42
and 2.93 in the second and third ranges. Then the
mean value of Tobin‘s Q declines to 2.51, 2.32, and
1.98, until reaching 1.47 in the last range of
managerial ownership of over 60%. This distribution
is consistent with the descriptions in Cho (1998),
where Tobin‘s Q has a similar inverse relationship
with the level of managerial ownership. The
association between the levels of equity stake owned
by board members and capital structure measured by
the debt/asset ratio is also non-monotonic, as shown in
Table 2. At the level of managerial ownership below
5%, the mean leverage ratio is 0.59. The leverage ratio
subsequently decreases from between 5% and 10%
managerial ownership to between 10% and 15%.
Thereafter, the leverage ratio increases as managerial
ownership increases. The leverage ratio approaches its
highest level of 0.58 when managerial ownership is
over 60%. Therefore, quadratic curves do exist
between managerial ownership and Tobin‘s Q, and
74

between managerial ownership and capital structure.
The directions of the relationships between managerial
ownership and Tobin‘s Q, and between managerial
ownership and capital structure are opposite.
4 Empirical specifications and results
4.1 Managerial ownership and firm value
In order to model the relationship between Tobin‘s Q
and managerial ownership (MANA) and determine
two extremum turning points of managerial ownership
when Tobin‘s Q changes direction, we specify a cubic
function28 as follows:
Q=a+

1

MANA +

2

MANA2 +

3

MANA3 + ε
(1)

MANA stands for the proportion of managers‘ stock
ownership, Q stands for Tobin‘s Q, namely firm value.
The regression results are:

The intercept coefficient, which is an estimate of
Tobin‘s Q in firms with no managerial holdings, is
1.99, which is similar to the 1.85 recorded in Davies et
al. (2005). Each coefficient is of the expected sign,
and statistically significant at the 1% level for constant,
MANA and MANA2, and at the 5% level for MANA3.
Although the adjusted R square is low, it is similar to
those found in other relevant papers (for example,
Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990;
Cho, 1998; Himmelberg et al,, 1999; Davies et al.,
2005). We then calculated turning points by
differentiating Tobin‘s Q with respect to MANA. The
two turning points are:
MANA = 0.171 and MANA = 0.671
As expected, Tobin‘s Q first increases when
managerial ownership is less than 17.1%, and then
declines until managerial shareholding reaches to
67.1%. Tobin‘s Q rises again slightly as managerial
ownership reaches over 67.1%. This result validates
Hypothesis 1, discussed in the section on theoretical
predictions. At low levels of managerial ownership, an
increase in management equity holding closely aligns
28

For the number of turning points of managerial
ownership to firm value, Morck et al. (1988) found two
points; McConnell and Servaes (1990) model the
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value
as a quadratic function, which has only one turning point;
Cho (1998) and Miguel et al. (2004) have two points,
following Morck et al. (1988); while Davies et al. (2005)
used a quintic equation and generated four turning points.
The number of points probably does not matter; however,
significance is of most importance, and determining how to
explain the significance of each turning point. Considering
the theoretical predictions and results of the descriptive
statistics of this study, we decided to use a cubic model,
which involves two extremum points and three intervals of
managerial share ownership.
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with the interests of managers and shareholders,
thereby increasing corporate value. However, at
relatively high levels of managerial ownership, an
increase in management equity shareholding makes
management more entrenched and less subject to
market discipline, thereby reducing corporate value
(Cho, 1998). When managerial ownership rises to a
considerably high level, managers‘ interests fully align
with shareholders‘ interests. In this situation,
management pursue best firm performance and firm
value is maximised.
This nonlinear tendency is consistent with results
from Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998) and so on;
however, the turning points are different. Morck et al.
(1988) used a piecewise regression on a sample of
Fortune 500 firms and found two extremum values of
managerial ownership: 5% and 25%. Cho (1998) used
a grid searching technology with a sample of Fortune
500 firms also, and found the turning points of
managerial ownership at 7% and 38%. Miguel et al.
(2004) used unbalanced panel data of 135 Spanish
companies and found two turning points of 35% and
70%.
The sample differences in firms and markets may
be one possible reason for the variation in pairs of
turning points. However, we suspect that the sample
differences in time are the main explanation for the
differing turning points. For example, the study by
Morck et al. (1988) used evidence based on 1980 data.
Cho‘s (1998) finding resulted from 1991 observations.
The data time horizon in Miguel et al. (2004) was
from 1990 to 1999. Our finding was generated from
the data for 2005. The turning points of managerial
ownership with respect to firm values move upward as
the sample time approaches the present. We strongly
argue that, due to the evolution of corporate
governances and regulations, the thresholds of
managerial ownership for either self-interested
decision making or interest alignment between
managers and shareholders have moved up. In other
words, managers need more ownership to obtain
sufficient voting power to make decisions that are in
their own interest. Furthermore, more managerial
ownership is required for a full interest alignment
between managers and shareholders.
4.2 Managerial ownership and capital
structure
Based on the analysis of the theoretical predictions,
we here examine the relationship between managerial
ownership and capital structure. For the convenience
of a further comparison, and according to the
description in Table 2, we modified model (1) into
model (2):
CS (capital structure) = a +

3

1

MANA +

2

MANA2 +
MANA3 + ε
(2)
where MANA = the proportion of managerial
ownership, and CS = capital structure, which is

defined as total debt divided by total assets.
The results of model (2) are:

All the coefficients are of the expected signs and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Then we
calculate points of extremum and intersection via
derivation. The two turning points are:
MANA = 0.192; and MANA = 0.635
The results of model (2) show negative
relationships between managerial ownership and
leverage ratios when managerial ownership is in the
range from 0% to 19.2% or beyond 63.5%; while a
positive relationship between managerial ownership
and leverage ratios exists when managerial ownership
is in the range from 19.2% to 63.5%. This result
validates our prediction and Hypothesis 2. First, when
the level of managerial ownership is low, an increase
in managerial ownership has the effect of aligning
management and shareholders‘ interests (Brailsford et
al., 2002). Consequently, the main objective of
managers is to maximize shareholders‘ wealth and to
achieve higher firm performance by using appropriate
financial decisions to avert financial distress. Thus a
negative relationship exists between managerial
ownership and capital structure.
Second, as the increase of managerial ownership,
external block holders may not have the ability to
prevent self-interested managers from indulging in
non-maximizing behavior. Board members become
entrenched with significant voting power and
influence and began to manipulate the debt ratio to
achieve self-interest. For example, they may increase
debt to obtain more cash, therefore make suboptimum
investment decisions or build a ―management empire.‖
However, when corporate managers hold a significant
proportion of a firm‘s shares (over 63.5%), managers
have their own interests aligned with those of
shareholders. The entrenchment effect decreases,
resulting in reduced debt ratio as managers seek to
reduce bankruptcy risks, or alternatively, the
agency-related benefits from the use of debt are
substituted through managerial ownership.
Brailsford et al. (2002) examined the relationship
between ownership structure and capital structure with
a sample of top 500 companies listed on the Australian
Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 1995. Their
results indicate a nonlinear inverted U-shaped
relationship between the level of managerial
ownership and leverage ratios. The results of the
present study could supplement the evidence from
Brailsford et al. (2002).
[Figure 1 here]
The regression results of models (1) and (2) and
the estimated turning points are shown graphically in
Figure 1. The track generated by model (1) displays a
75

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership
and Tobin‘s Q, indicating that firm value increases as
managerial ownership rises from zero to 17.1% of P1
at point A. Firm value then decreases as board
ownership increases, until another value of 67.1% of
P4 at point D is reached. Finally, firm value increases
slightly again for managerial ownership levels above
67.1%. The relationship between capital structure and
managerial ownership is also non-monotonic, as
described by the track generated by model (2). The
value of capital structure decreases in managerial
ownership less than 19.2% as described of P2 at point
B, then the value increases until managerial
shareholding reaches 63.5% of P3 at point C; while
the value of leverage goes down again when the stake
of managerial ownership is over 63.5%. However, P1
could be explained as the coincidence of P2; while P3
and P4 could also be coincident. The occurrence of
these small differences may be because of statistical
error.
Figure 1 clearly shows the three levels of
managerial ownership. At a low level of managerial
ownership (less than 20%), external discipline and
internal controls or incentives dominate managers‘
behavior (Fama, 1980; Davies et al., 2005).
Managerial labor markets operate on the principal that
poorly performing managers can be removed and
appropriately disciplined (Davies et al., 2005). Board
members have sufficient incentive to adopt financial
policies such as debt decisions that avert financial
distress and achieve better firm performance. As the
level of managerial equity ownership rises beyond a
certain level (approximately 20%), managerial
objectives begin to be entrenched. Internal mentoring
and external discipline become weak. This lack of
disciplinary control over management may strengthen
managers‘ ability to pursue their own benefits at the
cost of decreasing firm value by using suboptimal
corporate policies. As the level of managerial
ownership reaches a considerably high value
(approximately 65%), managers align their interests
with those of other owners, which leads to value
maximization management behavior, as predicted by
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Managers use less debt
to avert being purchased or increase financial risk.
According to the results of OLS regressions, we
conjecture that managerial ownership affects capital
structure, which in turn affects firm value. However,
we could not confirm this transmitting association
without a stricter test. Next, we estimate a
simultaneous equations model to test this relationship.

Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital
structure, ROE, liquidity)
(3)
Firm value = g (managerial ownership, capital
structure, investment, size)
(4)
Capital structure = h (managerial ownership, firm
value, ROE, liquidity)
(5)
We estimate the simultaneous equations with
control variables29. ROE in equation (3) and equation
(5) is defined as earnings before interest and taxes
divided by total common equity. Liquidity is the
common equity minus liquidation value. Although this
paper discusses the intermediate function of capital
structure, investment is nevertheless an important
financial policy, so we used investment as a control
variable of equation (4) and capital expenditure as a
variable of investment, following Cho (1998) and
Davies et al. (2005). Table 3 reports the regression
results of the simultaneous equations. First, for the
multiple relationships between managerial ownership,
capital structure and firm value, as Cho (1998) and
Himmelberg et al. (1999) document, once endogeneity
is controlled, the perceived impact of managerial
ownership on corporate value disappears. The results
of the firm performance equation of model (4) in
Table 3 suggests that the levels of board shareholding
do not influence firm value directly, which contrasts
with the OLS results of model (1). This evidence
reflects the complicated causality between firm value
and managerial ownership, and other variables may
act as intermediates to assist managerial ownership, in
turn imposing effects on firm performance. Capital
structure has a negative influence on firm value, as
described by the results of equation (4) — evidence of
its intermediate function. Managerial ownership also
has significant effects on capital structure, as shown in
the result of capital structure30 equation (5) in the last
column of Table 3. Therefore, the results address the
influence of managerial shareholding on capital
structure, which in turn affects firm value.

4.3 Managerial ownership, capital
structure and firm value

29 This study also advances dummy variables representing
industry effect, based on three-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes. Because the variables of industry
are not significant, we eliminated them.
30
For the coefficients in the capital structure equation, each
slope coefficient is of the correct sign and is statistically
significant at the 5% level. The adjusted R square of model
(5) is much higher than that of model (2). The extremum
turning points of model (5) through a derivation are MANA
= 20.8%, 61.9% — almost equal to that of model (2), which
are 19.2% and 63.5%.

To capture the potential multiple relationship between
managerial ownership, capital structure and firm
performance, we applied a set of simultaneous
equations using the two-stage least square (2SLS)
method.
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[Table 3 here]
The results of equation (3) also suggest that the
ownership of board directors is not significantly
affected by Tobin‘s Q, which differs from the result
found by Cho (1998), Kole (1994), and Davies et al.
(2005), but is consistent with Demsetz and Villalonga
(2001). In equation (3), ROE has an insignificant
coefficient, which suggests that earnings have
insufficient influence on managerial ownership. Cho
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(1998) and Davies et al. (2005) used volatility in their
managerial ownership equations and obtained similar
results. Conversely, liquidity has a significant negative
effect on managerial ownership in our model (3),
while Cho (1998) found an insignificant effect and
Davies et al. (2005) found positive effects from this
variable. Thus, the relationship between managerial
ownership and liquidity is controversial. Furthermore,
the negative and significant coefficient of capital
structure in model (3) suggests that board directors in
firms with lower debt hold a larger fraction of their
firm‘s shares.
The second column of Table 3 represents the
coefficients of model (4). Capital expenditure, which
is a proxy of investment in this study, slightly
influences firm performance, but not quite
significantly. This is consistent with the results of Cho
(1998) and Davies et al. (2005)31 and to some extent
represents evidence of relationship between
investment and firm value. Relevantly, asset size is
quite a significant determination of firm performance.
Therefore, we also used company size as a control
variable in equation (4). We measured firm size as the
logarithm of the replacement cost of assets, following
Cho (1998), to alleviate the possible size effect
problem. As expected, firm value turns out to be a
decreasing function of company size. McConnell and
Servaes (1995) used the estimated replacement value
of assets as a proxy for size, and found a negative
relationship with Tobin‘s Q for all categories
according to P/E ratios. However, the negative
relationship is insignificant, which echoes the findings
of McConnell and Servaes (1990), Miguel et al.
(2004), and Berger and Patti (2006).
The significant negative coefficient of capital
structure in equation (4) requires more discussion.
Morck et al. (1988) found that leverage has a negative
but insignificant impact on corporate value, and
attributed this to the possibility that managers in
highly leveraged firms might hold a higher than
average level of ownership (Davies et al. (2005).
However, contradicting these results, McConnell and
Servaes (1990) report a positive significant coefficient
for leverage ration on firm performance. Leverage is
one way of imposing external discipline on
management and, if effective, leads to increased
corporate value. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)
interpret the negative association between leverage
and firm value as being due to the relative inflation
between the current time period and the earlier time
period when companies had issued much of their debt.
In this study, the negative association between capital
structure and firm value meets the requirement of
being a transitional variable of managerial ownership
on firm performance. Thus, we can take this negative
relationship as indirect evidence of Hypothesis 2 and
31

Both these papers discuss the relationship of ownership
structure and investment, which in turn affects corporate
value. Therefore, we used the capital expenditure on firm
value equation in this study as a control variable.

Hypothesis 3, as discussed in theoretical predictions.
ROE measures a firm‘s efficiency at generating
profits from every dollar of shareholders‘ equity. It
shows how well a company uses investment dollars to
generate earnings growth. ROE was found to be
positive and significant related to the level of capital
structure for the results of model (5). This suggests
that firms with higher earnings have a higher debt
capacity due to lower bankruptcy risks. Noticeably,
some of the literature uses the accounting profit rate to
measure firm performance, such as ROE in Demsetz
and Lehn (1985), and profitability in Chaessens and
Djankov (1999). However, some critics might say that
accounting profit rate is backward-looking and Tobin‘s
Q is forward-looking (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).
Most of the more recent literature use Tobin‘s Q as a
proxy for firm performance. Therefore, the negative
influence (-0.06) of Tobin‘s Q on capital structure and
the positive effect (0.05) of ROE on capital structure
are consistent with our expectation. Firm liquidity has
a positive influence on capital structure, but the effect
is insignificant. Cho (1998) examined the relationship
of liquidity and investment, and produced a significant
positive coefficient. We viewed the other important
result from the simultaneous equations as being the
endogeneity of capital structure. The regression results
of the last column in Table 3 also indicate that Tobin‘s
Q negatively affects capital structure. Added to the
effect of capital structure on firm valuation, firm
performance and capital structure have a mutual
influence, which reflects the endogenous character of
capital structure. Taken together, the capital structure
is not only an intermediate variable of influence
between managerial ownership and firm value, but
also an endogenous variable which should not be
neglected in financial research practices.
Capital structure affects managerial ownership
and firm value. Managerial ownership has an indirect
influence on firm value, but has a significant effect on
capital structure. Thereby, managerial ownership is not
influenced by firm value, which is at odds with Cho
(1998), Davies et al. (2005). The problem may rise
from using different samples and data from former
research. However, if the endogeneity of managerial
ownership varies in different samples, it warrants
further exploration and research. In summary,
hypothesis 3 is partly proved by the results of the
simultaneous equations. Managerial ownership affects
capital structure, which in turn affects firm value.
However, the endogeneity of capital structure is
confirmed, while the endogenous managerial
ownership is still controversial.
4.4 Robustness tests
Firstly, this section discusses the lagged dependent
variables for model (1) and model (2). We examined
the relationship between managerial ownership and
firm value above, as well as the relationship between
managerial ownership and capital structure separately
for S&P 500 firms in 2005. However, the function of
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managerial ownership on firm value and on capital
structure may display a time effect. Therefore, we
conducted estimations by using Tobin‘s Q and capital
structure of S&P 500 firms in 2006 and managerial
ownership in 2005. We assumed that the managerial
ownership impacts mainly on the firm value and
capital structure of the next year. The results are
described in Table 4.

MANA 19% to 64%= 0 if managerial ownership < 0.19,
=
managerial
ownership minus 0. 19 if 0.19 < managerial ownership
< 0.64,
= 0.64 if managerial
ownership> 0.64.
MANA over 64% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm
< 0.64,
= managerial ownership
minus 0.64 if managerial ownership > 0.64.

[Table 4 here]
[Table 5 here]
We used the value of the leverage variable and Tobin‘s
Q for data from 2006 to build up a relationship with
the one-year advanced value of managerial ownership
in 2005. In model (1) of Table 4, significant
coefficients and the predicted slope look similar to
those without a time lag consideration, which is
discussed in Section 4.1. The extremum turning points
of managerial ownership with respect to firm value are
0.1759 and 0.7016. In model (2) of Table 4, after
considering the time lag, the coefficients are
noticeably less significant than previously; also, all the
coefficients for managerial ownership are still
significant at the 10% significance level. In summary,
the results indicate that time effects do not alter the
influence of managerial ownership on firm value and
capital structure.
We also use piecewise regression with
simultaneous equations to explore whether
considering different ranges of managerial ownership
produces results with significant differences from
those estimated via models (3), (4), and (5). The
sample consists of 353 S&P 500 companies in 2005.
The models are as follows, and the estimations are
reported in Table 5.
Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital
structure, ROE, liquidity)
(6)
Firm value = g (piecewise managerial ownership,
capital structure, investment, size)
(7)
Capital structure = h (piecewise managerial
ownership, firm value, ROE, liquidity) (8)
The piecewise managerial ownership (MANA)
in the firm value model (7) is defined by the results of
turning points (17.1%, 67.1%) from equation (1):
MANA up to 17%
= managerial ownership if
managerial
ownership
<
0.17,
= 0.17 if managerial ownership of firm >0.17.
MANA 17% to 67%= 0 if managerial ownership < 0.17,
= managerial ownership minus 0. 17 if 0.17 <
managerial
ownership
<
0.67,
= 0.67 if managerial ownership> 0.67.
MANA over 67% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm
< 0.67,
= managerial
ownership minus 0.67 if managerial ownership > 0.67.
In the capital structure model (8), the three levels
of managerial ownership are defined by two breaking
points of 19% and 64%, which resulted from model
(2) of 19.2% and 63.5%:
MANA up to 19%
= managerial ownership if
managerial
ownership
<
0.19,
= 0.19 if managerial ownership of firm >0.19.
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The results in Table 5 show that most coefficients are
similar to those in Table 3. Managerial ownership in
model (7), using three piecewise variables, remained
an insignificant influence on firm performance. For
the results in model (8), the coefficients of managerial
ownership over 64%, and in the range between 19%
and 64%, are insignificant in the 5% significant level.
This may be due to the limited sample of firms in this
range, compared to the multitude of sample firms in
the range of managerial ownership up to 19%.
However, the significant coefficient of MANA up to
19% still offers powerful evidence for prior
prediction.
The other robustness test is for the measurement
of firm performance. Cheng (2008) used a proxy of
industry-adjusted Q, defined as the difference between
the firm‘s Q and the average Q of the firms in the
same two-digit SIC code industry in the same year. We
used a similar method for calculation of
industry-adjusted Tobin‘s Q, which is applied in model
(1), and produced the following results:

We then calculated points of extremum and
intersection via derivation. The two extremum points
are: MANA = 0.170 and MANA = 0.671
For the simultaneous
equations
using
industry-adjusted Q, we derived similar results, as
shown in Table 3. This indicates that the relationship
between firm value and managerial ownership is not
affected by industrial diversity. Himmelberg et al.
(1999) employed the data from Compustat firms over
a three-year period from1982 to1984 to investigate the
relationship between managerial ownership and firm
performance. After controlling for fixed three-digit
SIC effects for each regression, our results are almost
the same after adjustment of industry effects.
5 Conclusions
This paper extends the previous research (Morck et al.,
1988; Cho, 1998; Short and Keasey, 1999; Davies et
al., 2005) by introducing capital structure as an
intermediate variable between managerial ownership
and corporate value. Through a sample of 353 S&P
500 firms in 2005, this study applied two cubic
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equations to explore the relationship between
managerial ownership and firm performance, and
managerial ownership and capital structure. The study
also applied simultaneous equations in order to detect
the interrelationship between managerial ownership,
firm value, and capital structure.
First, we found a nonlinear relationship between
Tobin‘s Q and the fraction of shares owned by a board
of directors, which is consistent with the results of
Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998), Short and Keasey
(1999), and Miguel et al. (2004). Tobin‘s Q, which is a
proxy of firm performance, increases as managerial
ownership grows until it reaches 17.1%. Thereafter,
Tobin‘s Q declines with the decline in managerial
ownership until it reaches 67.1%. Tobin‘s Q rises
again slightly as managerial ownership increases
higher 67.1%. We found that the two turning points
were higher than those detected by Morck et al. (1988)
and Cho (1998), using early period data from the
Fortune 500. We strongly argue that, due to the
evolution of corporate governance and changes of
regulation, the managerial control for pursuing
self-interest and alignment of interests between
managers and other shareholders can only be
approached by management holding more ownership
than that in early time.
Second, the association between managerial
ownership and capital structure is non-monotonic. A
negative relationship exists between managerial
ownership and leverage ratios when managerial
ownership is below 19.2% or higher than 63.5%.
Within the managerial ownership range 19.2% to
63.5%, the leverage ratio increases as the managerial
ownership increases. These results imply that a
transitional relationship exists between managerial
ownership, capital structure, and firm value.
Third, by using a simultaneous equation
regression, we found that managerial ownership does
not influence firm value significantly when capital
structure is added into the equation. However,
managerial ownership significantly affects capital
structure, and capital structure affects corporate
performance directly. Meanwhile, capital structure is
endogenously determined by both firm value and
managerial ownership. Therefore, the results from this
study address the influence of managerial
shareholding on capital structure, which in turn affects
firm value.
Furthermore, three intervals of managerial
ownership exist, which have different effects on
managers‘ financial decision making; namely, their
selection of capital structure. Ultimately, the different
capital structures have varying influences on firm
value. When managerial ownership is less than 20%,
managerial labor market and external discipline
dominate managers‘ behavior. The incentive against
firm value maximization can be removed. Managers
are motivated to adopt financial policies (such as
leverage ratio) to avert financial distress and acquire
better firm performance. When managerial ownership
is between approximately 20% and 60%, internal

monitoring and external discipline becomes less
effective. The voting power of managers allows them
to choose suboptimal capital structure for
entrenchment and then decrease firm value. When
managerial ownership exceeds a considerable level,
perhaps 60%, management then has aligned interests
with other shareholders, and managers choose optimal
capital structure and thus increase firm value.
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Appendices
Table 1. Summary of main statistics
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. dev
Skewness Kurtosis
Managerial ownership
0.046
0.013
0.874
0.000
0.097
4.416
27.819
Tobin‘s Q
2.199
1.707
13.024
0.878
1.431
2.866
15.87
Capital structure
0.572
0.575
1.153
0.084
0.204
-0.062
2.621
Notes: Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding. Tobin‘s Q is the
market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The
sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005.
Table 2. Mean values of Tobin‘s Q and capital structure by managerial ownership levels
Managerial ownership

Number
of firms

Mean Tobin‘s Q

Std. dev
Tobin‘s Q

of

Mean
structure

capital

Std. dev of capital
structure

0 < = MANA < 5%

282

2.1352

1.419

0.5934

0.1976

5% < = MANA < 10%
10% < = MANA < 15%
15% < = MANA < 20%
20% < = MANA < 40%
40% < = MANA < 60%

28
13
12
7
4

2.4202
2.9270
2.5052
2.3214
1.9804

1.7988
1.2600
0.9719
1.5675
0.6132

0.4711
0.4657
0.4609
0.5336
0.5470

0.2039
0.1395
0.2794
0.2331
0.2152

60% < = MANA

2

1.4696

0.6575

0.5847

0.2303

Notes: MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total
shares outstanding. Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Capital structure is the
ratio of total debt to total assets. The sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005.
Table 3. Simultaneous regression analysis using two-stage least squares method
Variable
Constant term
Tobin‘s Q
ROE
Liquidity
Capital structure
MANA
MANA2
MANA3
Capital expenditure
SIZE
Number of firms
Adj. R2

Managerial ownership (3)
0.099558 (4.46)***
-0.004038 (-0.97)
0.004714 (0.76)
-7.60E-07 (-2.07)**
-0.070173 (-2.48)**

353
0.019141

Firm value (4)
7.135857(12.94)***

-1.528850 (-4.09)***
1.807075 (0.62)
-8.475954 (-0.70)
5.985242 (0.53)
5.74E-05 (1.59)
-1.027659 (-6.71)***
353
0.269374

Capital structure (5)
0.729157 (35.42)***
-0.061894 (-8.75)***
0.045399 (4.01)***
-3.22E-07 (-0.47)
-1.457348 (-3.46)***
4.693926 (2.67)***
-3.784003 (-2.31)**

353
0.227331

Notes: Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. ROE is earnings before interest and
taxes, divided by total common equity. Liquidity is common equity minus liquidation value. Capital structure is the ratio of
total debt to total assets. MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership — the ratio of shares owned by all board members
to total shares outstanding. The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3. Size is the logarithm of total
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assets. Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding. Capital structure
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005.
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
Table 4. Results of model (1) and model (2) by one-year lagged managerial ownership
C

MANA

MANA2

MANA3

Adjusted
R-squared

Number
of firms

Model (1) Tobin‘s Q of 2.005261
7.686971
-27.32867
20.76365
0.012911
353
2006
(21.44)***
(2.56)**
(-2.18)*
(1.77)*
Model (2) capital 0.592953
-0.839774
3.511276
-3.165457
0.001471
353
structure of 2006
(41.58)***
(-1.83)*
(1.82)*
(-1.75)*
Notes: Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. Capital structure is the ratio of total
debt to total assets. MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board
members to total shares outstanding. The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3. The sample is 353
S&P 500 firms in 2005.
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 5. Robustness test using simultaneous regression with two-stage least squares method
Variable

Managerial ownership (6)

Firm value (7)

Constant term

0.099558(4.46)***

Tobin‘s Q

-0.004038(-0.97)

-0.062804(-8.87)***

0.004714(0.76)

0.045708(4.03)***

Liquidity

-7.60E-07(-2.07)**

-2.20E-07 (-0.32)

Capital structure

-0.070173(-2.48)**

ROE

7.161043(13.19)***

Capital structure (8)

-1.524488(-4.08)***

MANA up to 17%

0.854469(0.52)

MANA 17% to 67%

-1.852596(-1.18)

MANA over 67%

1.125821(0.17)

Capital expenditure

5.73E-05 (1.59)

SIZE

0.720942(35.67)***

-1.032152(-6.76)***

MANA up to 19%

-0.743853(-3.42)***

MANA 19% to 64%

0.293408(1.23)

MANA over 64%
Number of firms

-0.971243(-0.94)
353

353

353

2

Adj. R
0.019141
0.269532
0.221598
Notes: Tobin‘s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets. ROE is earnings before interest and
taxes, divided by total common equity. Liquidity is common equity minus liquidation value. Capital structure is the ratio of
total debt to total assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board
members to total shares outstanding. MANA up to 17% = managerial ownership if managerial ownership < 0.17, = 0.17 if
managerial ownership of firm >= 0.17. MANA 17% to 67% = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.17, = managerial ownership - 0.
17 if 0.17 < managerial ownership < 0.67, = 0.67 if managerial ownership > 0.67. MANA over 67% = 0 if managerial
ownership of firm < 0.67, = managerial ownership - 0.67 if managerial ownership > 0.67. MANA up to 19% = managerial
ownership if managerial ownership < 0.19, = 0.19 if managerial ownership of firm > 0.19. MANA 19% to 64% = 0 if
managerial ownership < 0.19, = managerial ownership - 0. 19 if 0.19 < managerial ownership < 0.64, = 0.64 if managerial
ownership > 0.64. MANA over 64% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm < 0.64, = managerial ownership - 0.64 if managerial
ownership > 0.64. The sample is 353 S&P 500 firms in 2005.
*** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
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Figure 1. Relationship among firm value, capital structure and
managerial ownership
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P1 = 0.171
P2 = 0.192
P3 = 0.635
P4 = 0.671
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THE FAMILY BUSINESS: A UNIQUE PROFILE OF BEHAVIOUR, OR A
PROFILE ADAPTED TO THE NEEDS OF THE FAMILY AND THE
MARKET?
Carmen Galve-Górriz*, Vicente Salas-Fumás*
Abstract
This paper helps to theorize the link between family generation and the characteristics, behaviour,
management and governance of the firm. The paper also answers the question: to what extent is
competitive position affected by each generation? The paper overcomes the limitation of the
cross-sectional data, since the investigation is applied to data from Spanish firms during the period
1994 to 2005, which is much more appropriate when discussing developmental models. Our results
confirm the greater degree of complexity of the family firm, as the ownership and the running of the
business is passed to future generations. However, and contrary to all expectations, family firms in the
sample have a high degree of concentration of ownership, regardless of the generation and a greater
complexity in the business does not give rise to the incorporation of external partners in the company’s
share capital. In fact, third generation companies have no external partners, with 100% capital
remaining in the family.
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1. Introduction
Family firms hold a particular position among all the
different types of company, owing to the nature of
their ownership structures, their leadership and their
evolutionary dynamics. In contrast to other types of
company, family firms constitute the basic foundations
of the business community worldwide. Their creation,
growth and longevity are critical to the success of the
global economy, and the economic and social
importance of family firms has been widely
recognized at an international level. The proportion of
family firms in relation to the total number of
registered companies; their contribution to the GDP of
a country and its levels of employment can be
considered measures of their importance 32.
Although there is a unanimous belief about the
quantitative and qualitative importance of family firms
in the economy of any country, the controversy
continues about how, and in what direction, family
ownership affects the behaviour and the performance
32

Ward and Aronoff (1990); Shanker and Astrachan (1996);
Gersick et al (1997); Laporta et al (1999); Upton and Petty
(2000); Amat (2001); McConaughy et al (2001); Faccio and
Lang (2002); Anderson and Reeb (2003); Chris-Graves
(2006).

of firms. Recent empirical conflicting evidence on the
performance of family firms compared with that of
non family one has raised the interest on this issue 33.
For some researchers the existing disparity of
conclusions has to do with the heterogeneous
definitions of family firms used in the different studies
(Dyer, 2006; Miller et al, 2007).
Dyer points out that classifying all family firms
in one category may lead to misleading conclusions.
Definitions of family firms based strictly on
33

Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006),
Perez Gonzalez (2006), and Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find
that listed family firms are more profitable than other listed
firms. Faccio et al (2001) find evidence of inferior
performance in family firms. Barth et al (2005) find that
family-owned firms are less efficient than non-family owned
firms.
On the other hand, there are studies that find no differences
between the performance of family and non-family firms.
Following the Comparative Institutional Economics Theory,
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998), Himmelberg et al
(1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Galve and Salas
(2005) find empirical support for the hypothesis that,
controlling for the characteristics of the transactions that
determine the choice of one form of governance or another,
no differences in profitability are expected among firms of
different ownership structure.
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percentages of ownership and management control
will likely not differentiate the various family effects,
and thus will not accurately predict or explain
differences in firm performance. These methodological
problems suggest that researchers need to unravel the
impact of the various factors affecting firm
performance, including the family itself, such as:
industry, governance, firm characteristics and
management. A family may influence firm governance,
its basic characteristics, the quality of its management,
and possibly even an industry (Dyer, 2003; Morck
&Jeung, 2003, 2004). Dyer (2006) suggests that it is
also possible that a family may have a direct effect on
a firm‘s performance that is not mediated through the
other four variables.
In order to increase the predictive power of the
analysis there have been a few attempts to create
typologies of family firms, such as the well- known
development model of family firms of Gersick et al
(1997), who consider a family firm as a system of
overlapping circles labelled ―family‖, ―business‖, and
―ownership‖; although the three circles provide a good
foundation for examining family business, most of the
problems and challenges of a family firm occur over
the course of time. One reasonable starting point in the
analysis of heterogeneous behaviour within family
firms is to compare the behaviour of family firms in
the first, second and multiple generations
Surprisingly, only very limited research has been
conducted in this area. Among the noteworthy
exceptions are the works of Ward (1991), Gersick et al.
(1997), Lansberg (1999), Van den Berghe & Carchon
(2002), Dyer (2006), and Rutherford et al. (2006).
There is very little empirical research on the
differences in governance structures among family
firms themselves. Additionally, scientific uncertainty
remains within the heterogeneous group of family
firms, with regard to how they behave.
Van den Berghe & Carchon (2002), collecting
data from a Belgian population of companies
submitting their annual accounts, in 1997, to the
National Bank of Belgium, attempt to identify
differences in corporate governance practices between
family and non- family firms, and investigate to what
extent differences can be found within the group of
family firms based on family ownership and family
generation34. Although their study contributes to the
corporate governance literature, to improve the
understanding of family firm governance it is
necessary to understand how the idiosyncratic
characteristics of this type of firm‘s corporate
governance affects its competitiveness, and for that it
is necessary to answer the following question: to what
34

Attending to the generation of the family that is involved
in the firm, they analyze whether there are differences in the
family ownership policy, the family member independence
ratio of the board of directors, the frequency of meetings of
the board, and the accumulation of the functions of president
of the board and representatives of the board of directors.
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extent is competitive position affected by each
generation?
The Catedra of family firms of Palmas de Gran
Canarias (Spain), in collaboration with The Institute of
Spanish
Family
Firms
(IEF)
and
Price-WaterHouse-Coopers, carried out a study of a
collective of 112 family firms belonging to 14 Spanish
Territorial Associations of family firms. This work
concerned differences in corporate governance
mechanisms (family board and board of directors), in
2000, between family firms of first, second and later
generations. As in the previous work, this paper does
not analyze the differences in business development
and competitive position with regard to the generation
that owns and runs the business.
Rutherford et al. (2006) provide an initial
empirical examination of the Gersick et al (1997)
developmental model of family business, through an
analysis of the relationship existing between family
development (first, second and further generations)
and ownership (controlling owner, sibling partnership
and cousin consortium) variables, and the variable of
business development (measured by size and growth
of the firm). They find a positive relationship between
the generation and the business development but no
relationship between the ownership dimension and the
business development. The authors also identify
additional key groups of variables (owner, firm, and
family characteristics) that help to explain family
business development. Although the authors point out
that the primary strength of this research is that it
provides additional insights into the developmental
model of family firms, they recognize that the
cross-sectional nature of the data is problematic when
discussing developmental models, a result of a
weakness of the survey: the historical growth rates
were collected for only one year prior to the study
This paper provides some answers to the
questions raised by Van den Berghe & Carchon (2002),
Dyer (2006) and Rutherford et al. (2006), and
overcomes some of their limitations. First, this paper
helps to theorize the link between family generation
and the characteristics, behaviour, management and
governance of the firm. Second, the paper answers the
question: to what extent is competitive position
affected by each generation? Third, the paper
overcomes the limitation of the cross-sectional data,
since the investigation is applied to data from Spanish
firms during the period 1994 to 2005, which is much
more appropriate when discussing developmental
models.
Our paper contributes to both Family Business
and Corporate Governance Literature; the first by
providing an empirical test of the developmental
model of family business (DMFB, developed by
Gersick et al. (1997), since the main objective of the
paper is to check how the family and its business
develop to a higher level of complexity as ownership
and the running of the business are passed on to future
generations, and the second by analysing the need for
adequate governance practices when a family and its
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business develop to a higher level of complexity.
The paper is structured as follows. In section two,
we focus on a theoretical discussion of the problems
related to the growth of the family and the company
over time, and of how the consequences of growth are
successfully managed through the implementation of
adequate governance practices. The third section
presents the results of our empirical analysis of the
sample of Spanish firms. The conclusions summarize
the main results of the paper.
2. Theoretical framework
One of the main sources of problems for family firms
is related to the growth of the family and the company
over time. Gersick et al (1997) and Leon-Guerrero et
al (1998) suggested that the nature of the family firm
changes over time in response to the developmental
dimensions of the family, the firm and the ownership,
with varying impacts on the firm at different stages 35.
The growth of the family signifies a larger number of
family members belonging to different branches of the
same family dynasty. One of the changes brought
about by family growth is the dispersion of
shareholders, resulting from the transfer of shares from
parents to children. This brings about a fragmentation
of shareholders' power, which requires heavy doses of
negotiation and consensus. A particularly difficult
transaction for a company, in these circumstances, is
the change from the first generation stage of
controlling owner to the second generation stage of
brothers' society [Levinson, 1971; Lansberg, 1988;
Handler, 1990; Barach & Ganitsky, 1995; Cabrera
Suarez et al, 2001]. Another point to take into account
is that, as the family grows, not all shareholding family
members will work in the company, and so active and
non-active family shareholders must be differentiated,
since their interests will not always coincide. While
non-active family shareholders will be interested in
obtaining returns on their investment in the company,
the active family shareholders will also be interested in
their careers in the company and their salaries [Gersick
et al, 1997; Lansberg, 1999; Schulze et al, 2003]. Thus,
a potentially difficult area for family firms is that
interpersonal relationships are of the utmost
importance, and family members involved in the
running of the company cannot take business oriented
decisions in isolation, without considering family
matters. A lack of optimum interpersonal relations, or
the existence of conflict between family members, will
inevitably lead to these conflicts being transferred
from the family to the company (and/or vice versa)
[Hilburt-Davis & Dyer, 2003 36; Lee, 2006 37 ;]. This

may put the long-term survival of the company at risk:
some members of warring family factions may block
investment projects for the simple reason that they
have been proposed by another faction, without
determining whether the projects are really appropriate
from a business perspective [Dyer, 1986; Kaye, 1991;
Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 1987].
It is also important to take into account that once
the family has grown past the point where there is a
clear identity among family members involved in
management and family members who are owners, it
is time to provide a clear and acceptable division
between the Governing Body of the company and
Family Deliberations. All members of the family with
interests in the company should meet at regular
intervals to discuss family and business matters
(Neubauer and Lank, 1998; Sanchez-Crespo, 2003)38.
A family forum means the generally accepted
union between family and company, rather than simply
a rapprochement between individuals belonging to the
family. The forum provides a recognised means of
communication between family and company. In these
forums, non-active family members can ask questions
about company policies and projects and express their
points of view. Executive family members can explain
policies and progress, and have the opportunity to gain
the support of non-active family members for
implemented policies and proposed changes. It is
probable that the non-active family members, if they
are well-informed and considerate, will support
policies and changes proposed by executive family
members, so long as they do not entail a break with the
family's original company philosophy, culture and
values. Among the specific mechanisms of governance
of the business family, we can identify the Family
Assembly and the Family Council.
The discussion suggests the following
hypotheses :
H1: As the family grows over time, there will be
a higher dispersion of shareholding, as a result of the
transfer of shares from parents to children. Thus, first
generation family firms will have a higher degree of
concentration of family-held shares than second or
later generation family firms.
H2: As the family grows over time, not all
shareholding family members will work in the
company, and so active and non-active family
shareholders must be differentiated. Thus, first
generation family firms will have a lower proportion
of non-active family shareholders than second or later
generation family firms.
H3: In order to successfully manage the
consequences of complexity and growth of the family,

35

Kotey (2005) examines differences in business goals,
management practices, and performance between small
family and non-family firms and changes in these differences
as the firms grow.
36
Hilburt-Davis &Dyer (2003) point out that family
members may have competing goals and values, which may
spring from complex conflicts and family dynamics that
arise from a family‘s psychosocial history.

37

For further information about the literature that researches
the impact of family relationships see Lee, J. (2006).
38
For more information about mechanisms of Governance
in Spanish family firms, see the document published in 2002
by the Institute of Spanish Family Firms, Price-WaterHouseCoopers and the Network of Spanish Cátedras of Family
Firms.
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second and later generation family firms will provide a
more clear culture of transparency than first generation
family firms, through the implementation of the
Family Assembly and the Family Council.
According to company growth, although the
growth goal may not feature strongly for family firms,
some level of growth is required if the aim of the firm
is to remain competitive and to assure its long-term
survival, maintaining ownership and control of the
firm within the family (Pollak, 1985; Casson, 1999;
Chami, 1999). Family firms, as any firm, face a
dynamic, global and highly competitive market, which
increasingly demands the incorporation of new
products, new technologies, new organizational
methods and new methods for competing in the
market; further, in family firms, growth goals (in terms
of internationalization, commercialization, and
innovation), are likely to be pushed by second or later
generation proprietors as they bring new perspectives
to the firm (See Fernández-Nieto, 2005, and Gallo &
Pont, 1996). Although life-cycle literature suggests
that second and later generation family firms are likely
to be more mature, and to be growing more slowly
than founder-led firms, it should not be forgotten that
there is a need of family owners of second or later
generations to adopt new perspectives and new
corporate strategies for growth, in order to guarantee
the survival of the firm, to remain competitive, and to
accommodate the needs of the extended family as
other family units join the firm (Poza, 1988).
As the firm grows in complexity over time, and is
faced with the need to invest in growth strategies
requiring a high level of investment, and thus a higher
amount of funds than may be available within the
family and the firm, it could be necessary to
incorporate external partners in order to obtain
additional funds without losing control of the firm.
Based upon this discussion, we present the
following hypotheses:
H4: Founder-led firms are likely to be in the
founding and growth stages of their life-cycle and
firms in the second and later generations are likely to
be bigger, older and more mature.
H5: In order to guarantee the survival of the firm
and remain competitive, second and later generation
family firms will invest more in growth strategies and
in key factors to gain a competitive advantage (such as
internationalization, commercialization, innovation
and quality) than first generation family firms.
H6: Taking into account the hypothesis 4 and 5,
differences in growth rates between family firms of
first, and second or later generations, are not expected.
H7: Second and later generation family firms will
have
more
non-family
shareholders
than
first-generation family firms, to finance growth
strategies without losing the family control of the firm.
It is also important to take into account that the
new demands of the dynamic, global and highly
competitive market bring with them the need for new
knowledge and skills. Gallo et al (2002) and King,
Salomon & Fernald (2001), argue that, as the business
86

grows and becomes more complex, the demand for
role specialization and the number of required
managerial layers increases, as does the complexity of
the managerial roles. However, skills and knowledge
are not always available among family members. The
quality and experience of the family managerial labor
pool may not be able to fulfil the range of specialist
managerial functions that a competitive, growing, and
complex firm requires (Casson, 1982). Obstacles to
firm development may be overcome by investing in
training to develop the skills and competencies of
family members. However, it may be preferable for
owners of some family firms to recruit non-family
professional managers and directors to secure firm
development. Outside directors and managers, and
sometimes non-family shareholders, can provide firms
with expert advice, specialist skills, and resources that
a family firm does not necessarily possess (Kesner &
Dalton, 1994; Blondell, Carlock, & Heyden, 2000).
This, in turn, means that as the business grows and
becomes more complex, the future of the family firm
depends on its ability both to recruit and promote its
most capable family members, and to offer attractive
options (the possibility of a professional career) in
order to attract and retain the best professionals from
outside the family. Selection of family members often
proves to be more complicated than recruitment of
external professionals, as a result of the institutional
overlap between family and company. There are two
appropriate policies for the incorporation of family
members into the business: i) Selective Policy,
whereby the company only recruits those family
members it considers to have a potential for promotion
at a later date, and ii) Open Door Policy, whereby the
company opts to accept any family member who is
prepared to work hard and accept that promotion is not
guaranteed (Cadbury, 2002).
In addition to having, or obtaining, the
managerial capacity and expertise, it is also important
that firms utilize planning and control techniques that
assist in monitoring and controlling performance as
they grow. Leon-Guerrero (1998) and Reid and Adams
(2001) argued that family firms are also pushed
towards more formal practices as growth occurs.
Growth requires formal management systems with
clear definition of tasks, clear lines of responsibility
and authority, and greater documentation of
management decisions, procedures and achievements.
Formal management systems provide greater
transparency and ensure fairer treatment of employees.
Tasks and responsibilities must be defined in order to
establish objective bases for the evaluation of how
they are carried out and remunerated. The Board of
Administration provides the basis for the construction
of a logical organisational structure, and defines clear
lines of authority and responsibility. With growth, the
need for more formal practices increases, since
conflicts will occur between the requirements for
effective management of growth and the preferred
informal, personal and direct style of family owners
(Mintzberg, 1994; Van Den Berghe & Carchon, 2002;
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Cadbury, 2002).
The Board of Administration should determine
the company's long-term aims and objectives and the
means by which they can be achieved, leaving
day-to-day decision-making to the Committee of
directors. In certain cases, the Board provides the ideal
way to attract independent, external members. The
nomination of an external member to the board means
sharing the responsibility of directing the company
with somebody who is neither a family member nor an
executive. This can be vital to non-active family
members when they do not have sufficient information,
[Ward, 1991; Hoy and Verser, 1994; Harris et al, 1994;
Cadbury,2002; Van Den Berghe & Carchon, 2002;
Sirmon and Hitt, 2003].
In order for the Board to accomplish its mission
satisfactorily, it would seem necessary, according to
certain codes of good government (Olivencia, 1998;
Aldama, 2003; and Conthe, 2006, in Spain), that the
roles of president of the board and that of chief
executive officer, are separate. The main role of the
President of the board is to hire, fire, evaluate and pay
top management, thus making it extremely difficult to
do so for him/her self. Concerning the size of the
Board, the recommended number of members is
between 5 and 9; fewer than five members limits
creativity, while more than nine may lead to
inefficiency.
The discussion suggests the following
hypothesis:
H8: In order to successfully manage the
consequences of complexity and growth of the firm,
second and third generation family firms will be more
professionalized, with a higher number of non-family
directors, and will have a higher ability to recruit,
promote and retain the best professionals, than first
generation family firms.
H9: In order to successfully manage the
consequences of complexity and growth of the firm,
second and third generation family firms will provide a
more efficient organizational structure than first
generation family firms through the board.
3. Empirical study of the running of
Spanish family businesses in Aragon
The sample was selected from a population of 85
companies included in the SABI-Database 39 , who
report their annual accounts in the Mercantile Register,
according to the following criteria: i) the company
should belong to the Autonomous Community of
Aragón; ii) the number of employees of the firm
should be at least 10, and the annual turnover of the
firm should be at least 1,9 million of euros. The latter
criterion, whose objective is to exclude the
micro-firms from the sample, has also been used by
Astrachan and Kolenko (1994).
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The Sabi-Database is edited by Bureau Van Dick, Informa
S.A, and Coface. It includes financial and shareholder
information about Spanish and Portuguese Firms.

Of the 85 companies with these characteristics,
only 44 were family firms, these are: the family had
enough percentage of shares to exercise effective
control over the firm and one or more family members
held posts of management in the firm.
Two types of information have been used in this
research. Qualitative data (case-based data) from an
extensive and complete questionnaire (related to
ownership structure, size, growth strategies,
management and governance practices in the firm over
time) were completed with quantitative data collected
from the balance sheet, income statements and annual
reports of firms in the Spanish Mercantile Register.
Before the survey was distributed, it was
reviewed by a focus group of family business owners,
belonging to the Association of Family Firms in
Aragon and to the Family Firm Institute, and a pilot
study was conducted. A total of 22 companies meeting
the criteria responded to the questionnaire, a response
index of 50%. Those completing the questionnaires
occupied a key position in the decision-making
process of their companies - general director, president
of the board, president of the board of administration,
executive director - and had received some kind of
training course related to the concerns of the family
business. The firms in the sample can be classified in
three main industrial sectors, based on ISIC codes
(manufacturing, wholesale/retail and services). The
period of study was from 1994 to 2005, therefore the
number of observations considered is 264.
3.1 Family development and ownership
structure
Table 1, presents the distribution of businesses in the
sample (differentiating between the generations
leading the company) in terms not only of the nature
and type of shareholders who participate in the share
capital, but also their degree of participation in the
share capital, which allows us to analyse the
composition of shareholders. With regard to the nature
or identity of the main shareholders of the family
business, the following groups were identified: family
owners, family holding company, other private
individuals, financial entities, national companies,
foreign capital, and non-family employees. In relation
to the generation that runs the business, first, second
and third generation family firms were identified. The
variable generation was measured by the number of
generations between the current chief executive officer
(CEO) and the founder of the firm.
The table shows that 27.3% of the total number
of businesses in the sample are in the first generation
businesses, 59.1% in the second generation and 13.6 %
in the third generation. The date reveal that, on the one
hand, in the majority of the businesses analysed (80%),
independent of which generation runs the business, the
family is the only shareholder in the company, with the
proportion of companies having external, non-family
member shareholders being small (only 18% of the
businesses, on average). On the other hand, that a
87

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
greater complexity in the business does not give rise to
the incorporation of external partners in the company's
share capital. In fact, third generation companies have
no external partners, with 100% of capital being in the
hands of the family. Therefore, our results do not
support hypothesis H7.
Another relevant question is whether these family
businesses have undergone important changes in
ownership structure during the past twelve years. The
answer can be found by comparing ownership
structures at the end of 2005 with those existing at the
end of 1994, table 2. From this comparative analysis
(table 1 versus table 2) it can be seen that, during the
period 1994-2005, regarding the nature of the main
shareholders participating in the share capital of the
businesses in the sample, seventy-three percent
maintained their ownership structure and their main
shareholders. Although 18.1% of the remaining
businesses maintained their principal shareholders, one
family sold shares to a company holding (in one case it
sold 100% of its shares) belonging to the family. The
holding was created in order to ensure the efficient
growth of the company, both from the point of view of
optimum resource management and from a legal-tax
perspective. Contrary to expectation, 95% of family
firms increased or maintained exactly the same level of
ownership over the last twelve years. Five percent of
the firms underwent only a little dispersion of
ownership with the arrival of new partners.
Additionally, it is also important to know what is
the minimum number of family shareholders necessary
to obtain complete control or a majority in the business.
The greater this number is, the more difficult it will
probably be to obtain a large enough majority to
exercise effective control over the firm, and the greater
will be the need for negotiation and consensus-seeking
among family members. The relevant variable is the
degree of concentration of family-held shares. This is
measured, in the present study, by the percentage of
shares in the hands of ―n‖, main shareholders, where n
varies from one to eight. This variable is represented
as ―An‖. Table 3 presents the degree of concentration
of family-held shares (differentiating between first
generation companies and second and third
generation40). The date reveal that the group of family
businesses analysed, regardless of generation,
possesses an elevated concentration of ownership. One,
two or three shareholders are enough to exercise
effective control in 82% of the businesses. The
remaining 18% are also characterized by a high degree
of concentration of family shareholders, with 5, 6 or 8
being sufficient to control. There is only one exception
where the family has minority control.
In addition, table 3 also presents the total number
40

From here on, the study will differentiate only two
categories: first generation businesses, and second and third
generation businesses, given that there are only 3 third
generation companies and the transfer of leadership
happened only recently so there is no great difference
between the two groups
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of shareholders in the business, allowing us to check
for possible discrepancies. The table shows that the
average total number of shareholders is less than or
equal to five in approximately 82% of the businesses,
including between 6 and 8 in 5% of the businesses,
and higher than 26 in only three businesses. Thus, the
data reveal a strong concentration of ownership, since
the number of shareholders in most of the businesses
in the sample is relatively small. There is a marked
asymmetry in the distribution of share capital among
shareholders, especially in those three businesses
where the number of shareholders is greater than 26.
Both facts suggest that the possibility of obstructing
decision-making in the business, when there are
differing opinions and conflicts of interest among
shareholders, is minimal.
We can conclude that our results do not support
hypothesis H1. Second and third generation family
businesses do not have a higher level of dispersion of
ownership than first generation family businesses.
Both collectives of family firms have a high degree of
concentration of family-held shares.
On the other hand, and with the aim of testing our
hypotheses 2, and contributing information that will
permit inferences to be made about the risks of
conflicts of interest between different family parties,
table 4 presents a ratio showing the existence of
different groups: active family shareholders (88% of
the total number of shareholders in first generation
businesses and 65% of the total number of
shareholders in second and third generation
businesses), which supports our hypothesis 2 that, as
the family grows over time, a lower proportion of
family shareholders will work in the company, and so
active and non-active family shareholders must be
differentiated.
Finally, and as a consequence of the last result, to
manage the consequences of complexity and growth of
the firm successfully, second and third generation
family firms should provide a more clear culture of
transparency than first generation family firms,
through the implementation of Family Assembly and
Family Council. Table 5 presents an analysis of
governing mechanisms specific to the families of the
sample businesses. Very few businesses in the sample
make use of the Family Assembly as a vehicle for
family deliberation about possible tensions, between
different groups (active and non-active shareholders),
that may put the survival of the business at risk.
Concerning the Family Board, table 5 shows again that
only a third of first generation companies have one,
and that this percentage is even lower in second and
third generation businesses (18.7%).
We can conclude that the data do not support our
hypothesis H3; a possible explanation for this result
could be that family firms do not have an important
need for these mechanisms of family governance, due
to the high degree of concentration of family
shareholders, and to the small average total number of
shareholders (see table 3). Both facts suggest that the
possibility of obstructing decision-making in the
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business, when there are different opinions and
conflict of interests among shareholders, is minimal.
3.2 Business Development
This section focuses on the empirical study of the
heterogeneous characteristics and behaviour within
family firms, analyzing how the firm changes in
characteristics and behaviour over time (so as to make
investment decisions related to growth strategies, and,
in response to other key factors, to gain a competitive
advantage: internationalization, commercialization,
innovation and quality), depending on the particular
stage in the family generation evolution.
In order to test hypothesis 4, related to the
life-cycle of firms, which predicts that ―founder-led
firms are likely to be in the founding and growth
stages of their life-cycle and firms in second and later
generations are likely to be bigger, older and more
mature, and growing more slowly or even declining‖,
we present table 6. As dependent variables, we employ
life-cycle variables, such as size, age, and growth. Size
is measured in four dimensions: level of sales, assets,
value-added, and the number of employees. Age is
represented by the number of years the company has
been in business. Growth is represented by the mean
level of sales growth achieved during prior fiscal years.
We use a historical measure of growth, rather than a
perception of future growth, which provides the
benefit of objectivity, as it is easier to measure past
financial results than future projections of growth 41.
Furthermore, past growth has been shown to be highly
correlated with future growth and perception of future
growth (McMahon, 2001).
The general information about the data set is
compiled in table 6. The data are collected from the
balance sheet, income statement and annual reports
that firms reported to the Mercantile Register for the
period 1994-2005. The table also shows the results of
the test of equal mean and equal median of the variable,
for first and second-third generation firms, with time
and industry variables of control. Our results support
hypothesis H4, for all the size variables, in terms of
sales, assets, employees and value-added. First
generation family firms are significantly smaller than
second and later generation family firms, and are
younger than second and later generation family firms.
The test of equal growth cannot be rejected
(hypothesis 6).This result of equal sales growth rates
between families of first, and second-third generations,
could be explained by the need of family owners of
second-third generations to seek new perspectives and
corporate strategies, in order to guarantee the survival
of the firm and to remain competitive, as well as to
accommodate the needs of the extended family as
other family units join the firm.
41

This measure has been used in previous family business
studies (Rutherford et al, 2006; Rutherford et al, 2003;
Schulze et al, 2001)

Another way to test whether first generation
family firms grow at a higher or equal rate than
second-third family firms (hypothesis 6), assuming
that the size at the time they are created is similar,
among firms of similar age, is by postulating a simple
relation between size (Assets), age (T), and average
growth rate (g),

AssetsT  Assets 0 (1  g )T
(1)

AssetsT

are the current total assets of the firm (in

year 2005) and

Assets 0

are the unknown assets

when the firm was created in year 2005-T. Taking logs
we have
.
Ln AssetsT  Ln Assets 0  T Ln (1  g )
Therefore from the empirical model,
Ln Assets  a  b T  c FirstGeneration T
T

(2)

We can test the hypothesis that first generation
family firms have a higher or equal growth rate in
invested assets than second-third family firms. In terms
of the model in equation (2) this implies that,
(c  b)  Ln (1  g first Generation)  g FG  b  Ln (1 g MultigenerationalGeneration)  g MG

(3)
Table 7 presents the results of the test of the
prediction of the life cycle literature that first
generation family firms are smaller in size than
multigenerational family firms. The first column
shows that, controlling for industry effect, the
coefficient of the dummy first generation family firm
is negative and statistically significant, which implies
that first generation family firms have a lower stock of
assets than multigenerational family firms. The
conclusion changes, as expected, when we control for
age, column 2, taking into account that both types of
family firms are of different age (see table 6). The last
column of table 7 explains the differences in size as a
result of differences in age. Finally, the estimated
coefficient of the variable ―FirstGenerationAge‖ is not
statistically significant, which implies that first
generation family firms grow at a rate equal to
second-third family firms, again confirming our
hypothesis H6.
In an attempt to test our hypothesis 5, that is to
see whether differences in the type of family firm,
depending on the generation running the business,
cause differences in the key factors to gain competitive
advantage (specifically, factors related to investment
decisions, commercialization and internationalization,
innovation and quality) in the last twelve years, we
present tables 8, 9 and 10.
To analyse the possible differences: First, in
commercialization, the variables used are the use of
own brands, the percentage of own brand sales over
total sales, and changes made in product/brand
presentation. Second, in internationalization, the
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variables used are the percentage of exports over total
sales, the distribution of exports per country, the
existence of affiliates and production plants abroad.
Third, in innovation, the variables used are the
percentage of sales of new products, the existence of R
& D departments, the number of people working in R
& D, and their level of education, the investment in R
& D, and the number of patents per business. Finally,
in quality, the variables used refer to whether the firm
uses different models or certifications of quality, the
percentage of total staff involved in quality teams or
quality circles, and the percentage of returned
products.
Concerning the key factors to competitive
advantage
in
―Commercialization
and
Internationalization, table 8 reveals that: firstly, in
terms of commercialization policy, one third of first
generation family businesses, and 44% of second and
third generation family businesses, provide their own
brands, with the percentage of own brand sales over
total sales being only 1% for the former and 30% for
the latter. With regard to the variable, changes made in
product/brand presentation, there are various
differences depending on generation. The data show
that about 60% of second and third generation
businesses modify product/brand presentation,
compared to 33.3% of first generation businesses. This
implies that second and third generation businesses are
more innovative and commercialize their own brands
to a greater extent than first generation businesses.
Secondly, regarding internationalization actions,
second and third generation businesses are also better
prepared, in terms of resources and products, than first
generation businesses to compete in more developed
markets. The table shows that 33% of first generation
businesses export products, with the average level of
exports over total sales being 25%. Exports are mainly
distributed in Europe, (75%), Asia and Oceanía,
(12.5%), África and South America (6.3% each).
However, among second and third generation
businesses, 62.5% export, and the level of exports over
total sales is 27.3%. They export a larger proportion of
their products to Europe, the USA and Canada than
first generation family businesses and a smaller
proportion to developing countries. Finally, only
second and third generation family firms have
affiliates and production plants abroad, 60% and 20%,
respectively.
Concerning the key factor to competitive
advantage in ―Innovation‖ in the last twelve years,
data in table 9 shows that only 33.3% of first
generation family businesses innovate, with the level
of sales of new products, (less than 5 years on the
market), standing at 26%. The number of second and
third generation firms who innovate is fifty% and the
level of sales of new products stands at 42%. In
addition, first generation businesses do not have R+D
departments, and do not devote human or financial
resources to these activities. In contrast, 50% of
second and third generation businesses have a research
and development department, with eight people
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working full time, 3 of whom have higher education.
Finally, second and third generation businesses
designate 1.2% of sales to internal R+D costs and
0.8% to external R+D costs. Regarding patents, only
31.3% of second and third generation businesses have
them, with the average number of patents per business
being 10.8. In contrast, none of the first generation
businesses have patents.
Finally, in terms of the key factors to competitive
advantage in ―Quality‖, table 10 shows that, although
there are no great differences in the number of
businesses who have obtained ISO or similar
certification, there are important differences in other
variables relating to quality. Among first generation
businesses, the level of total staff involved in quality
teams or circles is 8.1%, compared to approximately
36% in second and third generation businesses. In
addition, none of the first generation businesses use
European or non-European quality models, and only
16.6% employ environmental protection policies.
These levels are 25.0%, 13.0% and 75.0%,
respectively, for second and third generation
businesses. Finally, there are no differences in the
quality of products among the two groups, the level of
returned products is 0,5% in both.
It may be concluded that our results support our
hypothesis H5, as time passes and businesses become
more complex, they invest more in commercialization
and internationalization strategies and in technical or
intangible resources, with the aim of obtaining a
competitive position in the market and guaranteeing
their survival as a family firm, in an increasingly
complex, competitive and globalized environment.
In order to manage the consequences of
complexity and growth successfully, and guarantee
survival, the family firm faces the need for adequate
governance practices. In particular, the family firm has
two organizational requisites: the ability to recruit,
promote and retain the best professionals; and the
implementation of a more efficient organisational
structure.
3.2.1 Analysis of personnel selection,
recruitment, payment and training
In relation to our H8, Table 11 also allows inferences
to be made about recruitment policies in the company.
It shows the following, by generation: i) the proportion
of family directors out of the total number of directors
contracted by the business. This reveals the degree of
external professionalization in the business; ii) the
proportion of family directors over the total number of
family members active in the business. This indicates
the existence of selection policies for family members,
and enables us to see whether the recruitment policy
applied is selective (only allowing qualified family
members to become directors, thus avoiding possible
problems caused by the heterogeneity of positions
occupied by family members at different levels) or if,
on the contrary, the business applies an open door
recruitment policy which allows this sort of
heterogeneity. iii) The number of family members
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contracted, of the total number of active family
members, who have technical or university level
qualifications. This is an indication of the degree of
professionalization among family members employed
in the business. iv) The degree of job security among
employees in the business, measured by the percentage
of permanent contracts of the total number of
employees at the end of 2005. Finally, v), it shows the
proportion of expenditure devoted to training
employees, which will provide information about
employee policies.
The degree of external professionalization
increases over time as the business becomes more
complex. The percentage of family directors is 72.6 in
first generation businesses compared to 50.7 in the
second and third generation. The table also reveals that,
as the business becomes more complex over time,
training and competence requisites increase for family
executives; in first generation businesses, 47.2% of
active family members have technical and/or
university qualifications, compared to 60.7% of active
family members in second and third generation
companies.
It is also interesting to note that second and third
generation family businesses use a more selective
recruitment policy for family members than do those
of the first generation. The table shows that 92% of
active family members hold key positions in the
business, compared to 55.1% of family members in
first generation businesses. Another interesting point
revealed in the table is that, with the passing of time,
the family business becomes more committed to
ensuring job security for its employees: 80.1% of
personnel in second and third generation family
businesses have permanent contracts, and 64.4% of
personnel in first generation businesses.
Finally, the table reveals a greater awareness of
the need for training as the business grows in
complexity over time. Second and third generation
businesses devote 2% of their total personnel costs to
training for employees, compared to 1% of first
generation companies.
According to the selection and promotion
policies for directors, table 12 shows that the main
selection criteria is professionalization, regardless of
family relationship, in approximately 80% of second
and third generation family businesses and 67% of first
generation businesses. On the other hand, and
independently of the generation leading the company,
around 70% of businesses in the sample apply only
one promotion policy, and give equal opportunity to
the consideration of proposals made by all executives,
regardless of family relationship.
Secondly, with reference to the length of time the
general director stays with the company, the time
period is more than 15 years for 100% of the first
generation businesses, and 60% of the second and
third generation businesses. The lower percentage for
second and third generation businesses can be
explained by the fact that there are a group of
businesses that have recently passed from second to

third generation. Moreover, and regardless of
generation, the family plays an important part in
decision making in 80% of the sample.
Finally, with regards to payment policies, 80% of
first generation family businesses pay their executives
a fixed salary and only 20% pay partly fixed and partly
variable salaries, depending on profits. These
percentages change radically in second and third
generation businesses, where a fixed salary is applied
in 50% of the companies, and a mixed salary in the
remainder. The average level of variable salary, in
businesses using this system, is 30% in first generation
companies, and 24.3% in second and third. On the
other hand, in 83.3 percent of first generation family
firms, and in 75% of multigenerational family firms,
there is more than one payment policy, dependent on
kinship. Moreover, salary scales are fixed by the
owners in 80% of the businesses, who are, in most
cases, the directors of the business.
The data support our hypothesis H8: as the
business gains in complexity, and the degree of
external and family directors professionalization is
increasing, family firms use a more selective
recruitment policy for family members and invest
more in training employees. However, with regard to
payment policies, and independently of the generation,
more than 70% of family firms apply two different
payment policies, depending on kinship.
3.2.2 Analysis of the Formal Structure of
the Organisation: The Board of
Administration
Concerning the composition of the Board of
Administration, table 13 shows that the average
number of members belonging to the Board of
Administration is 4.7 in first generation family
businesses (89.4% family member), and 4.8 in second
and third generation businesses (77.1% family
members). This table also shows information about the
generation to which the family board members belong.
In first generation family businesses, 71.4% of family
board members belong to the first generation and the
remaining 28.6% are second generation family
members. In second and third generation businesses,
different generations are also represented: 13.5% of
board members are first generation, 73% are second
generation, and the remaining 13.5% are third
generation.
The table 13 also shows the frequency per year of
board meetings. Among first generation businesses, the
board meets only once a year, or sporadically, in 50%
of the companies; between one and eleven times in
33.3% of the companies, and more than eleven times
in only 16.7% of the companies. In second and third
generation businesses, the board meets sporadically in
40%, between two and eleven times in 33.3%, and
more than eleven times in 26.7% of the companies.
In addition, the table shows the degree of
independence of the Board through the representation
of family shareholders, measured by the proportion of
family shareholders on the board and the total number
91

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
of family shareholders. Data obtained from this table
reveals that all the family shareholders in first
generation businesses have a place on the board,
compared to 77.5% of family shareholders in second
and third generation businesses. The ratio of
independence of the board, measured by the proportion
of independent board members among the total
number of board members, is zero in first generation
family businesses, and 0.6% for second and third
generation businesses. Only one firm has an
independent board member, who is not linked to the
management or shareholders of the business. The table
also shows that, in 67% of first generation businesses
and 53% of second and third generation businesses,
the president of the board is also the managing director
of the business, which may put the effectiveness of the
board at risk when it comes to supervising
management.
Regarding functions carried out by the Board of
Administration, table 14 shows that, as the business
gains in complexity, with transfers over generations,
there is an increasing concern for Administration
boards to be more formal and efficient in terms of
management. Specifically, the data shows that, among
second and third generation businesses, greater care is
taken in the decision-making process; 86% of this
group mark their boards as being responsible for the
ratification and selection of strategies proposed by the
management team and control of the results of these
elected strategies, whereas the level of first generation
businesses whose boards carry out these two functions
is lower (16.7% and 33.3%, respectively). In addition,
a greater concern can also be seen, in these more
complex businesses, for the use of more formal
organisational structures which help to prevent
confusion and intrigue; 78.6% of second and third
generation businesses mark the main task of the board
as being the definition of lines of responsibility and
authority. This level is 16.7% (only one business)
among the group of first generation businesses.
It is interesting to note that in half of the boards
of first generation businesses, and a third of the boards
of second and third generation, tasks are confused and
involve day-to- day operative policy. In addition, the
boards of first generation businesses pay little or no
attention to tasks involving the selection, supervision,
evaluation and control of the management team.
Finally, with reference to payment policy, table
15 shows that in approximately 70% of first generation
family businesses, members of the board receive no
payment for being board members and, in the
remaining 30%, they receive a fixed amount. On the
contrary, in 77% of second and third generation family
businesses, members of the board are paid for being
board members, a fixed amount in 30% of the
businesses, fixed plus expenses in 40%, and a variable
amount in the remaining 30% of the businesses. The
average levels of fixed payment, fixed plus expenses,
and variable out of total payment are, 65%, 23% and
12%, respectively. These payments are fixed by the
owners in all first generation businesses and in half of
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the second and third generation businesses, with the
board establishing payment in the other half of the
businesses. In conclusion, the information obtained
from this table reveals that, as the business gains in
complexity, there is an increasing concern for director
boards to be more efficient in terms of payment policy
to their members.
Summarising the results obtained, we can
confirm our hypothesis H9. We conclude that the data
reveal that, as the business grows in complexity, there
is an increasing concern for director boards to be more
formal and efficient in management. The data show
that, among second and third generation family
businesses, greater care is taken in the
decision-making process, there is greater concern for
the use of more formal organisational structures which
help to prevent confusion and intrigue, and greater
care is taken concerning the composition, degree of
independence and frequency of meetings of the board,
along with a greater focus on efficiency in terms of
payment policy to their members.
4. Conclusions
Our results confirm the greater degree of complexity
of the family firm, as the ownership and the running of
the business is passed to future generations. However,
and contrary to all expectations, family firms in the
sample have a high degree of concentration of
ownership, regardless of the generation; one, two or
three shareholders are enough to exercise at least a
majority control in 82% of the businesses. On the other
hand, and also contrary to expectations, our results
reveal that a greater complexity in the business does
not give rise to the incorporation of external partners
in the company‘s share capital. In fact, third generation
companies have no external partners, with 100%
capital remaining in the family. The results reveal
that the ownership structure remains stable and
undergoes no important change over time, regardless
of the generation. This result could be explain that
very few businesses in the sample, independently of
the generation running the business, make use of
governing mechanisms specific to the families, as a
vehicle for family deliberations concerning possible
tensions between different groups.
Family firms, as any firm, face a dynamic, global
and highly competitive market, which increasingly
demands the incorporation of new products, new
technologies, new organizational methods and new
methods for competing in the market. With the aim of
maintaining a competitive position in the market,
guaranteeing survival as a family firm, and to
accommodate the needs of the extended family as
other family units join the firm, family firms in second
or later generations are larger, invest more in
commercialization and internationalization strategies
and in technical or intangible resources. However,
there are no differences in the level of sales growth
and in the quality of products between generations; the
level of returned products is 0.5% in both cases.
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The results also confirm that, as the business
gains in complexity, the degree of external and family
directors‘ professionalization increases, family firms
use a more selective recruitment policy for family
members, and they invest more in training employees.
However, with regard to payment policies, and
independently of the generation, more than 70% of
family firms apply two different payment policies,
depending on kinship.
In addition to having managerial capacity and
expertise, it is also important that firms utilize
planning and control techniques that assist in
monitoring and controlling performance, as they grow.
Growth requires formal management systems with
clear definition of jobs, clear lines of responsibility
and authority, and greater documentation of
management decisions. The results obtained reveal
that, as the businesses grow in complexity, there is an
increasing concern for director boards to be more
formal and efficient in management. Data show that,
among second and third generation family businesses,
greater care is taken in the decision-making process,
there is greater concern in using more formal
organisational structures, helping to prevent confusion
and intrigue, greater care is taken in the composition,
degree of independence and frequency of meetings of
the board, and there exists a greater concern to be
more efficient in terms of payment policy to members
of the board.
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Appendices

XEN %
Participation
of other National Companies in
Shares Capital

XEXT %
Participation of
Foreign Capital in Shares Capital

XFIL %
Participation of
Affiliates‘Companies in Shares Capital

XPART %
Participation Of Private Individuals
in Shares Capital

5

XFA = 100

-

-

-

-

-

-

Family, Family

1

25 XFA<

25 XH<

-

-

25 XEMP<

-

-

Total Number of Firms

XFA %
Participation of Family in Shares Capital

Only Family Shareholders (FA)

NATURE OF SHAREHOLDERS

XH
% Participation of Family Holding in
Shares Capital

XEMP %
Participation of the Employees in Shares Capital

Table 1. Generational Distribution of Family Firms in terms of Identity and Participation of Principal
Shareholders in Shares Capital of the Firm in 2005

FIRST GENERATION

Holding and

Employees

50

50

50

SECOND GENERATION
Only Family Shareholders (FA)

9

XFA = 100

-

-

-

-

-

-

Family Holding (H)

1

-

XH = 100

-

-

-

-

-

Family and Private Individuals

1

25 XFA<

(FA, PART)
Family

XPARTi < 5*

50

Holding

and

Other

1

XH = 50

XEN = 50

National Firm (FA, EN)
Family,

Family

Foreign Capital,

Holding,
Employees,

1

25 XFA<

25 XH<

25 XEXT<

50

50

50

Affiliates‘ Companies (FA, H,

XEMP < 5

XFIL < 5

EXT, EMP, FIL)
THIRD GENERATION
Only Family Shareholders (FA)

2

XFA = 100

-

-

-

-

-

-

Family (FA) y Family Holding

1

XFA50

5 XH< 25

-

-

-

-

-

(H)
T. Firms with no External

18

(81,8%)

Shareholders
T.

Firms

with

External

4

(18,2%)

Shareholders

Own Elaboration; Note: XPART i < 5*, where i= 1 …91
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Table 2. Ownership Structure of Family Firms According to Identity and Participation in share capital of
Principal Shareholders in 1994
XFA

XH

XEN

XEF

XEMP

XFIL

Total

%

%

%

%

%

%

XPART
%

Number

Participation

Participation

Participation

Participation

Participation

Participation

Participation

NATURE OF THE

of

of the

of the

of Other

of

of

of

of

SHAREHOLDERS

Firms

Family

Family

National

Financial

Employees

Affiliates

Private

in

Holding in

Firms

Entity in

in

Companies

Individuals in

Shares

Shares

in

Shares

Shares

in

Shares Capital

Capital

Capital

Shares

Capital

Capital

Shares Capital

Capital
Only Family Shareholders (FA)

16

XFA = 100

-

-

-

-

-

-

Family (FA) and

1

XFA50

-

-

-

25 XEMP<

-

-

Non-Family

Executive Employees (EMP)

50
1

XFA50

-

-

-

XEMP< 5

-

-

Private

1

5 XFA< 25

-

-

-

-

-

XPARTi < 5*

Family Holding and Other

1

XFA = 50

-

XEN = 50

-

-

-

-

1

25 XFA< 50

25 XH< 50

-

-

XEMP < 5

XFIL < 5

-

1

5 XFA< 25

-

-

XEF50

-

-

-

Family (FA) and Non-Family
Executive Employees
Family

and

Individuals (FA, PART)

National Firms (FA, EN)
Family Holding,, Employees
and Affiliates Companies (FA,
H,

EMP, FIL)

Family, (FA) and Financial
Entity

Note: XPART i < 5*, where i= 1 …91
Own Elaboration
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Table 3. Generational Distribution of the Firms in terms of degree of Concentration of the Shares in the hands of
Family Shareholders in 2005
FIRST GENERATION

SECOND AND THIRD GENERATION
TOTAL

Number of

Number of

Number of

Number of

Number of

Number of

Firms

Shareholder

Firms

Shareholder

Firms

Shareholder

%

On Average

%

On Average

%

On Average

2

33,3

4

4

25,0

3

6

27,4

3

3

50,0

3,7

7

43,8

3,7

10

45,5

4

-

-

-

2

12,5

4

2

9,1

4

-

-

-

1

6,3

48

1

4,5

48

-

-

-

1

6,3

27

1

4,5

27

-

-

-

1

6,3

100

1

4,5

100

1

16,7

8

-

-

-

1

4,5

8

A1
Only one Shareholder
Exercising Majority
Control
A2
Two Shareholders
Exercising Majority
Control
A3
Three Shareholders
Exercising Majority
Control
A5
Five Shareholders
Exercising Majority
Control
A6
Six Shareholders
Exercising Majority
Control
A6
Six Shareholders
Exercising Effective
Control (with a
percentage of capital of
less than 50%)
A8
Eight Shareholders
Exercising Majority
control

Table 4. Differences in the percentage of Active Family Shareholders between Generations

FIRST
GENERATION

Active Family Shareholders
(in percentage )
Total Family Shareholders
Own Elaboration

88,1

SECOND & THIRD
GENERATION

65,1
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Table 5. Mechanisms of Governance of the Business Family (2005)

1ª GENERATION
FAMILY ASSEMBLY & FAMILY BOARD

2ª & 3ª GENERATIONS

N

%

N

%

Firms with Family Assembly

1

16,6

4

26,6

Firms with Family Board

2

33,3

3

18,8
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Table 6. Means, medians and statitstics from tests of differences in means and medians for size, age and growth
variables between first generation and multigeneration family firms
(1994-2005)
First Generation Family
Firms

Sales

Second-Third Generation
Family Firms

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

t-student
differ
(means)©

Kruskal
Walis Test
Chi-Square
differ
(medians)

4.594

3.755

42.308

12.702

-4.3***

50.9***

***

29.7***

Assets

4.709

3.890

57.718

13.389

-3.7

Value Added 

1.601

1.182

15.451

3.579

-4.0***

47.0***

-4.3

***

44.6***

-7,5

***

33.3***

Employees

41

Age of the Firm

20

213

73

21

21

36

32

[Sales‘s GrowthT-Sales‘s Growth(T-1)]/Sales‘s Growth (T-1)

0,03

-0,08

0,03

-0,07

Number of Observations

264

0,3

0,2

264

Note:
The number of firm-year observations totals 264 for the period 1994-2005. Data collected from the balance sheet,
income statement and annual reports that firms have to report to Spanish Mercantile Register.
©Control variables of time and industry dummies in all regressions although the coefficients are not reported.
 Millions of Euros
***

p  1%;

**

p  5%; * p  10%
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Table 7. Growth and size of first and second or more generation family firms (1994-2005)
The table presents the results from tests for differences in size and growth between firt and second or more
generations family firms. The dependent variable is Log Assets in year 2005.Model 1 tests for differences in size.
Model 2 tests differences in size controlling for age. Model 3 tests for differences in growth rate. In all models.
control variables of industry. T-student in parenthesis.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Constant

16.79***

15.4***

16.2***

(29.8)

(16.7)

(17.7)

First Generation

-1.59***

-0.98

(-2.2)

(-1.3)

-

0.03**

Age

-

FG Age

0.04***

(1.9)

(2.3)

-

-0.03**
(-1.0)

22

22

22

R2

0.12

0.22

0.20

F

2.2**

2.7***

2.9***

Observations

Own Elaboration
***

p  1%;

**

p  5%;

*

p  10%
Table 8. Commercialization and Internationalization
1ª GENERATION

2ª & 3ª GENERATION

KEY FACTORS TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
N

%

N

%

2

33,3

7

43,8

COMMERCIALIZATION
Promotion of Own Brands

1,0

Percentage of Sales Destined to Promotion of Own Brands
Have changed Presentation of Products/Brands in last Three Years

30,0

2

33,3

10

62,5

2

33,3

10

62,5

INTERNATIONALIZATION
Export
Percentage of Exports over Sales:

25,0

27,3

75,0

83,6

0

2,0

Latin-American

6,3

3,4

Asia y Oceania

12,5

6,4

Africa

6,3

4,6

Distribution of Exports by Country
Europe
United States and Canada

Firms has Commercials Affiliates Abroad

0

-

6

60,0

Business has Production Plants Abroad

0

-

2

20,0

Own Elaboration
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Table 9. Innovation
1ª GENERATION

2ª & 3ª GENERATION

KEY FACTORS TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
N

%

N

%

2

33,3

8

50,0

INNOVACIÓN
Firms having New Products (less than 5 years)
Percentage of Sales of New Products (less than 5 years)

26,0

41,9

Use Patents in the Sector

0

-

5

31,3

Have R+D Department

0

-

8

50,0

Number of Patents

0

10,8

Number of Persons dedicated full time to R+D

0

8,1

Graduates dedicated full time to R+D

0

2,5

Persons with Vocational Training dedicated full time to R+D

0

0,8

0

1,2

0

0,9

1ª GENERATION

2ª & 3ª GENERATIONS

Total Internal Expenses I  D
(in prrcentage)
Total Sales
Total External Expenses I  D
(in percentage)
Total Sales

Table 10. Quality

KEY FACTORS TO COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
N

%

N

%

4

66,7

13

81,3

QUALITY
Has ISO or other quality certification
Percentage of staff participating in Quality Teams

8,1

35,58

Uses European quality model as reference

0

-

4

25,0

Uses other quality management models

0

-

2

13,0

Applies environmental protection policy

1

16,7

12

75,0

Percentage of Products returned

0,44

0,5
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Table 11. Family Recruitment Policies and Job Security

RECRUIMENT

FIRST

POLICY

SECOND & THIRD GENERATION

GENERATION

Active Family Shareholders
(in percentage )
Total Family Shareholders

88,1

65,1

Family Executives
(in percentage )
Total Executives

72,6

50,7

Family Executives
(in percentage )
Total Active Family Shareholders

55,1

91,8

Active Family withThecnical or Higher Education
(%)
Total Active Family

47,2

60,7

64,4

80,1

1,1

2,1

Permanent Employees at the End of 2004
(in percentage )
Total Employees at the End of 2004
Training Employees Expenses
(in percentage )
Total Personnal Expenses
Own Elaboration

Table 12. Recruitment, Promotion, Payment and Permanence Policies for Directors
RECRUITMENT, PROMOTION AND PAYMENT POLICIES FOR DIRECTORS AND

FIRST

SECOND &THIRD

GENERACIÓN

GENERACION

PERMANENCE OF DIRECTORS
N

%

N

%

Main Selection Criteria is Professional Capacity. Family Relation is not taken into account.

4

66,7

11

78,6

There is only One Promotion Policy. Family Relation is not taken into account.

4

66,7

10

71,4

The same weight of consideration is given to Proposals from both Family and Non-family
Directors.
PERMANENCE OF GENERAL DIRECTOR

4

66,7

10

71,4

Six to ten years

0

-

3

18,7

Eleven to fifteen years

0

-

3

18,8

More than fifteen years

4

100

10

62,5

Receives Fix Salary

4

80,0

8

53,0

Receives Fix Salary + Variable Salary

1

20,0

7

47,0

RECRUITMENT AND WORKING CRITERIA

TOP MANAGEMENT PAYMENT POLICY

Sum of the Percentages of VariableSalary
Number of Firms with VariableSalary

30,0

24,3

Identical payment, regardless of kinship

1

16,7

4

25,0

Pay scales fixed by owners

5

83,3

12

75,0

Pay scales fixed by Board

1

16,7

4

25,0

Own Elaboration
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Table 13. Composition of the Board
1ª GENERATION

COMPOSITION
Size and Members of Board of Administration

2ª & 3ª GENERATIONS

Mean

%

Mean

%

Total Members belonging to board

4,7

100

4,8

100

Total Family Members on Board

4,2

89.4

3,7

77.1

3

71.4

0,5

14.2

1,2

28.6

2,7

73

0

-

0,5

13.5

0,5

10.6

1,1

22.9

First Generation Family Members
Second Generation Family Members
Third Generation Family Members
Total NonFamily Members on Board
DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE OF BOARD (in percentage)
Independent Members/Total Members
CEO is President of Board
FamilyShareholders on Board
Total FamilyShareholders

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

0

-

0,6

0

66,7

100

53,0

100

100

100

77,5

100

Own Elaboration
Table 14. Tasks of the Board of Administration and Annual Frequency of Meetings
1ª GENERATION

2ª & 3ª GENERATION

TASKS CARRIED OUT BY THE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION
N

%

N

%

Definition of lines of responsibility and authority

1

16,7

11

78,6

Selection, Supervision, Evaluation and Control of managers

1

16,7

7

50

Play an important role in operative policy

3

50

4

33,3

Identify principal risks facing the company

1

16,7

7

50

Ratify and select strategies proposed by management

1

16,7

12

85,7

Control Results of selected strategies and their implementation by the management team

2

33,3

12

85,7

Determine Information and communication policies with all interested parties, ―Stakeholders‖

1

16,7

2

14,3

Responsible for electing President of the Board

3

50

13

92,9

Ensure Succession in top management

3

50

7

50

Once a year

1

16,7

0

-

Sporadic and unplanned.

2

33,3

6

40

Between 2 and 11 times a year

2

33,3

5

33,3

More than 11 times a year

1

16,7

4

26,7

FREQUENCY OF BOARD MEETINGS

Own Elaboration
Table 15. Payment Policy to the Members of the Board
PAYMENT

Payment received

POLICY

1ª GENERACIÓN

2ª & 3ª GENERACION

N

%

N

%

2

33,3

13

76,9

Fix Payment

2

100

4

30,0

Fix Payment + Expenses

-

-

5

40,0

-

-

4

30,0

Variable Payment depending on Results
Fix Payment
(in percentage)
Total Payment

100

65,0

-

23,0

-

12,0

VariablePayment
(in percentage)
Total Payment
ExpensesPayment
(in percentage)
Total Payment

Own Elaboration
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This paper examines the non-linear effects of ownership structure (variables) on corporate
performance. The data used in this study are derived from 167 publicly traded companies quoted on the
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), over the period 1989-2006. The ownership structure is measured by
the percentage of shares held by each type of owner (state, institution, foreign concentrated owners,
and individuals). Results in this study confirm earlier findings of a curvilinear relationship reported for
larger markets. The results also show that the relationship between government ownership and ROA
and MBVR is a hump-shaped curve. The value of a firm increases when government ownership is low,
but the value of a firm decreases when it is high. As the government reduces its stake in a privatised
company to below a specific point, perhaps market monitoring become ineffective and this increases
the agency costs. The results also document that the relation between institutional ownership and ROA
and Tobin’s Q is a hump-shaped curve. When institutional ownership increases above a specific point,
institutional shareholders negatively influence a firm’s activities. Findings in this study contribute to
the growing body of international evidence that the non-linear cubic relationship between ownership
structure and corporate performance is robust to differences in governance structures across markets.
Keywords: Ownership Structure, Corporate Performance, Failure, Jordan
School of Economics and Finance, University of Western Sydney, Phone: +612 96859164, Mobile: +612 404955320, E-mail:
r.zeitun@uws.edu.au or r_zaiton2005@yahoo.com. I am grateful to valuable comments mad by associated Professor Gary Tian and
associated Professor Steve Keen and Professor Tom Valentine on an early draft of this paper.
*

1.

Introduction

The relationship between ownership structure and firm
performance has been an important research topic
during the last three decades, and has produced
ongoing debate in the literature of corporate finance.
Theoretical and empirical research on the relationship
between ownership structure and firm performance
was originally motivated by the separation of
ownership and control identified by Berle and Means
(1932). Berle and Means (1932) suggested that an
inverse correlation should be observed between the
diffuseness (concentration) of shareholdings and firm
performance, in which ownership structure affects
firm performance. The financial literature assumes
that managers are imperfect agents for investors, as
managers may attempt to pursue their own goals
rather than shareholders‘ wealth maximisation. Also, it
has been stated that there may be a conflict of interest
between outsiders (shareholders) and insiders
(managers), as managers may have incentives which
serve their own benefit rather than maximising
104

shareholders wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
One approach that may control this conflict,
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), is to
increase the equity ownership of managers in the
firms, therefore encouraging managers to work more
efficiently to maximise shareholders‘ wealth and carry
out less activities of self-interest (see Jensen and
Meckling (1976); Fama and Jensen (1983); Shleifer
and Vishny, (1986)). However, it may also work in the
opposite direction, as large shareholders may use their
control rights to achieve private benefits.
Nevertheless, this view has been challenged by
Demsetz (1983), who argued that the ownership
structure of a company should be thought of as an
endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the
influence of shareholders on a firm‘s performance.
According to Demsetz (1983) there should be no
systematic relationship between ownership structure
and firm performance. For instance, even if a manager
owns only a small stake, market control, including the
managerial market, and the market for corporate
control, may force him toward the firm‘s value
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maximisation, as a manager wants to guarantee his
employment. On the contrary, a manager with a high
ownership percentage may have enough votes to
guarantee his employment without any market control
(see Fama, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). A firm‘s
ownership structure is affected by the firm-specific
risk, as firms have different characteristics and operate
in different environments, so the optimal ownership
structure varies across firms.
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) extend
the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study by adding new
variables to explain the variation in ownership
structure. In order to control for various possible
unobserved heterogeneities, a fixed effects panel data
model and instrumental variables are used. Ownership
structure is measured by the shareholdings of insiders.
Their results showed that insider ownership is
negatively related to the capital-to sales ratio, but
positively related to the advertising-to-sales ratio and
operating income to sales ratio. After controlling for
these variables and fixed firm effects, changes in
ownership holdings were found to not have a
significant impact on firm performance. However, a
quadratic relationship between ownership and firm
performance was found when they controlled for the
endogeneity of ownership.
More recently, the focus of literature has shifted
and several theories have been proposed to show the
ambiguity of the effect of ownership concentration. La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)
argued that the agency problem in many emerging
markets is relatively severe due to the absence of
strong legal protection and other governance
mechanisms. The monitoring manager is not the main
problem of corporate governance but the main
problem is the expropriation of minority shareholders.
In this case, the legal protection of the minority is the
main issue.
The relationship between ownership structure
and corporate value could be non-linear. Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) point out that a manager
responds to two opposing forces. At a lower level of
managerial ownership share, managers tend to allocate
a firm‘s resources for their own benefit and at the
expense of the outside shareholders. However, when
the level of managerial ownership increases, a
manager‘s interests become more associated with the
outside shareholders. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1988) ignore the endogeneity issue altogether and reexamine the relationship between corporate ownership
structure and performance. A cross section of 371
Fortune 500 firms was taken in 1980. They measured
performance by Tobin‘s Q, and managerial ownership
as the combined shareholdings of all board members

who have a minimum share of 0.2% of ownership.
They find a positive relationship between management
ownership and firm value in the 0% to 5% ownership
range and beyond the 25% ownership range. But at
moderate levels of management ownership, between
5% and 25%, firm performance decreased. A study by
Cho (1998), using cross-sectional data and ownership
information from value line replicates the Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study and finds a similar
nonmonotonic relationship between Tobin‘s Q and
management share holdings.
In contrast to findings in Morck et al. (1988),
McConnell and Servaes (1990) reported a quadratic
functional form and do not detect any inverse
relationship especially over the 5–25% ownership
range. McConnell and Servaes (1990) used the US
data for more than 1000 firms from the Compustat
database to investigate the relationship between
Tobin‘s Q and managerial share ownership. They
found a positive relationship between management
ownership and firm performance in the 0% to 40% 50% ownership range. McConnell and Servaes (1995)
replicated and extended their earlier study but over a
later time period and obtain similar results to
McConnell and Servaes (1990)42. Hermalin and
Weisbach (1991) estimated the effect of managerial
ownership and board composition on Tobin‘s Q using
panel data for five years. They found no relationship
between board composition and performance, but
found a significant non-monotonic relation between
managerial ownership and corporate performance, a
positive relationship between 0% and 1%, a
decreasing relationship between 1% and 5%, an
increasing relationship between 5% and 20%, and
decreasing beyond 20%.
Furthermore, recent findings in Davies et al.
(2005) for UK firms are even more disturbing. Using a
simultaneous equations framework in the presence of
conflicting managerial incentives, Davies et al. (2005)
report that the relationship between managerial
ownership and firm value is essentially quintic
(double-humped) and not just cubic as reported in
Short and Keasey (1999). Collectively, these
conflicting findings suggest that the debate over the
precise functional form of the insider ownership–firm
value relationship is far from conclusive.
In Australia, Craswell, Taylor and Saywell
(1997) investigated the relationship between the
distribution of equity ownership and a firm‘s
42

Steiner (1996), and Han and Suk (1998) obtained a
similar conclusion. Their results confirm the existence of
managerial entrenchment when insider ownership is beyond
36.6% and 41.8%, respectively.
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performance using 349 publicly traded firms in 1986
and 1989. Their results are weakly supportive of a
curvilinear relationship between insider ownership and
corporate performance. Also, institutional ownership
was not found to be an important determinant of
Australian corporate performance. Short and Keasey
(1999) provided evidence for the curvilinear effects
(non-linear relationship) between insider ownership
and firm performance in UK firms, but that insider
ownership becomes entrenched at higher levels of
ownership (the breakpoints were 12% and 41%) than
their US counterparts (see Morck et al., 1988).
Aldamen (2002) provided evidence from the
Jordanian market. He investigated the impact of
foreign ownership on firm value for a sample
consisting of 46 industrial and service companies
listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) covering
the period between 1990 and 2000. In order to
investigate the impact of foreign ownership on a
firm‘s performance he used a cross-sectional, timeseries ordinary least squares (OLS) piecewise
regression. Four variables were used in his study to
represent ownership on the basis of the proportion of
foreign held shares. Aldamen (2002) found that the
relationship between firm value and foreign ownership
in the Jordanian case is non-linear. His results reveal
that the value of Jordanian firms rises as foreign
ownership increases from 0% to 1%, firm‘s value
decreases as foreign ownership rises from 5% to 20%,
and firm‘s vale increases as foreign ownership moves
beyond 20%.
Zeitun and Tian (2007) examined the impact of
ownership structure on Jordanian firm's performance
and the default risk using a matched sample of 59
publicly listed firms in Jordan for the period 19892002. This paper investigates the effect of ownership
structure on a firm‘s performance and its failure in
Jordan using panel data of 167 firms.
A number of reasons make the choice of Jordan
interesting. First, Jordan is a much smaller market
than the US, UK, China, or Australia, which were the
subjects of prior studies, and hence it is likely that
managerial actions will be more translucent that may
lead to a less conflict of interest between insiders and
outsiders. Second, since 1990 privatisation of publicly
held shares is an ongoing program in Jordan.
Managing state holdings in Jordanian listed companies
has become a top government priority, with the
government supporting the private sector to takeover
and participate more in economic growth43 (see, for

example, CBJ (2003, 2006)); World Bank (2000)). So,
it could be anticipated that privatisation in Jordan
would affect a firm‘s performance and failure as it
changed the ownership structure of firms and
ownership concentration.
Third, the Jordanian Government undertook
major reforms of the legislation that governs securities
the law 22 of 1997, which is most recently amended in
the law 76 of 2002, provides basic Company Law or
Securities Law. This reform was intended to
strengthen internal control, shareholders rights, and
the protection of minority shareholders and, therefore,
potentially could have an impact on the relationship
between insider ownership and firm value. For
example, shareholders have the right to take part in
discussing matters presented thereto, and in voting on
the resolutions adopted by assembly regarding this
matter (see, for example, JSC (2001, 2004). In the
event of bankruptcy or liquidation65, ―if the
company's assets are insufficient to meet its
obligations as a result of the negligence of its
Chairman, members of the Board, the General
Manager, or its auditors, the court may charge those
responsible for the deficit jointly and severally‖ (JSC,
2001, p.23). Furthermore, ―shareholders representing
not less than 15% of the subscribed share capital can
require the Controller of Companies to inspect the
company for possible violations‖ (JSC, 2001).
Finally, the ownership of ASE listed firms is
highly concentrated. It is feasible that this significant
concentration may help to increase the firm's
performance, as the large shareholders may help
reduce the free-rider problem of small investors. For
example, the fraction held by companies seems to be
on the rise; for instance, it increased from 26.4 percent
in 1996 to 30.5 percent in 2006 (See Zeitun 2009).
This paper examines the non-linear effects of
ownership structure (variables) on corporate
performance. To the best of the author‘s knowledge,
this is the first study that real figures about ownership
structure (mix and concentration) to investigate the
non-linear effects of ownership structure (variables)
on corporate performance for Jordanian companies
using a large sample. It is worth noting that collecting
the data on ownership structure (mix and
concentration) for each firm and for each year over the
period 1989-2006 constituted a large part of the
research for this thesis as the data were collected
manually. This vast effort made this research possible.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive discussion

43

Privatisation is part of the overall economic package that
the government has adopted since the economic adjustment
program of the early nineties, and self-reliance in the
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aftermath of the economic crisis in 1989 that befell the
country.
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about ownership concentration and ownership mix for
the Jordanian companies used in the study. Section 3
introduces the estimation method. Section 6.4 introduces
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper
2.
Ownership Structure and Firm
Performance: a Descriptive Discussion
The corporate governance mechanisms vary around
the world which could affect the relationship between
ownership structure and corporate performance
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For example, in Europe
and Japan, there is less reliance on elaborate legal
protection, and more reliance on large investors while,
in the US, firms rely on legal protection. So, due to the
differences between US corporate governance and
other systems, a different relationship between
ownership and firm value could be expected. Also,
recent studies of corporate governance suggest that
geographical position, the tax system, industrial
development, and cultural characteristics, along with
other factors, affect ownership structure which in turn
impacts on a firm‘s performance and its failure
(Pedersen and Thompson, 1997). Therefore, this study
is important as it provides evidence from the emerging
markets and, more specifically, from Middle Eastern
countries using Jordan as a case study44.
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) provides
some evidence about the ownership structure of the
companies traded on the ASE. There are five types of
shares. First, government shares are those held by the
central government. Government shares are not
available for trading on the ASE, but government
ownership has fallen during the last ten years as a
result of privatization. Second, government agency
shares are shares owned by the government agencies.
Third, company shares are shares owned by domestic
institutions. The company is defined as a legal person
or a non-individual legal entity or institution. Fourth,
individual shares are held and traded by individuals.
Fifth, foreign and Arab shares are those held by Arabs
and foreign owners. All these shares entitle
shareholders and have the same voting rights and
dividend payment.
Table 1 shows the average ownership mix of
stock companies listed on the ASE. The fraction of
government shares appears to have declined from
1994 to 2006. The fraction of Arab ownership appears
to have increased from 10.20 percent in 1994 to 13.5
percent in 2006. The fraction of foreign owned shares

appears to have been unstable as it both increased and
decreased over this time period. However, it appears
to have increased to 15 percent in 2006. The fraction
held by companies seems to be on the rise; for
instance, it increased from 26.4 percent in 1996 to
30.5 percent in 2006.
Foreign ownership has been on the rise since the
beginning of the 1990's. The ASE has categorized the
foreign (Non-Jordanian) ownership as Arab and
non-Arab investors. Foreign investors can trade (buy
and sell) on the ASE without any restriction.
Furthermore, non-Jordanian investors are also allowed
to invest in any project within any sector according to
regulation No. 54 of the year 2000 (Non-Jordanian
Investment Regulation). This regulation allowed
foreigners to own up to 100% of any investment
project in any sector, with the exception of the mining
sector, trade and industry sector, transport sector, and
clearance services, and allowed foreign investors to
own a high percentage of the traded companies on the
ASE (World Bank, 2003).
Table 2 shows the percentage of foreign
ownership in the shareholding listed companies by
sector as a percentage of capital market capitalisation
for the period 1999-2008. According to Table 2, the
year 1999 recorded the highest foreign ownership
percentage in the financial sector at 56.65 percent;
while the year 2008 recorded the highest foreign
ownership percentage in the industrial sector at 53.35
percent of the total market capitalisation (MC). The
foreign ownership increased by more than 20 percent
in both industrial and services sectors during the
period 1999-2008. For example, the highest foreign
ownership percentage in the service sector reached
36.55 percent in 2006 compared with 13.98 percent in
1999.

44

For more details about the effect of corporate governance
on the incentives for the private sector to invest, see Stone,
Hurly and Khumani (1998).
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Table 1. Ownership Structure of ASE Listed Companies at the End of the Year (%)*
Gov.
Agency
Government
Companies
Individual
Arab
Foreigners
4.5
6.3
30.5
47
13.5
15
2006
-14.8
-12.8
-19.4
-25.3
-11.4
-10.8
5.5
6.4
30.2
46.3
13.1
14.2
2005
-21.4
-22.1
-21.3
-25.3
-12.3
-13.7
7.5
10.2
28.2
46.5
13.3
13.2
2004
16.3
18.5
27.4
55
9.5
11.3
9.5
12
27.9
46.7
12.8
7.5
2003
-12.3
-16.1
-22.1
-26.1
-18.7
-15.1
8.3
18
28
46
10.8
11.9
2002
-12.4
-24.3
-22.2
-25.3
-15.6
19.2
7.6
16.4
28.4
46.3
13.8
7.4
2001
-8
-22.2
-22.1
-25.1
-17.9
-13.1
10.6
16.6
27.4
50.7
7.9
9.3
1997
-11.4
-23.1
-20.3
-25.1
-11
-13.5
15.2
16.2
26.8
51.9
7.1
9.6
1996
-14.4
-22.2
-18.9
-25.1
-10.2
-14.4
15.3
16.5
26.4
53
8.5
7.3
1995
-14.8
-23.8
-19.1
-25
-11.4
-11.8
22
15.6
24.6
52.8
10.2
7.4
1994
-20.7
-22.7
-19.3
-25.3
-13.6
-13
*Cross-firm average with standard deviations in parentheses. Calculated by the author based on data from ASE
Statistics and Annual Reports.
Sources: Annul reports of listed companies
Year

Table 2. Percentage of Foreign Ownership in the Shareholding Companies by new sectoral specification
(1999-2008) *
Period

Financial

Services

Industrial

General

1999

56.647

13.977

30.483

43.099

2000

55.181

21.257

30.213

41.672

2001

47.426

19.676

27.872

38.507

2002

47.564

26.792

26.093

37.43

2003

46.275

24.285

30.098

38.844

2004

47.441

25.593

36.791

41.264

2005

49.77

26.185

38.088

45.043

2006

47.733

36.553

43.709

45.531

2007

50.733

36.152

51.881

48.947

33.811

53.347

49.247

2008
52.102
*As a percentage of market capitalization
Sources: Amman Stock Exchange

However as reported by Zeitun (2009), despite
its privatisation program, the government still holds a
large stake in Media, Utility and Energy, and Steel,
Mining and Heavy Engineering companies (43.20%,
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33.70 %, and 22.04 %, respectively) because they are
considered strategic industries. Table 3 shows the
trading activity of foreign investors for the period
2001-2008. For example, the value of shares
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purchased by foreign investors amounted to USD
5943.4 million in 2008, representing 20.8 percent of
total trading volume, with a 2.29 percent decrease
from 2007. The percentage of total buying to the total
trading reached its highest percentage in 2007, at

about 22.88 percent. Net foreign investment showed
negative balances of USD 151.4 million in 2001. The
net foreign investment reached the highest in 2007
amounted USD 656.6 million.

Table 3. Trading of Non-Jordanian (Foreign) Investment during 2001-2008
Foreign Ownership
of Market
Year
Capitalisation. (%)
2001
38.5
2002
37.4
2003
38.8
2004
41.3
2005
45
2006
45.5
2007
48.9
2008
49.2
Source: Amman Stock Exchange

Total Buying
(USD million)
147.2
328.7
395.9
535.6
3031.3
2810.0
3979.3
5943.4

Total Selling
(USD million)
298.6
327.5
280.7
438.6
2449.6
2555.6
3322.7
5507.0

Net Investment
(USD million)
-151.4
1.3
115.2
97.2
581.7
254.4
656.6
436.3

Market
Capitalization
/ GDP (%)
75.7
80.4
116.8
184.7
326.6
233.9
289
226.3

The ownership structure in the ASE is highly
concentrated (the median largest shareholder in Jordan
is large by Anglo-American standards but within the
range of those in France and Spain, 20 and 34 percent
respectively (see e.g. Becht and RÖell, 1999)45. In
theory, the concentration of control in the hands of a
few shareholders can reduce the agency problem.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that the agency
problem comes from the conflict between controlling
owners and minority shareholders, instead of between
managers and diffuse shareholders, which reflects the
legal protection of minority investors. Corporate
governance systems are affected by several
institutional factors such as the legal protection of
investors, the level of ownership concentration, the
level of capital market development, the role of the
market for corporate control, and the effectiveness of
boards (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000).
Table 4 reports the ownership structure of listed
companies in 2006 by sectors, namely the Industrial,
Services, Insurance, and Banking sectors. Table 4
shows that the government holds a large stake in the
Industrial and Services sectors, while it holds a small
stake in both Insurance and Banking sectors. This is
because the government participates in utility
companies such as electricity companies and mining
industries. For instance, in 2006, the government
shares in the electricity were about 30 percent of the
total shares in this sector. The average proportion of
institutional shares is greater in Services and Industrial

than in the Banking and Insurance sectors. Arab
investors have their largest stake in the Banking sector
and then the Insurance sector. The average proportion
of foreign shares is greatest in the insurance sector,
while it is still very low in all sectors.
Furthermore, Table 4 shows that the largest five
shareholders46 own more than 50 percent in the four
sectors. This indicates that ownership of ASE listed
firms is highly concentrated. It is feasible that this
significant concentration may help to increase the
firm's performance, as the large shareholders may help
reduce the free-rider problem of small investors and
therefore decrease the likelihood of default.

45

46

For more detail about the ownership concentration in the
ASE, see Zeitun (2009).

The threshold of ownership used by the ASE in 2002 was
5%.

109

Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 7, Issue 2, Winter 2009
Table 4. Ownership Structure and Concentration of Listed Companies in 2006 by Sector* as a (%)
Largest 5
Government**
Companies
Individual
Arab
Foreigners Shareholders
9.2
30.3
45
12.2
10.3
53.9
Industrial
-33.1
-22.3
-26.4
-14.9
-13.6
-25.6
15
35.5
40.4
12.1
12.3
63.2
Services
-27.3
-22.3
-27.2
-15.1
-11.4
-22.2
3
21.9
49.7
14.7
20.2
59.9
Insurance
-4.5
-19.7
-22.3
-18.2
-17.3
-24.7
4.7
16.8
40.1
30.5
13.9
56.9
Banking
-3.7
-22.6
-23.9
-26.5
-7.2
-22.5
*Cross-firm average with standard deviations in parentheses. Calculated by the author based on data from ASE
Statistics and Annual Reports of listed companies, 2006. ** includes government and government agencies.
Government includes both government shares and government agency shares.
3.

Data and Estimation Method
3.2

3.1

The data used in this study is derived from publicly
traded companies quoted on the Amman Stock
Exchange (ASE), over the period 1989-2006. The data
set contains detailed information about each enterprise.
The major items of interest are: balance sheets,
income statements, ownership structure, and the
percentage holdings of all direct shareholders 47. The
full balance sheets and income statements are usually
available from firms as the law requires disclosure.
The ownership data was collected manually, as it
is not available for all firms and for all years from the
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) reports. Collecting
this data on ownership structure and concentration for
each firm and for each year constituted a large part of
the research for this thesis. This vast effort made this
research possible, since the analysis uses real figures
rather than dummy variables for ownership structure.
Furthermore, the changes in real figures over years are
more valuable, as they shed light on the effect of
changes in ownership structure on both the firm‘s
health and failure. It is worth noting that the
unavailability of data for the managerial ownership
and ownership held by outside block holders
prevented the researcher from further investigation for
the effect of these variables.
The sample includes pooled cross-sectional and
time-series data for 167 firms (47 defaulted and 120
non-defaulted) over the period 1989-2006. These
firms ranged from old to newly established ones.

Four ratios to measure firms‘ performance were
calculated for both the panel data sample and matched
sample, namely return on equity (ROE), return on
assets (ROA), Tobin‘s Q, and MBVR. Tobin‘s Q and
MBVR are used to measure the market performance
of firms, while the ROE and ROA are employed as
measures representing accounting performance
measures. The explanatory variables are ownership
fractions, concentration ratios, and other control
variables.
The ownership fraction (mix) is divided into the
fraction owned by government (GOV), GOV the
fraction owned by the foreigner (FORG), the fraction
owned by companies (INSTIT), and the fraction
owned by individuals (CITIZEN). By controlling for
both ownership concentration and mix, we hope to be
able to distinguish which factors are more significant
in poorly performing enterprises.
Factors other than ownership structure may also
affect a firm‘s performance and health. To take them
into account, we introduce a set of control variables.
Dummy variables for industries are used to control the
difference between sectors, DUMi, i= 1, 2,...,5, for
Manufacturing, Trade, Steel and Mining, Utility, and
Real Estate in the matched sample, and 16 industrial
dummy variables in the panel data regressions (see
Table 6-2 for sector definitions). To control for other
factors with potential to affect firm value, I include the
following variables that proxy for these factors. Firm
size (SIZE)48, according to Short and Keasey (1999)
48

47

The ownership concentration is defined as any owner
possessing more than 5% and 10% of the company's shares.
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Variables Selection

Data

In the previous work, the value of total assets is used to
control size effect (see e.g. Morck et al., 1988 and
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Other studies used sales to
control for size (see e.g. Xu and Wang, 1997). The logarithm
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size has a significantly positive effect on firm
performance, since larger firms have access to the
external sources of funds. firm‘s age (AGE), capital
structure variable (DEBT), which is defined as total
debt to total assets (TDTA), following McConnell and
Servaes (1990) and Morck et al. (1988), Short and
Keasey (1999) includes a control variable to proxy for
the level of indebtedness.. Growth opportunity
(GROW) is defined as growth in sales (GROW1), or
net income to capitalisation (NICAP) 49.
Table 5 and Table 6 presented the descriptive
statistics of firm-specific variables used in the
analysis.
Table 7 presented a correlation matrix for the
variables of interest. Consistent with Scott (1976), size
is positively correlated with leverage but contrary to
intuition I find a positive association between size and
the price to earnings ratio. Larger firms also seem to
be more profitable, as the correlation between log of
sales and return on equity is significantly positive.
3.3

Non-Linearity of Ownership

The primary hypothesis I examined was that the value
of Jordanian firms is non-linearly related to the
percentage of equity held by government and
institutional. A non-linear relation between a firm‘s
value and ownership structure has been theoretically
predicted, and empirical evidence has shown the
non-linearity of this relationship (Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishney (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and
Lodered and Martin (1997)). Following Lodered and
Martin (1997), and McConnell and Servaes (1990),
the squared values of government and institutional
ownership are included as independent variables to
capture the non-linear relationship between ownership
structure and firm performance. Four measures of
performance are used: ROA, ROE, Tobin‘s Q, and
MBVR. The logarithm of total assets is used to control
for size, growth in sales is used to control for growth,
and the debt level is used to control for leverage. In
order to investigate if there is a non-linear relationship
between ownership structure and firm performance
pooled and panel regressions are carried out using the

random effects model to estimate the following
equations:
Y  0  1Goverment   2Goverment 2  3 Foreign 

 4 SIZE  5 DEBT  6GROW  

(1)
Y  0  1institutional   2institutional 2  3 Foreign 

 4 SIZE  5 DEBT  6GROW  

(2)
Yit  0  1Govermentit   2Goverment 2it  3 Foreignit 

 4 SIZEit  5 DEBTit  6GROWit   it

(3)
Yit  0  1institutionalit   2institutional 2it  3 Foreignit 

 4 SIZEit  5 DEBTit  6GROWit   it

(4)
Based on theoretical and empirical studies,
government ownership is hypothesised to have a
negative impact on a firm‘s performance as
government has other objectives rather than firm value
maximisation. Previous research, such as Boardman
and Vining (1989), Megginson and Netter (2001), and
Wei, Xie, and Zhang (2005), found that government
ownership has a negative impact on firm performance.
However, other studies, such as Anderson, Lee
and Murrell (2000) and Gupta, Ham and Svejnar
(2001) found that government ownership has a
positive impact on firm performance in a transition
economy. Institutional ownership is expected to have a
positive impact on firm performance as institutional
ownership motivation is to maximise a firm's profit.

of total sales is used in this research. It has lower
explanatory power than assets, and its inclusion in
regressions of ROA and ROE makes the results not
significant.
49
The growth in total assets and the book value of total
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of
equity divided by book value of total assets are used in this
study. However, while all the measures of growth are found
to have a similar result, the growth in sales and NICAP are
provide the best results regarding the model explanatory
power.
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Table 5. Description Statistics for the Variables Used in The Study
Std.
Variable

Obs

Mean

Dev.

Min

Max

CV

Skewness

Kurtosis

Shapiro-Wilk

Probability

ROA

1586

0.012

0.152

-4.071

0.681

12.6667

-13.460

343.435

465.132

0.000

ROE

1586

-0.142

4.195

-159.39

1.998

-29.542

-35.248

1317.897

930.45

0.000

Q

1408

1.701

15.443

0.000

538.734

9.0788

31.815

1066.859

840.099

0.000

MBVR

1277

1.947

12.636

-2.556

450.000

6.4900

34.959

1239.922

758.284

0.000

TDTA

1586

0.357

0.268

0.0002

2.600

0.7507

2.184

15.356

128.768

0.000

Growth

1270

0.716

8.633

-1.000

292.979

12.0573

30.888

1037.096

736.898

0.000

SIZE

1450

14.81

2.0564

0.000

20.4917

0.1389

-0.5394

5.6287

26.154

0.000

AGE

1575

14.625

12.903

1.00

65

0.8823

1.3301

4.3507

123.389

0.000

Tobin‘s

Table 6. Ownership Structure for the Sample

TDTA
SIZE
AGE
GOVE
INSTIT
FOREIG

TDTA
1
0.227
0.165
0.079
-0.095
-0.003

SIZE

AGE

GOVE

INSTIT

FOREIG

1
0.430
0.053
-0.126
0.203

1
0.123
-0.075
0.005

1
0.135
0.226

1
-0.236

1

Table 7. Correlation Matrix of the variables used in the study

Mean

Median

Std.Dev

Maximum

Minimum

Government

14.88

2.40

23.87

100

0

Companies

25.29

25.41

17.72

85.26

0

Individual
(Citizen)

44.36

47.50

24.56

97.77

0

Foreign

9.89

5.20

15.04

96.017

0

4. Empirical Results
The empirical results that consider the relationship
between government ownership and firm performance
are presented in Table 8. From the pooled data sample,
it is documented that government ownership is
significantly positively related to ROA and MBVR, at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively. This finding is not
consistent with our hypothesis, or with previous
findings such as Wei, Xie, and Zhang (2005).
The results also show that the relationship
between government ownership and ROA and MBVR
is a hump-shaped curve. The value of a firm increases
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when government ownership is low, but the value of a
firm decreases when it is high. As the government
reduces its stake in a privatised company to below a
specific point, perhaps market monitoring become
ineffective and this increases the agency costs.
Therefore, after some point, firm value will decrease
as government ownership declines. However, this
effect does not exist for the ROE and Tobin‘s Q
regressions in the panel data. Also, it does not exist for
any regression using the panel random effects model.
Our finding is consistent with the hypothesis of Morck
et al. (1988) about how inside ownership affects a
firm‘s value. However, these results are inconsistent
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with previous findings such as Tian (2003) and Wei,
Xie and Zhang (2005).
Furthermore, the results show that foreign
ownership is negatively significantly related to firm
value Tobin‘s Q, and firm performance ROA,
indicating that foreign investors may influence
management of the firm negatively. It may also
indicate that the presence of foreign ownership forces

management to allocate resources for their own
benefit as they are not sure about the foreigners‘
strategies. However, this result is inconsistent with
previous findings such as Smith, Cin, and Vodopivec
(1997), who find a positive and significant
relationship between firm performance and foreign
ownership.

Table 8. Ownership Structure and Firm‘s Performance: Non-linear Specification for Government and Institutional
Ownership
Pooled Data

Panel Data

Variables

ROA

ROE

Tobin‘s Q

MBVR

SIZE

0.057

0.053

-0.057

0.371

(9.23)***

(0.65)

(-0.06)

(3.62)***

DEBT

GROW1

GOV

GOV2

FORG

Constant

F-statistic

R-square

-0.192

-0.643

-0.848

-0.385

(-16.65)***

(-4.2)***

(-0.47)

(-1.68)*

0.001

0.003

-0.051

-0.012

(2.6)***

(0.56)

(-1.01)

(-0.59)

0.118

0.290

0.620

1.510

(2.68)***

(0.5)

(0.09)

(2.05)**

-0.148

0.030

-1.000

-2.003

(-2.62)***

(0.04)

(-0.11)

(-1.99)**

-0.038

0.120

-6.925

-0.355

(-1.75)*

(0.41)

(-2.00)**

(-1.04)

-0.381

-0.332

87.020

-1.572

(-7.97)***

(-0.52)

(10.42)***

(-1.86)*

ROA

ROE

Tobin‘s Q

0.054

-0.035

-0.136

0.476

SIZE

(5.00)***

(-0.21)

(-0.13)

(2.87)***

-0.163

-0.469

-0.851

-0.328

DEBT

(-10.69)***

(-2.18)**

(-0.45)

(-1.22)

Variables

GROWT

0.001

0.002

-0.048

-0.005

(2.48)**

(0.45)

(-0.94)

(-0.25)

0.086

-0.073

0.595

0.377

GOV

(1.17)

(-0.07)

(0.08)

(0.34)

-0.035

0.590

-1.009

-0.853

GOV2

(-0.38)

(0.44

(-0.1)

(-0.59)

0.043

0.169

-7.440

-0.290

FORG

(1.45)

(0.41)

(-2.01)**

(-0.65)

-0.382

0.198

85.751

-2.300

Constant

(-4.4)***

(0.13)

(9.46)***

(-1.68)*

19.15

2.17

12.81

5.88

170.12

31.23

230.72

31.83

(0.00)***

(0.00)**

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

Wald test

(0.00)***

(0.06)*

(0.00)***

(0.06)*

0.2313

0.019

0.1755

0.0842

R-square

0.2084

0.0249

0.1904

0.0942

Tobin‘s Q

MBVR

Pooled Data
Variables
SIZE

DEBT

GROW1

INSTIT

INSTIT2

FORG

Constant

F-statistic

R-square

MBVR

ROA

ROE

Panel Data
Tobin‘s Q

MBVR

0.066

0.102

-0.009

0.407

(10.71)***

(1.25)

(-0.01)

(3.97)***

-0.190

-0.627

-1.534

-0.392

(-16.38)***

(-4.05)***

(-0.85)

(-1.71)*

0.001

0.002

-0.053

-0.009

(2.49)**

(0.36)

(-1.03)

(-0.46)

0.133

0.039

-16.006

0.708

(2.95)***

(0.06)

(-2.23)**

(0.97)

-0.189

-1.108

15.775

0.314

(-3.11)***

(-1.37)

(1.62)

(0.31)

-0.036

-0.138

-8.595

-0.121

(-1.61)

(-0.47)

(-2.44)**

(-0.35)

-0.449

-0.554

88.785

-2.021

(-9.4)***

(-0.87)

(10.56)***

(-2.38)**

20.22

2.63

13.090

6.25

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

(0.00)***

0.2427

0.0265

0.18

0.0905

Variables

ROA

ROE

0.066

-0.003

-0.050

0.410

SIZE

(6.07)***

(-0.02)

(-0.05)

(2.42)**

-0.169

-0.479

-1.674

-0.266

DEBT

(-10.99)***

(-2.18)**

(-0.88)

(-0.98)

GROWT

0.001

0.002

-0.050

-0.001

(2.41)**

(0.41)

(-0.97)

(-0.03)

0.037

0.113

-19.882

1.191

GOV

(0.58)

(0.13)

(-2.55)**

(1.21)

-0.115

-0.594

19.755

-0.718

GOV2

(-1.34)

(-0.5)

(1.88)*

(-0.54)

0.023

0.070

-9.536

-0.051

FORG

(0.78)

(0.17)

(-2.53)**

(-0.11)

-0.452

0.029

87.473

-2.081

(-5.29)***

(0.02)

(9.5)***

(-1.5)

185.08

31.96

234.27

33.48

Wald test

(0.00)***

(0.06)*

(0.00)***

(0.04)**

R-square

0.229

0.0267

0.1945

0.1028

Constant

Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Statistical significance t-statistics
is determined with White (1980) standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. Industrial dummy variables
are included in the regression.
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Table 8 presents the empirical results of the
regression that investigates the relationship between
institutional ownership and firm performance using
the pooled and panel data. The results show that
institutional ownership is positively related to the firm
value and the results for the pooled sample are
significant at the 1% and 5% level for the ROA and
Tobin‘s Q, respectively. These results show that
government ownership and institutional ownership are
positively related to the firm‘s value. The results also
document that the relation between institutional
ownership and ROA and Tobin‘s Q is a hump-shaped
curve. When institutional ownership increases above a
specific point, institutional shareholders negatively
influence a firm‘s activities. Thus, increasing
institutional ownership will decrease the firm‘s value
and firm performance, measured by Tobin‘s Q and
ROA, respectively. The non-linear relationship
between firm value and Tobin‘s Q is documented by
using the panel random effects model. Furthermore,
foreign ownership is found to have a negative effect
on the firm value Tobin‘s Q.
The adjusted R-squared statistics show that the
independent variables combined can explain a
substantial amount of the variation in firm value,
ranging from 3% in the ROE to 24% in the ROE.
Furthermore, as the effect for the same proportion of
government or institutional ownership may be
different in one industry than in others, 15 industrial
dummy variables were used to control for potential
industry effects. During the sample period of
1989-2003, Jordanian macroeconomic variables, such
as interest rate, GDP, unemployment, and other
economic variables, were different from one year to
another. Controlling for the effect of time-series,
dummy variables for the years were used in both the
pooled and panel sample. When the time dummy
variables were added to the model, the ownership
structure variables became insignificant.

different from Middle Eastern countries. So,
implications from the theory may not be applicable to
other countries. This study provides evidence from
Middle Eastern countries and expands the previous
studies by investigating the effect of ownership
structure on the firm‘s failure.
This paper examines the non-linear effects of
ownership structure (variables) on corporate
performance. The data used in this study are derived
from 167 publicly traded companies quoted on the
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), over the period
1989-2003. The ownership structure is measured by
the percentage of shares held by each type of owner
(state, institution, foreign concentrated owners, and
individuals). Results in this study confirm earlier
findings of a curvilinear relationship reported for
larger markets. The results also show that the
relationship between government ownership and ROA
and MBVR is a hump-shaped curve. The value of a
firm increases when government ownership is low, but
the value of a firm decreases when it is high. As the
government reduces its stake in a privatised company
to below a specific point, perhaps market monitoring
become ineffective and this increases the agency costs.
Our finding is consistent with the hypothesis of Morck
et al. (1988) about how inside ownership affects a
firm‘s value. However, these results are inconsistent
with previous findings such as Tian (2003) and Wei,
Xie and Zhang (2005).
The results also document that the relation
between institutional ownership and ROA and Tobin‘s
Q is a hump-shaped curve. When institutional
ownership increases above a specific point,
institutional shareholders negatively influence a firm‘s
activities. Findings in this study contribute to the
growing body of international evidence that the nonlinear cubic relationship between ownership structure
and corporate performance is robust to differences in
governance structures across markets.

5.
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MERGERS DECISION IN JAPANESE SMALL MUTUAL BANKS:
EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT OR EMPIRE BUILDINGS?#
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Abstract
With the number of bank consolidations increasing around the world since the 1990s, several
studies have examined what factors drive banks to consolidate, and some argue that bank
managers who have a motive of empire buildings choose mergers. In this study, we deal with
mergers among Japanese small mutual banks (credit associations or Shinkin banks) during the
period 1996 to 2005. Japanese credit associations have been experiencing an unprecedented wave
of consolidation, with their number decreasing from 410 (March 1996) to 292 (April 2006).
Interestingly, unlike stock companies, mutual companies are often expected to be weak in terms of
disciplining managers. If so, mutual banks tend to choose inefficient mergers at the expense of
other stakeholders. Here, we use the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to obtain “cost efficiency”
proxy. We find that while the efficiency of acquiring credit associations decreases during the
merger period, mergers do ultimately improve efficiency. Based on our results we find that raising
efficiency, not for building empires, is an important goal for such credit association mergers.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Efficiency, Mergers, Japanese credit associations
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1. Introduction
The financial services industry has been subject to
consolidation around the world since the 1990s, and
Japan has been no exception to these developments
with megabank groups in particular having been
established through mergers and acquisitions among
city banks. Japan‘s 13 city banks of the early 1990s
were gradually reduced to the present four city bank
groups. In addition to these megabank mergers, the
number of small and medium financial institutions
such as credit associations (Shinkin banks) has also
been decreasing through a rise in mergers and
acquisitions in recent years (from 410 (March 1996) to
292 (April 2006)).
The underlying motivation for mergers of credit
associations may be different from that of banks,
however, given that credit associations are ―mutual‖
organizations (Davis, 2001). More precisely,
irrespective of the size of the individual member‘s
deposits and loans, ―one member, one vote‖ remains
the basic principle guiding these institutions‘ actions.
Furthermore, the fundamental objective of credit
associations is maximization of members‘ benefits
rather than institutional profits. Despite this, however,
the managerial environment of Japanese financial
institutions—including
credit
associations—has
changed considerably in recent years. Credit
associations have traditionally been classified as
cooperative regional financial institutions serving
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and local
residents, which were underserved by private stock
banks. As large firms turn to the financial markets in
recent years, banks are increasingly focusing on SMEs
and the retail market. This has led to increasingly
severe competitive pressure on credit associations to
the extent that while mutuality remains a basic
principle of such associations, the revenue structure of
cooperative financial institutions has deteriorated. The
recent increase in consolidation of credit associations
might be a response to such environmental changes. If
so, it is likely that seeking an improvement in
efficiency is the main purpose behind this recent wave
of consolidations among Japanese credit associations.
Studies that examine the causes and
consequences of consolidation in the U.S. banking
industry often highlight improvements in profit
efficiency and risk diversification, although
improvements in cost efficiency are harder to find
(Berger et al., 1999). In contrast to these findings, and
while the evidence remains limited, studies dealing
with ―mutual‖ financial institutions obtain quite
different results. A study of U.K. building societies
found significant efficiency gains following
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acquisitions (Haynes and Thompson, 1999). A U.S.
study of credit unions similarly found that mergers
resulted in improved efficiency, whereas roughly half
of acquiring credit unions and roughly 20% of
acquired credit unions experienced a decline in
efficiency after a merger (Fried et al., 1999) Similarly,
another study of Australian credit unions revealed that
some mergers do produce efficiency benefits (Ralston
et al., 2001; Worthington, 1999, 2001). In contrast, a
study of Japanese credit associations found that the
cost efficiency of consolidated institutions was
significantly lower than that of non-consolidated
institutions shortly after the merger, while the cost
efficiency of consolidated institutions improves over
time (Yamori and Harimaya, 2008). These suggest that
it is therefore premature to conclude that mutual
institutions inevitably choose value-decreasing
mergers.
This paper aims to provide new evidence by
focusing on the efficiency effect of mergers of
Japanese credit associations during the period 1996 to
2005 50 . Specifically, we examine why credit
associations choose consolidation and whether
consolidation actually improves efficiency. If any
efficiency improvements were not realized, the recent
unprecedented wave of consolidation have been
considered to be occurred by a sacrifice of member's
interests. Thus, the motivation for empire buildings
seems to be a critical factor.
Our analysis proceeds in two stages. Cost
efficiency scores were calculated by employing a
stochastic frontier approach in the first stage, and
regression analysis was then applied to investigate the
efficiency effect in the second stage. The analytical
method we employ in this study has been widely used
in previous studies investigating efficiency gains of
consolidation in the financial sector51.
This paper is divided into six sections. Sections 2
and 3 describe the methodology and data used in this
study. Section 4 outlines the efficiency scores, and
Section 5 presents and interprets the estimation results.
A summary and conclusions are given in Section 6.
2. Empirical methodology
Two main approaches have been adopted in the
literature studying efficiency in the public and private
sector - a parametric and non-parametric approach. In
sharp contrast to the non-parametric Data
50

Credit associations are not marginal institutions: Their
loans amounted to 63.5 trillion yen or about 12.6% of
Japanese loan markets (as of March 2007).
51
See Amel et al. (2004) for a more detailed survey of the
available empirical evidence.
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Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method, which does not
require any statistical assumption, the Stochastic
Frontier Approach (SFA) focuses on the distribution
of the error term, a part of which is considered to be
inefficiency. While no consensus has been reached on
the best frontier approach for efficiency analysis, the
SFA is consistent with production theory and is
flexible 52 . In this paper, we therefore employ the
parametric Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA).
In an attempt to estimate the stochastic frontier
model, we first need to assume a functional form. In
this study, we employ the standard translog function in
contrast to the Fouier-flexible functional form that has
been employed in recent literature, which requires a
large sample size to obtain accurate results and is
more suitable when applied to large banks (McAllister
and McManus, 1993; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996). In
addition, although the mean difference in average
efficiency is statistically significant, efficiency
rankings are virtually identical to the results of the
standard translog function (Berger and DeYoung,
1996).

We specify the frontier cost function as:
n

m

k 1

l 1

ln C   0   k ln Yk    l ln Pl 

1 n n
 kj ln Yk ln Y j
2 k 1 j 1

n m
1 m m
   lh ln Pl ln Ph    lk ln Yk ln Pl  v  u (1)
2 l 1 h1
k 1 l 1

where C is total costs, Yi are the outputs and Pk
are the input prices, v is statistical noise, assumed to
be distributed as a two-sided normal with zero mean
and variance ζ2, u is the inefficiency term, assumed to
be distributed as a one-sided positive disturbance, and
α, β, and δ are coefficients to be estimated. The SFA
requires a priori distributional assumptions regarding
the inefficiency term, u. Following previous studies
(Mester, 1996; Allen and Rai, 1996, Altunbas et al.,
2000), we specify the distribution to be half-normal.
Furthermore, the usual symmetry and linear
homogeneity restrictions are imposed a priori.
Estimates of this model can be carried out
through the maximum likelihood procedure 53 . As
Jondrow
et
al.
(1982)
pointed
out,
observation-specific estimates of inefficiency are
obtained as the mean of the conditional distribution
(i.e., E[ui|εi] (εi = vi + ui)). In this study, we employ the
alternative point estimator proposed by Battese and
Coelli (1988), which can be expressed as follows:

(2)
1  ( *   *i  * )
1
CEi  E (exp{ui } |  i )  [
]  exp{ *i   *2 }
1  (  *i  * )
2
where μ*i = εiζ2u/ζ2 and ζ* = ζuζv/ζ (ζ2=ζ2u+ζ2v).
The efficiency scores obtained from (2) have a value
of between 0 and 1.
After obtaining a ―cost efficiency‖ measurement,
we then employ a multinomial logit regression to
investigate whether the efficiency could be considered
as a determinant of merger activity. We identify an
acquiring credit association as a legally surviving
institution and an acquired credit association as an
institution that has legally disappeared. Accordingly,
the dependent variable of the multinomial logit model
is divided into the following three groups: Taking
value zero if a credit association was not involved in a
merger; value one if a credit association acquired
another credit association (acquiring); and value two if
a credit association was acquired by another credit
association (acquired). In addition to the pre-merger
investigations, we also empirically examine the
post-merger efficiency gains. To avoid a shortage of
degree of freedom, we pool our data from the period
1996 to 2005. Table 1 shows fluctuations in numbers
of each group for the sample period. As shown in
Table 1, there are 410 credit associations for the
sample from 1996, while recent consolidation reduced
the sample size to 292 credit associations by 200554.
3. Data
With regard to the input and output specification, we
employ the intermediation approach commonly used
in the literature on modeling bank behavior (e.g.,
Sealey and Lindley, 1977). We define three inputs and
outputs, so that credit associations are viewed as
financial intermediaries that use labor, capital, and
funds as inputs and produce loans and securities
services as outputs. Here, we use interest income on
loans and discounts (Y1), other interest income (Y2),
and fees and commissions (Y3) as output variables.
Three input prices are defined as follows: The labor
price (P1) is the ratio of personnel expenses to the
number of employees, the price of capital (P2) is the
ratio of non-personnel expenses to the value of
movable and immovable capital, and the price of
funds (P3) is the ratio of interest expense on deposits
to the total amount of deposits. Total costs are defined
as a sum of labor expenses, interest expenses, and
capital expenses. All the data used in this study are
taken from The Analysis of Financial Statement of All

52

Although several studies attempt to compare analytical
techniques, the results differ with regard to efficiency scores
and rank correlations (Berger and Mester, 1997; Bauer et
al.1998; Weill 2004).
53
See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for more details.

54

In this paper, all years are expressed in fiscal years. For
example, the Japanese fiscal year 1999 runs from April 1,
1999 to March 31, 2000.
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Credit Associations for the period 1996 to 2005. Table
2 provides descriptive statistics of the relevant
variables for fiscal 1996 and 2005.
For the second stage multinomial logit regression,
we chose financial health, market power, and
profitability in addition to the cost efficiency discussed
above as important independent variables. For the
financial health variables, we use the capital ratio (CPR),
which is defined as the ratio of total capital to total
assets55. We expect that acquired credit associations are
financially unhealthy and acquiring credit associations
are financially healthy.
We use the share of loans of associations within
each prefectural market (LMS) for the market power
proxy. If size is an important factor in credit association
mergers, a positive coefficient is expected in terms of
regression in acquiring credit associations and a
negative coefficient for acquired credit associations. For
profitability variables, we use the following two
variables: The loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) and the
general and administrative expenses ratio (GAER). The
first measure (LDR) relates to differences in demand for
loans, quality of borrower, and management skill in
lending. A positive (negative) coefficient is thought to
exist ex-ante for acquiring (acquired) credit associations.
The second measure (GAER) is defined as the ratio of
administrative expenses to total income. That is, it
captures the possibility that an association‘s operating
costs exceed its revenues. We expect that acquiring
(acquired) credit associations have lower (higher) GAER.
Moreover, for the variable reflecting mutual financial
characteristics of credit associations, we have included
the degree of dependence on interest on deposits with
banks (DDID), which expresses dependency on the
Shinkin Central Bank, which serves as the central bank
for credit associations 56 . If a credit association with
profitable loan opportunities does not make deposits to
the Shinkin Central Bank, a higher DDID suggests
lower profitability. We therefore expect that acquired
(acquiring) credit associations are likely to have a
higher (lower) DDID. Finally, as control variables, we
use the logarithm of the number of cooperative
members (LCM), and dummy variable (DDM), which
takes one for the deficit credit association and zero
otherwise.

4. Summary of cost efficiency scores
Due to space limitations, we do not include details of
the parameters of the frontier cost function in this
study57. The majority of the parameters, including those
of dummy variables, are approximately estimated. The
regularity conditions of the cost function evaluated for
the mean values are also satisfied. Furthermore, results
of the LR test for the presence of a stochastic element of
inefficiency reject the null hypothesis of no inefficiency
at the 1% significance level.
Table 3 shows the time-varying average cost
efficiency scores. In addition to the results of
pre-merger credit associations, the table also displays
those of the just-merged credit associations in each year.
Results from the full sample indicate that cost efficiency
scores vary only very slightly around the 90% mark.
With regard to a comparison between pre- and
post-merger values, average cost efficiency is generally
higher in pre-merger credit associations, whereas that
for post-merger credit associations is usually lower. The
latter results are highly consistent with the findings of
Yamori and Harimaya (2008) that institutions subject to
merger experience significant declines in their DEA
efficiency scores in the year of amalgamation. In
contrast, however, the yearly average measures of
acquiring credit associations are more efficient than
those of acquired credit associations in 7 out of 10 years,
while these differences between average efficiencies are
statistically insignificant58.
5. Empirical results of credit association
mergers
The estimated coefficients for the multinomial logit
regressions are presented in Table 4. In these regressions,
credit associations that have not been subject to any
consolidation are provided as a reference group. We
initially pay attention to the coefficient of the cost
efficiency (CE), which is considered an important
determinant of credit association consolidation. In an
attempt to verify the consistency of the results, we also
estimate a reduced model formed by omitting the CE
variable. As shown in the results of the full model, our
findings reveal that the estimated coefficient of the cost
efficiency (CE) is significant with the hypothesized sign
only for acquiring credit associations. It should

55

As credit associations were not obligated to disclose the
amount of non-performing loans until recently, we were
unable to take the bad loan ratio into account.
56
The main role of the Shinkin Central Bank lies in the
effective investment of the credit associations' surplus funds,
adjusting supply and demand for funds among the credit
associations, and functioning as a clearing bank for credit
associations.
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Estimation results are available from the authors upon
request. While not shown in (1), annual dummy variables
(reference year: 1996) are employed.
58
A study of Australian credit unions found that acquired
credit unions are less efficient than acquiring credit unions
(Worthington, 2004). A study of U.S. credit unions, in contrast,
found the exact opposite result (Fried et al., 1999).
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therefore be noted that more cost efficient credit
associations are more likely to acquire other credit
associations. This suggests that credit associations under
good management tend to improve the efficiency of
their acquired institutions by using their inherent
management skills. Expected efficiency-gains can
therefore be seen as an important motive behind credit
association mergers; thus, empire buildings motives are
not revealed. These results are consistent with the
findings of a study of Australian credit union mergers
(Worthington, 2004).
Turning to the other results regarding the full
model, in the case of the probability of acquiring
credit associations, the coefficients relating to the
loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR), the general and
administrative expenses ratio (GAER), and the number
of cooperative members (LCM) are significant with
positive signs. The fact that the capital ratio (CPR)
and the share of loans within each prefectural market
(LMS) are insignificant, however, indicate that both
financial health and market power are not relevant
determinants for credit associations in deciding
whether to acquire other institutions. We observed an
interesting result in terms of the coefficient of the
GAER variable; its sign is opposite to the ex-ante
prediction. The results for the LCM variable indicate
that larger credit associations are more likely to
acquire other credit associations.
In looking at acquired credit associations, we find
that the estimated coefficients are significant for all
factors but the LDR variable. In particular, and in sharp
contrast to the results from acquiring credit associations,
the variables for financial health and market power
conform to the hypothesized sign. These results suggest
that credit associations in a relatively weak financial
condition and with a small market share are more likely
to be acquired compared to a credit association that does
not involve consolidation. Furthermore, the positive
coefficient of the GAER is identical to the results
provided by acquiring credit associations. We found it
noteworthy that the coefficient of the degree of
dependence on the Shinkin Central Bank (DDID) is
negative - its sign is also the reverse of the ex-ante
prediction. The results for the LCM and the DDM
variables are consistent with our general expectations the smaller and less profitable the credit association, the
more likely it is to be acquired.
Finally but equally importantly, we investigate the
post-merger performance of the acquiring credit
associations. In order to examine the post-merger
efficiency improvement, we use a simple OLS
regression analysis method with cost efficiency scores
as the dependent variable and the time dummy variables
indicating the years after the merger as independent

variables. As part of the regression analysis we also use
the cost efficiency rank as the dependent variable on the
basis that the efficiency scores obtained from SFA are
not statistically consistent. By using the cost efficiency
scores for each year, the ranks are converted to a
uniform scale over the [0, 1] interval using the formula
(orderit-1)/(nt-1), where orderit is the order rank of the ith
credit association in the tth year evaluated from the cost
efficiency scores, and nt is the number of credit
associations in year t. The credit association with the
lowest cost efficiency score therefore has the worst rank
of 0, and the credit association with the highest cost
efficiency score has the best rank of 1 in each year.
Results of the regression analysis are presented in
Table 5. As the table shows, we consider a set of dummy
variables for years t, t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 – namely,
from the year of merger to four years after the merger.
Despite the low explanatory power and insignificant
estimates, some interesting results can clearly be
observed.
First, in terms of the results of cost efficiency
scores, the estimated coefficients are clearly negative in
the period t to t+2 but positive in the periods t+3 and
t+4. This indicates that mergers experience efficiency
declines over periods of up to two years following a
merger, and become relatively efficient as time passes.
The former findings are in contrast to the findings of
Fried et al. (1999) regarding U.S. credit unions. Such
differences may be caused by different adjustment
speeds between Japan and the U.S. It generally takes
longer to rebuild and reallocate management resources
such as branch offices and employees in Japan than in
the U.S. Indeed, it is extremely rare to observe any
substantial reduction in management resources
following mergers between Japanese financial
institutions, so it should be noted that efficiencies are
temporarily reduced due to the small cost reduction at
the initial stage of the merger process59. However, as
shown in the coefficients on the year dummy variables
for t+3 and t+4, we find that there is a tendency for such
institutions to increase in efficiency over time. Although
it may take several years to realize the benefits of
mergers, these results are consistent with our previous
findings that most Japanese credit associations chose
mergers to enhance their efficiency. The results of cost
efficiency ranks also present the same findings - the
efficiency effect of credit association mergers is
apparent several years later.
In sum, although mutual companies are said to be
weak in corporate governance, managers in Japanese
59

Some U.S. banking studies also found that acquirers
failed to improve efficiency after the merger (Rhoades,
1993; DeYoung, 1997; Peristiani, 1997; Berger, 1998).
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mutual banks are actually well disciplined. One of
reasons is that recent severer market competition in
Japan does not allow managers to choose inefficient
mergers. Another interesting finding is that Japanese
mutual bank managers can implement mergers from the
long-term perspective. If stakeholders has short-term
horizon, they may make an objection of managers‘
merger decisions, which erode short-term profitability.
We need further research on whether stakeholders have
similar long-horizon or managers have strong discretion
power.

5.

6.

7.

6. Concluding remarks
In this present study we set out to investigate the
underlying motives of mergers by Japanese credit
associations during the period 1996-2005 and also
consider the consequences of these mergers. Our
findings can be summarized as follows.
First, the cost efficiency obtained from SFA is an
important factor on mergers between credit associations,
and cost efficient credit associations tend to be acquirers
of other associations. Second, the cost efficiency of
acquiring credit associations declines over a period of
up to two years following a merger, and become
relatively efficient as time passes.
These results suggest that efficiency improvement
is one of the important motives for credit associations in
undertaking mergers. In other words, as sound corporate
governance in mutual institutions in Japan is confirmed,
our results supports that empire building of bank
managers is limited regarding Japanese small banks.
Also, we find that it may take several years to achieve
an improvement in efficiency. This means that Japanese
mutual banks managers are allowed to have a long-term
perspective, while managers in stock companies are
under strong pressure of short-term profits
maximization. We need further research on these
interesting facts.
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Appendices
Table 1.
Database Sample Size of Credit Association Merger Study, 1996-2005
Pre-merger
Year

Total
Acquiring

Acquired

1996

410

8

9

1997

401

3

5

1998

395

5

9

1999

386

7

7

2000

370

11

16

2001

343

14

17

2002

326

14

20

2003

306

7

7

2004

298

5

6

2005

292

3

5

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Variables used for DEA to Measure Efficiency (millions of yen)
1996

2005

Variable
Mean

Std. dev.

Mean

Std. dev.

Y1

Interest income on loans and discounts

5,901

7,429

5,300

6,764

Y2

Other interest income

2,209

3,223

1,653

1,971

Y3

Fees and commissions

420

527

755

976

P1

Labor price

6.6384

0.7731

0.0006

0.0004

P2

Physical capital price

0.4514

0.1596

7.1657

0.8996

P3

Deposit interest price

0.0067

0.0010

0.3756

0.1492

C

Total costs

5,944

7,793

5,105

6,064

Number of observations

410

292

Table 3
Time-Varying Average Cost Efficiency
Pre-merger
Year

Total

Merged
Acquiring

124

Acquired

1996

0.9002

0.9087

0.9233

0.8010

1997

0.9000

0.9075

0.8959

0.7724

1998

0.8997

0.9089

0.8625

0.7970

1999

0.8977

0.9116

0.8824

0.7195

2000

0.8976

0.9216

0.8953

0.8612

2001

0.8961

0.9035

0.8991

0.7952

2002

0.8942

0.9034

0.8893

0.7679

2003

0.8931

0.9065

0.9097

0.7661

2004

0.8957

0.9119

0.9099

0.7603

2005

0.8963

0.8792

0.8989

0.8455
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Table 4
Multinomial Logit Regressions Results
Full model

Reduced model

Acquiring

Acquired

Acquiring

Acquired

Variable
Coefficient
CONS.

-20.8832

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

***

3.9666

3.3187

2.9585

**

3.1674

2.8163

2.4230

Coefficient
-14.0595

***

Std. error

Coefficient

Std. error

2.4811

5.9807

***

1.8842

CE

7.0100

CPR

-0.7819

6.0270

-21.2692

***

4.2955

2.3410

6.1480

-20.0980

***

4.2057

LMS

-0.0436

0.0454

-0.7764

***

0.1745

-0.0494

0.0465

-0.7829

***

0.1738

LDR

2.7897

**

1.3494

-0.7058

1.0270

3.2217

1.3258

-0.4102

0.9872

GAER

3.3379

**

1.5394

2.4135

*

1.2523

2.2704

1.4644

1.9429

1.1871

DDID

-5.5851

5.6530

-18.9671

***

6.1745

-7.2935

5.6718

-19.8826

***

6.1218

LCM

0.7341

0.1553

-0.8893

***

0.1702

0.7095

0.1565

-0.8955

***

0.1692

DDM

-0.3563

0.4179

1.2686

***

0.2398

-0.3493

0.4160

1.2837

***

0.2387

***

**

***

Table 5
OLS Regressions
Results
Variable
Coefficient
Const.

0.8989

Yeart

Std. error
***

Coefficient

Coefficient

0.0031

0.5145

0.0030

0.8974

-0.0533

0.0510

-0.0518

0.0510

Yeart+1

-0.0045

0.0203

-0.0030

Yeart+2

-0.0330

0.0096

-0.0315

***

Yeart+3

0.0137

Yeart+4

0.0270

Adj. R2

0.0280

0.0320

***

Std. error

***

**

Std. error
***

Coefficient

Std. error

0.0176

0.5045

-0.1104

0.1679

-0.1004

0.1680

0.0204

-0.0383

0.1405

-0.0283

0.1405

0.0097

-0.2445

0.0537

-0.2345

***

0.0134

0.1008

0.0107

0.1690

0.0245

***

***

0.0182

0.0539
0.0890

**

0.0860

0.0316

** Significance level at the 5% level.
*** Significance level at
the 1% level.
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1.

Introduction

The high-profile corporate scandals in Japan after the
fall of 2004 generated discussion on reinforcing
corporate governance and the accounting profession.
In order to restore investors‘ confidence and regulate
internal control over financial reporting, the Japanese
Diet passed bills in June 2006 called the Financial
Instruments and Exchange Law (FIEL), 60 or the
so-called the Japanese Sarbanes-Oxley Act (J-SOX).
Although the J-SOX has induced significant benefits
to investors, anecdotal evidence indicates that the
J-SOX has imposed substantial compliance costs. For
instance, the Nikkei newspaper reported on August 12,
2009 that audit fees paid by 297 major Japanese
companies increased by 32% from the previous year
in March 2009 as the internal control reporting system
requirements went into effect in fiscal year 2008.
Several studies have examined shareholder
wealth effects of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and determinants of such effects. However, it is still
controversial whether the U.S. SOX positively
affected stock markets: Jain and Razaee (2006) and Li
et al. (2008) found a total positive effect of the U.S.
SOX on stock prices, while Zhang (2007) reported a
60

To be more precise, the FIEL, or the J-SOX, incorporates
the Amendment of the Securities and Exchange Law, which
was approved and enacted at the 164th Diet session on June
7, 2006 and promulgated on June 14, 2006.
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total negative effect of the U.S. SOX on stock prices.
The difference in results is partly due to the fact that
these studies identified different key dates; hence,
their interpretation differed as to whether the events
on these dates would have been interpreted by
shareholders as increasing or decreasing the likelihood
of passage of the U.S. SOX.
Studying the Japanese case enables us to avoid
such an identification problem associated with the
interpretation of the events. Because the U.S. had
already enforced the SOX and because Japan was also
experiencing high-profile corporate scandals after the
autumn of 2004, there was little uncertainty over
whether the J-SOX would be introduced. However,
shortly after the enactment of the J-SOX, the U.S.
SEC relieved smaller public companies from
responsibility for compliance to Section 404 of the
U.S. SOX. In addition, the Japanese Financial Service
Agency (FSA) attempted to incorporate the criticisms
of the U.S. SOX concerning the large costs of
implementation by employing a more concise and
efficient way of implementing the regulation. Thus,
key events prior to the enactment of the J-SOX can be
expected to have had positive effects on the Japanese
stock market, since presumably the J-SOX would lead
to an increase of future firm values, while the market
reaction to events between the enactment (June 2006)
and the enforcement (September 2007) is an empirical
question, because these actions may reduce both the
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benefits from improved financial reporting and the
costs that arise from preparation for the J-SOX
compliance.
The objective of this article is twofold. First, it
complements existing studies by examining the
Japanese case. We investigate stock market reactions
to news leading to the introduction of the J-SOX. In
contrast to the existing U.S. studies, our sample
includes not only events leading to the passage of the
J-SOX but also the events between the enactment and
the enforcement. The latter events include the U.S.
regulator‘s attempts to revoke some of the regulations
set by the U.S. SOX and the Japanese FSA‘s attempts
to set the guidelines on the implementation standards
of the J-SOX by taking into account criticism against
the U.S. SOX for imposing large implementation
costs.
Second, we examine whether firm-specific
attributes (corporate governance, audit functions, and
financial conditions) are associated with their
individual market reactions. In particular, it is quite
valuable to examine how abnormal stock returns are
associated with the governance structure of firms
during the period of legal and economic changes.61
Traditionally, Japanese firms depend upon a
bank-centered governance system, in which main
banks provide debtor firms with both monitoring and
certifying services, with a quite limited role of
independent auditors. However, recent legal and
economic changes in Japan, including the revision of
the Commercial Code in 2002 and the enactment of
the new Company Law of 2005, have enhanced the
role of auditors. Because Japan was in a transitional
period, we investigate how shareholder composition
and audit quality affect stock returns during the events
leading to the introduction of the J-SOX.
We find that the announcements that increased
the likelihood of the passage of the J-SOX raised stock
prices of firms listed on the First Section of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (TSE). Another finding is that firms
with a high ratio of foreign shareholders or leverage
experienced more positive stock price reactions,
perhaps because these firms were more prepared for
J-SOX compliance. On the other hand, whether the
firm was audited by a Big 4 audit firm did not seem to
matter to investors. In addition, large firms tended to
have more negative stock price reactions than small
firms, perhaps due to the high costs of preparing for
the J-SOX compliance.
The rest of the article is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides a literature review, background,
and hypotheses development. Sections 3 and 4
describe methodology and data, respectively. A
discussion of empirical results is provided in Section 4.

Concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2.
Literature review, background,
and hypotheses development
2.1 Literature review
Several papers have discussed stock market reactions
to the U.S. SOX of 2002. Two papers in particular
reported that the passage of the U.S. SOX had a
positive effect on stock markets. Jain and Rezaee
(2006) and Li et al. (2008) found a positive abnormal
return after legislative events that increased the
likelihood of the passage of the U.S. SOX. In addition,
Jain and Rezaee (2006) reported that abnormal returns
were more positive for firms that were closer to
compliance with the corporate governance provisions
of the U.S. SOX prior to the bill‘s passage. Li et al.
(2008) found that the positive return was associated
with the extent of earnings management. However,
Zhang (2007), who selected different event dates and
used non-U.S.-traded foreign firms as a control group,
showed that stock prices reacted negatively to news
related to the U.S. SOX.
These prior studies provide mixed results on
whether the U.S. SOX increased stock prices. As
mentioned by Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and
Wintoki (2007), these studies suffered from
identification problems - i.e., these studies identified
different key dates and news items; hence their
interpretation differed as to whether the U.S. SOX was
likely to pass. The Japanese case provides a favorable
opportunity to avoid such identification problems.
Because the U.S. had already enforced the SOX and
because Japan had also experienced high-profile
corporate scandals after the fall of 2004, there was
little doubt about the introduction of the J-SOX.
However, shortly after the enactment of the J-SOX,
the U.S. SEC relieved smaller public companies from
compliance to Section 404 of the U.S. SOX. In
addition, the Japanese FSA attempted to incorporate
criticism of the U.S. SOX concerning large costs of
implementation by employing a more concise and
efficient way of implementing the regulation. Thus,
we expect that key events prior to the enactment of the
J-SOX were likely to have positively affected stock
prices of listed Japanese companies, assuming that the
J-SOX was expected to enhance the future firm value.
By contrast, the effect of the events after the
enactment is an empirical question, because the
actions taken by the U.S. SEC and the Japanese FSA
may reduce both the benefits from improved financial
reporting and the costs that arise from preparation for
the J-SOX compliance. The next subsection describes
the background of the development of the J-SOX in
more detail.

61

Numata and Takeda (2008) explain details about the
changes associated with the main bank system and the role
of auditors.
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2.2 Japanese context
Similar to the Enron/Andersen scandal in the U.S.,
Japan experienced high-profile corporate scandals
after the fall of 2004, which generated doubts about
firms‘ compliance in financial reporting. In particular,
accounting frauds committed by Seibu Railway Co.
and Kanebo62 led to a discussion of the introduction
of J-SOX by councils of the FSA. In order to restore
investors‘ confidence and ensure credible disclosure
on financial and corporate information, the working
group of the Financial System Council of the FSA
proposed a mandatory requirement for listed
companies. These requirements included managers‘
evaluation of the validity of internal control over
financial reporting, which would be subject to audits
by certified public accountants or auditing firms, and
managers‘ submission of ―certification,‖ stating that
descriptions in financial statements are appropriate
and in compliance with laws and regulations (FSA,
2006). Then, the subcommittee of the Financial
System Council released a report, titled ―Legislation
for ‗the Investment Services Law (provisional title),‘‖
on December 22, 2005.
Following the debates in councils of the FSA,
the Japanese Diet approved and enacted the
Amendment of the Securities and Exchange Law on
June 7, 2006, and promulgated it on June 14,
2006. Later, it was incorporated into the Financial
Instruments and Exchange Law, the so-called J-SOX.
The J-SOX required listed companies to submit to a
quarterly reporting system, an internal control
reporting system, and certification by a management
system, which were enforced on September 30, 2007
and were applicable from the fiscal year beginning on
or after April 1, 2008.
However, around the enactment of the J-SOX,
the U.S. SEC looked for a way to offer further relief
from Section 404 compliance for smaller public
companies and many foreign private issuers to the U.S.
SOX and published a final rule, titled ―Management's
Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act
Periodic Reports,‖ in December 2006, which
exempted IPO companies from submitting reports for
the first year.
Taking into account the criticism of the U.S.
SOX for imposing huge implementation costs on
listed companies, the FSA looked for more concise
and efficient way to implement the J-SOX. There are
four major differences between the U.S. SOX and the
J-SOX. First, the J-SOX employs a top-down risk
approach, which enables firms to focus on major risks
rather than to evaluate all the detailed check items
under the baseline approach employed by the U.S.
SOX. Second, the J-SOX employs only two criteria
for deficiencies in internal control – material weakness
and control deficiency - while the U.S. SOX uses
62

Numata and Takeda (2008) analyze the impact of
Kanebo/ChuoAoyama scandal.
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these two categories plus another, ―significant
deficiency.‖ Third, the U.S. SOX requires independent
auditors to directly evaluate and report the internal
control system of the listed companies. By contrast,
under the J-SOX, evaluation of the validity of internal
controls over financial reporting is conducted by
managers and then checked by independent auditors.
Fourth, in the U.S., different auditors audit internal
controls and financial reporting separately, despite the
fact that these audits overlap in some part. The J-SOX
allows the same auditor to audit both internal controls
and financial reporting, cooperating with internal
auditors, in order to reduce audit fees.
Incorporating these concise and efficient ways,
in February 2007, the Business Accounting Council of
the FSA published a recommendation, titled ―On the
Setting of the Standards and Practice Standards for
Management Assessment and Audit concerning
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting (Council
Opinions).‖ This recommendation became a guideline
for implementing a new system of internal control
reporting. Although the J-SOX currently requires all
listed firms to be subject to the standards for
management assessment and audits concerning
internal control over financial reporting, an attempt to
offer relief for small firms may be discussed in the
future, since the large costs associated with internal
control reporting deter small firms from their IPOs
(Osaki, 2008).
2.3 Hypotheses development
In the present study, we first test whether the
announcements related to the J-SOX affected the stock
prices of Japanese firms. As shown in Table 1, we
select 12 events that are expected to have had a
potentially great impact on Japanese firms. 63 Events
G1 to G5 correspond to general news leading to the
passage of the J-SOX. These events occurred between
December 2005 and June 2006. Events A1 to A3
correspond to the U.S. announcements. These events
occurred between August 2006 and December 2006.
Events I1 to I4 are announcements regarding
guidelines for the implementation of the J-SOX. These
events happened between November 2006 and
February 2007.
[Table 1 here]
If investors expected that the introduction of the
J-SOX would lead to better internal control over
financial reporting practices, stock prices of Japanese
firms should have increased in Events G1 to G5. Thus,
our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: The stock market reacted
63

We do not include September 30, 2007, when the J-SOX
was enforced. This is because the stock market was
damaged by subprime loan problems in the world‘s major
countries.
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positively to the news, indicating an increase of the
possibility of enactment of the J-SOX.
By contrast, the effect of the events between the
enactment and the enforcement is an empirical
question, because the measures taken by the U.S. SEC
and the Japanese FSA were likely to reduce both costs
and benefits of the compliance of the regulations on
internal control over financial reporting. Thus, the null
hypothesis associated with Events A1 to A3 and I1 to
I4 becomes:
Hypothesis 2: The stock market did not react to
the news that the regulations included in the U.S. SOX
would be loosened for small firms and the news
concerning guidelines of the implementation of the
J-SOX.
Finally, we examine what factors contributed to
individual stock price fluctuations. In particular, we
are interested in how firms‘ governance structure is
associated with stock price reactions. Considering the
fact that the J-SOX attempts to discipline firms‘
internal control and financial reporting practice, we
expect that firms with better governance are likely to
experience more positive stock market reactions,
because such firms would bear low costs of the J-SOX
compliance. Thus, our final hypothesis becomes:
Hypothesis 3: The positive market reactions were
larger for firms that had more effective governance
structure.
The next section describes the methodology and
data used to test the above hypotheses.
3.

Methodology and Data

3.1 Univariate Stock Price Analysis
In order to examine stock price reactions to the
J-SOX-related news, we employ event study
methodology. Because the J-SOX is applicable to all
listed firms in Japan, the entire market is expected to
have been affected by the announcements related to
the introduction of the J-SOX. If we employ a simple
event study methodology in which the abnormal
returns of individual stocks are aggregated, we would
face a clustering problem in evaluating the
market-wide effect. That is, the cross-sectional
dependence among abnormal returns can generate the
bias in test results. In order to avoid the bias from the
test, we employ a portfolio approach using two market
portfolios – namely, the Tokyo Stock Price Index
(TOPIX), which is the market capitalization of all
floating stocks listed on the First Section of the TSE,
and the other market index, which is the equally
weighted average stock prices of 1526 firms listed on
the First Section of the TSE. Then, we estimate the
following model.
N

Rmt      j D j   t
j 1

(1)

Rmt represents a return of a market

where

portfolio, which is the TOPIX or equally weighted
market index, on day t . D j is a dummy variable
equal to one for the three-day event window
( t  0,1,2 ) of Event j ( j  1, 2,...,12 ) and zero
otherwise.

t

represents the zero mean disturbance

term.
We use least squares estimation with White
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariance to estimate the model over the 531 trading
days from January 2005 to February 2007. The
intercept (  ) represents the average daily stock
return across the 495 nonevent trading days. The
coefficient on each event dummy variable (  j )
represents an estimate of the average daily abnormal
return related to the event. We also estimate (1) for our
three event classifications: (a) general news leading to
the passage of the J-SOX (Events G1 to G5); (b) U.S.
news (Events A1 to A3); and (c) announcements
regarding guidelines for the implementation of the
J-SOX (Events I1 to I4).
3.2 Cross-sectional analysis
In order to investigate what factors contribute to
individual stock price fluctuations, we employ a
standard event study methodology for the
cross-sectional analysis to estimate abnormal returns
( ARit ) for each firm as follows.

ARit  Rit  (ˆ i  ˆi Rmt )

(2)
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm i
during period t and Rmt represents the return of the
TOPIX.

̂ i

ˆi

and

are parameters estimated by

the standard market model, per MacKinlay (1997), for
an estimation window from February 10, 2005 to
December 22, 2005, which corresponds to 200
transaction days prior to the first event (Event G1).
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is then
calculated by summing up the ARs over the event
window ( t  0,1,2 ):
2

CARi (0, 2)   ARit
t 0

.

(3)
We next conduct cross-sectional analysis for the
four G events, which could have been interpreted as
increasing the likelihood of the passage of the J-SOX,
in order to investigate what factors affect the mean
CAR. We estimate the following multivariate
regression models by using the least squared
estimation with White heteroskedasticity-consistent
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standard errors and covariance.
CARi  1   2 Big 4  3GAAP   4 IFRS  5 Foreign  6 Free
 7 Asset  8 Salesgrowth  9 ROA  10Leverage  11Beta  ui

(4)
where:
CAR
Big4

=
=

GAAP

=

IFRS

=

Foreign

=

Free

=

Asset
Salesgrowth

=
=

ROA
Leverage
Beta

=
=
=

mean cumulative abnormal return.
1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit
firm, 0 otherwise.
1 if the firm is listed on the U.S. market, 0
otherwise.
1 if the firm is listed on the European or
Singaporean market, 0 otherwise.
foreign shareholders‘ share of total
shareholders (%).
weight of listed shares available for
trading in the market (%).
logarithm of total assets.
rate of change in sales from the previous
settlement (%).
net profit divided by total assets (%).
liabilities divided by assets (%).
stock‘s beta (  ), estimated using a
standard market model.

To test Hypothesis 3 on the effect of the
governance structure, we include five variables (Big4,
GAAP, IFRS, Foreign, and Free). The first Big4
dummy variable becomes 1 if the firm is audited by a
Big 4 audit firm and 0 otherwise. We expect positive
coefficients for this variable, because the Big 4 audit
firms are supposed to provide better audit quality to
clients than the non-Big 4 audit firms.
The following two variables, GAAP and IFRS,
are dummy variables, which take 1 if the firm is listed
on the U.S., European, or Singaporean markets and 0
otherwise. The firms listed there have to prepare their
financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP
and/or International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). Because the U.S. GAAP and IAS require
greater disclosure to listed firms than the Japanese
accounting standards, we expect positive signs for
these two variables. In other words, firms listed on the
U.S. are likely to react positively to the news leading
to the passage of the J-SOX because they are expected
to be more prepared for the J-SOX compliance.
The next two variables are included to capture
the effect of shareholder composition. Foreign is the
percentage of foreign shareholders among total
shareholders, and Free is the free float ratio, which is
the weight of listed stocks available for trading in the
market. Firms with high ratios of foreign shareholders
are required to provide disclosure that is more
demanding than that required by domestic investors
and thus could have reasonably been expected to be
more prepared for the J-SOX compared with firms
that have low foreign shareholders‘ ratio. The effect of
the free float ratio is ambiguous. If blockholders,
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including main banks, provide better governance than
other short-sighted investors, CAR should be
negatively associated with the free float ratio.
However, if short-sighted investors are more
concerned about firms‘ performance than blockholders,
CAR should be positively correlated with the free
float ratio. Thus, whether there is a positive
correlation between CAR and the free float ratio is left
as an empirical question.
Asset is a logarithm of total assets. We include
this variable to capture the size effect. We predict that
Asset is negatively associated with CAR, because
investors could have reasonably assumed that large
firms conduct more complex operations than small
firms and would therefore incur higher costs in
preparing for J-SOX compliance. Salesgrowth is a rate
of change in sales, and ROA is the return on asset ratio,
which is net profit divided by total assets and is used
for measuring a firm‘s profitability. If investors regard
firms with higher sales growth or ROA as more
capable of preparing for the J-SOX compliance, the
estimated coefficients of these variables should be
positive.
Leverage is calculated as liabilities divided by
assets. The sign of Leverage is an empirical question.
Firms with a high leverage ratio may lack resources to
prepare for J-SOX compliance, so that the news on the
introduction of the J-SOX would affect them more
negatively. This would result in a negative sign for
Leverage. However, if main banks provide debtor
firms with better governance, the news on the
introduction of the J-SOX is likely to positively affect
firms with high debt-equity ratio. This would result in
a positive sign for Leverage. Thus, whether firms with
high leverage ratio experienced positive or negative
stock price reactions is tested.
The last variable, Beta, is stock‘s beta (  ),
estimated using a standard market model. This
variable is included to capture the firm‘s sensitivity to
systematic risk.
3.3

Data

Our sample for univariate analysis consists of 1526
firms listed on the First Section of the TSE 64 for
which stock price data are available throughout both
event and estimation windows. For cross-sectional
analysis, we delete firms that lack the financial data
needed to estimate equation (4). This elimination
process gives us 1339 firms with available data. We
note that firms in the financial industry, such as banks
and security companies, are eliminated in this process.
64

We limit our sample to firms listed on the First Section of
the TSE, because the stock price data of the other markets
are less useful due to the fact that stocks on the other
markets are less actively traded, with many days without any
deals.
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We rely on Toyo Keizai’s Kabuka CD-ROM and Toyo
Keizai’s Kaisha Shikiho (Japan Company Handbook)
CD-ROM to obtain stock price data and other financial
variables, respectively.
[Tables 2 & 3 here]
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics
and correlation matrices for the variables used in our
cross-sectional analysis. We note that the correlation
between Foreign and Asset is 0.51%. This indicates
that large firms tend to have higher ratios of foreign
shareholders than small firms. By contrast, Free is
negatively associated with Asset, with correlation
coefficients of -0.31%. This means that small firms
tend to have a higher free float ratio than large firms.
As a result, the correlation between Foreign and Free
is negative, with correlation coefficients of -0.49%.
4.
4.1

Discussions
Univariate analysis

Table 4 presents the regression results during 12 event
windows. Panel A reports results for each event date,
and Panel B reports results for aggregated events G, A
and I.
[Table 4 here]
We first discuss the results presented by Panel A.
The coefficients on Events G2 and G3 are
significantly positive at a 1% level for both the TOPIX
and equally weighted market portfolio results. The
coefficients on Event G1 are also positive but
insignificant for both portfolio results. This is
probably because the possibility of the introduction of
the J-SOX was not clear at Event G1, when it was
announced that a discussion of the J-SOX would take
place. The coefficients on G4 are insignificant for both
portfolio results. This may indicate that the passage of
the J-SOX was not big news compared with the
approval by the Cabinet Office.
By contrast, the coefficients on Event G5 are
significantly negative at a 1% level for both portfolio
results. This is surprising, since Event G5 is when the
J-SOX was finally approved by the Diet on June 7,
2006 and thus should have positively affected the
stock market. We suspect that stock prices are affected
by other confounding events, because on the same day,
stock prices declined in all major markets after Ben
Bernanke, chairman of the U.S. FRB, had warned of
the risk of inflation on June 5. Thus, we eliminate
Event G5 from Event G in Panel B and from the
cross-sectional analysis in the next subsection. As
shown in Panel B, overall, the coefficient on Event G
is significantly positive at a 1% level for both portfolio
results. This indicates that the TSE on average reacted
positively to the news that led to the introduction of

the J-SOX. In other words, our results are consistent
with Hypothesis 1.
The next events, A1 to A3, are related to the
news that the U.S. SEC was loosening the regulations
established by the U.S. SOX. The results are
ambiguous. Panel A shows that the coefficients on
Event A1 are significantly negative for both portfolio
results, while the coefficient on Event A2 is
significantly positive for the TOPIX but is
insignificant for the equally weighted market portfolio
result. The coefficients on Event A3 are insignificant
for both portfolio results. In addition, Panel B shows
that the coefficient on Event A is insignificant for both
portfolio results. These results indicate that the TSE‘s
reaction to the announcement of the U.S. loosening
the regulation was not obvious, perhaps because it was
not clear that the Japanese government would follow
the U.S. in making relief from the J-SOX compliance.
Lastly, we discuss stock market reactions to
Events I1 to I4, the news on the guidelines for
implementation of the J-SOX. Panel A shows that the
coefficients on Event I1 are significantly negative at a
1% level for both portfolio results, while the
coefficients on Events I2 to I4 are insignificant. In the
aggregated table, Panel B also shows that the
coefficients on Event I are insignificant for both
portfolio results. These results indicate that the effects
of the announcement of the guidelines of the J-SOX
were not obvious, perhaps because the guidelines
would have reduced both the benefits and the costs of
the J-SOX compliance.
In summary, our univariate analysis provides
evidence to support the notion that the events that
increased the likelihood of the passage of the J-SOX
positively affected the stock market in Japan. This
result indicates that investors were confident that the
J-SOX would increase the future value of Japanese
firms. By contrast, neither the events that loosened the
regulation set by the U.S. SOX nor the events that set
the guidelines for the implementation of the J-SOX
had obvious influence on stock market. The next
section will examine what factors contributed to the
stock market reactions for Events G1 to G4 using
cross-sectional analysis.
4.2 Cross-sectional analysis
Table 5 shows the regression results obtained by
employing mean CARs for a three-day event window
(0,2) as dependent variables. The F-statistics of all
regressions are statistically significant at a 1% level,
with explanatory power ranging from 0.8% to 6.1%.
[Table 5 here]
We first discuss the effect of a Big4 dummy
variable on the CARs. All coefficients are
insignificant for Events G1 to G4. This means that
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whether firms were audited by a Big 4 audit firm or
not did not affect the extent of stock price increases
caused by the J-SOX-related news. In other words,
Japanese investors appeared to regard Big 4 auditors
and non-Big 4 auditors as providers of similar-quality
auditing with regard to internal controls over financial
reporting, which were new to all audit firms in Japan.
The coefficients on GAAP and IFRS provide
inconclusive results. For GAAP, the coefficient is
significantly positive for Event G3 and insignificant
for the other three events. For IFRS, the coefficient is
significantly negative for Event G2 and insignificant
for the other three events. It should be noted that our
sample contains only 26 firms listed on the U.S.
markets and 33 firms listed on the European or
Singaporean markets. Reliance on such a small
number of firms may lead to ambiguous results in the
present study.
With regard to the foreign shareholder
composition, the coefficients of Foreign are
significantly positive for two regressions and
insignificant for two regressions. This result weakly
supports our prediction that firms with a higher ratio
of foreign shareholders would experience more
positive stock market reactions to the J-SOX-related
news. In fact, the presence of foreign shareholders in
the Japanese stock market has increased dramatically
in the past 10 years (Takahashi and Oyama, 2000;
Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). According to the TSE,
the ratio of foreign shareholders in the five Japanese
stock exchanges increased from less than 10% in 1995
to 28% in 2006. Foreign investors are likely to
demand greater transparency in financial reporting
practices and auditing independence. Thus, our results
indicate that foreign shareholders were interpreted by
the market as tending to contribute to better
governance by demanding greater transparency and
that stock prices of firms with a high ratio of foreign
shareholders increased more than firms with a low
ratio of foreign shareholders.
By contrast, the coefficients on Free are
significantly negative for two regressions and
insignificant for two regressions. This result weakly
indicates that firms with higher free float ratios
experienced more negative stock market reactions to
the
J-SOX-related
news,
perhaps
because
short-sighted investors did not seem to contribute to
the preparation for the J-SOX compliance.
We next discuss the size effect. The coefficients
of Asset are significantly negative for all regressions.
This result indicates that investors assumed that large
firms had more complex operations and thus would
suffer from larger auditing costs by the introduction of
the J-SOX. Accordingly, stock prices of large firms
experienced less positive market reactions than small
firms. Our results are in contrast to previous studies
that reported a negative relationship between stock
returns and firm size, as the U.S. SOX imposed larger
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costs for small firms than for large firms
(Chhaochharia and Gristein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007).
However, the following news may support our results.
For instance, the Nikkei newspaper reported on
August 12, 2009 that audit fees paid by 297 major
Japanese companies increased by 32% from the
previous year in March 2009, while audit fees
increased by 44.5% for SONY, 43.6% for Mitsubishi
UFJ Financial Group, 40.1% for Sumitomo Mitsui
Financial Group, 36.2% for Mitsui and Co., and so on.
Thus, the size effect of the SOX may depend on the
country in question.
We next discuss the effect of financial variables
and beta. The effects of Salesgrowth and ROA are
minimal, with insignificant coefficients for all
regressions. With regard to the effect of Leverage,
three regressions (Events G2 to G4) provide
significantly positive coefficients, while one
regression (Event G1) gives insignificant coefficient.
This result indicates that investors regarded firms with
a high leverage ratio as better prepared for the
introduction of the J-SOX, perhaps because of the
monitoring of the main banks. The effect of Beta is
minimal, as the coefficient on Beta is significantly
negative for Event G1 but insignificant for Events G2
to G4.
5.

Concluding remarks

In the present study, we investigated stock market
reactions to news related to the introduction of the
Japanese version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2006,
using event study methodology. We found that the
announcements that would have been interpreted as
increasing the likelihood of the introduction of the
J-SOX increased stock prices of firms listed on the
First Section of the TSE. Another finding is that firms
with a high ratio of foreign shareholders or leverage
experienced more positive stock price reactions,
perhaps because these firms were more prepared for
J-SOX compliance, with a better governance structure.
By contrast, whether the firm was audited by Big 4
audit firms did not seem to matter to investors. In
addition, large firms tended to have more negative
stock price reactions than small firms, perhaps due to
the high costs of J-SOX compliance.
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Appendices
Table 1. Events
Event
G1

Date
26/12/05

G2

24/01/06

G3
G4
G5
A1

10/03/06
17/05/06
07/06/06
24/08/06

A2

14/12/06

A3

20/12/06

I1

07/11/06

I2

21/11/06

I3

01/02/07

I4

16/02/07

News Announced
Subcommittee of Financial System Council of the Financial Service Agency (FSA)
released a report titled ―Legislation for ‗the Investment Services Law (provisional
title)‘‖ on Dec. 22, 2005.
The FSA announced the inclusion of new restrictions on limited partners for
investment into the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law (FIEL).
The FIEL was approved by the Cabinet Office.
The FIEL was approved by the House of Representatives.
The FIEL was passed by the House of Councillors and enacted.
The U.S. SEC announced its intention to offer further relief from Section 404
compliance for smaller public companies and many foreign private issuers to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
The U.S. SEC voted to propose interpretive guidance for management to improve
Sarbanes-Oxley 404 implementation on Dec. 13, 2006.
The U.S. SEC published a final rule titled ―Management's Report on Internal
Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act
Periodic Reports.‖
The Subcommittee on Internal Control of Business Accounting Council of the FSA
discussed a draft of the internal control rule on Nov. 6, 2006.
The Subcommittee on Internal Control of Business Accounting Council released an
exposure draft on the implementation standards of the FIEL on Nov. 20, 2006.
The Subcommittee on Internal Control of Business Accounting Council approved
of the guidelines on the implementation standards of the FIEL on Jan. 31, 2007.
The Business Accounting Council published a recommendation titled ''On the
Setting of the Standards and Practice Standards for Management Assessment and
Audit concerning Internal Control Over Financial Reporting (Council Opinions)‖
on Feb. 15, 2007.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis
Observations

G1
0.37
-0.13
27.56
-12.61
3.45
1.72
11.57
1,339

G2
1.14
0.64
27.53
-26.52
3.74
0.94
9.67
1,339

G3
0.78
0.51
16.73
-12.16
2.76
0.73
5.52
1,339

G4
0.71
0.48
13.91
-18.04
3.41
0.32
6.38
1,339

Big4
GAAP
0.85
0.02
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.36
0.14
-1.93
6.97
4.71
49.52
1,339
1,339

IFRS
Foreign
0.02
14.50
0.00
11.70
1.00
73.60
0.00
0.20
0.16
11.76
6.13
1.22
38.60
4.81
1,339
1,339

Free
18.87
16.80
63.30
0.20
11.14
0.70
2.93
1,339

Asset Salesgrowth
11.73
7.35
11.50
5.03
17.17
205.28
7.07
-65.38
1.40
15.18
0.73
3.92
3.57
37.90
1,339
1,339

ROA Leverage
2.96
52.67
2.82
54.05
55.78
98.78
-45.54
6.38
5.06
19.74
-0.26
-0.12
30.18
2.23
1,339
1,339

Beta
0.86
0.83
5.81
-0.06
0.33
2.81
38.49
1,339

Table 3. Correlation matrix

G1
G2
G3
G4
Big4
GAAP
IFRS
Foreign
Free
Asset
Salesgrowth
ROA
Leverage
Beta

134

G1
1.000
0.129
0.110
0.041
0.023
-0.020
-0.010
-0.020
-0.060
-0.081
-0.000
0.010
-0.083
-0.122

G2

G3

G4

Big4

1.000
0.110
0.109
-0.028
-0.075
-0.126
-0.064
0.094
-0.203
0.049
-0.026
0.037
-0.011

1.000
0.015
0.019
-0.014
-0.051
-0.019
-0.047
-0.103
0.043
-0.038
0.023
-0.037

1.000
-0.027
-0.033
-0.023
-0.025
0.065
-0.075
0.022
-0.041
0.039
0.026

1.000
0.045
0.068
0.087
-0.129
0.125
0.057
0.089
0.021
0.003

GAAP

1.000
0.431
0.232
-0.087
0.294
-0.006
0.069
-0.004
0.023

IFRS

1.000
0.177
-0.039
0.282
-0.010
0.000
0.004
-0.008

Foreign

1.000
-0.492
0.513
0.119
0.255
-0.195
0.099

Free

1.000
-0.309
-0.113
-0.285
0.247
0.039

Asset

1.000
0.058
0.053
0.271
0.214

Salesgrowth

1.000
0.199
-0.002
0.109

ROA

1.000
-0.282
0.138

Leverage

1.000
0.328

Beta

1.000
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Table 4. Results from least squares regression with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors &
covariance on dummy variables for event dates leading to the implementation of the J-SOX
Panel A: Results from least squares regression on dummy variables for each event date
TOPIX
(t-stat)
Coefficient
Constant
Event G1
Event G2
Event G3
Event G4
Event G5
Event A1
Event A2
Event A3
Event I1
Event I2
Event I3
Event I4

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Dec. 26, 2005
Jan. 24, 2006
Mar. 10, 2006
May 17, 2006
Jun. 7, 2006
Aug. 24, 2006
Dec. 14, 2006
Dec. 20, 2006
Nov. 7-9, 2006
Nov. 21, 2006
Feb. 1, 2007
Feb. 16, 2007

0.093
0.235
1.058
1.324
-0.218
-2.504
-0.912
0.436
0.447
-0.692
0.000
-0.198
0.020

(2.03)
(0.56)
(3.26)
(2.95)
-(0.38)
-(6.22)
-(3.46)
(3.77)
(1.37)
-(3.80)
(0.00)
-(0.33)
(0.18)

**
***
***
***
***
***
***

Market
(t-stat)
Coefficient
0.086
0.342
1.334
1.554
0.034
-2.774
-0.892
0.091
0.133
-0.972
0.204
-0.009
0.091

(1.87)
(0.89)
(4.81)
(3.69)
(0.08)
-(4.38)
-(2.55)
(1.21)
(0.33)
-(4.12)
(0.31)
-(0.02)
(0.57)

*
***
***
***
**

***

Observations

531
531
4.02%
5.60%
Adjusted R
S.E. of regression
0.995
0.999
DW stat
1.983
1.837
F-stat
2.849 ***
3.620 **:
Notes: 1. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
2. TOPIX is the market capitalization of all floating stocks listed on the First Section of the TSE.
3. Market is the equally-weighted average stock prices of 1526 firms listed on the First Section of the TSE.
2

Panel B: Results from least squares regression on dummy variables for aggregated event dates
TOPIX
(t-stat)
Coefficient
Constant
Event G
Event A
Event I
Event G5

(Events G1 to G4)
(Events A1 to A3)
(Events I1 to I4)

0.093
0.600
-0.010
-0.285
-2.504

(2.05) **
(2.07) **
-(0.04)
-(1.37)
-(6.27) ***

Market
(t-stat)
Coefficient
0.086
0.816
-0.223
-0.286
-2.774

(1.89) *
(3.06) ***
-(0.92)
-(1.18)
-(4.41) ***

Observations

531
531
3.70%
5.11%
Adjusted R
S.E. of regression
0.997
1.001
DW stat
1.961
1.818
F-stat
6.092 ***
8.135 ***
Notes: 1. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
2. TOPIX is the market capitalization of all floating stocks listed on the First Section of the TSE.
3. Market is the equally-weighted average stock prices of 1526 firms listed on the First Section of the TSE.
2
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Table 5. Cross-sectional analyses
Event G1
(t-stat)
Coefficient
Constant
Big4
GAAP
IFRS
Foreign
Free
Asset
Salesgrowth
ROA
Leverage
Beta
Observations

3.976
0.219
-0.087
0.260
-0.005
-0.025
-0.194
0.001
0.001
-0.002
-0.995

(3.85)
(0.78)
-(0.12)
(0.47)
-(0.45)
-(2.19)
-(2.11)
(0.17)
(0.05)
-(0.34)
-(3.65)

***

**
**

***

Event G2
(t-stat)
Coefficient
7.627
0.003
0.367
-1.842
0.041
0.015
-0.729
0.014
-0.004
0.024
-0.173

(7.44)
(0.01)
(0.61)
-(3.46)
(3.52)
(1.31)
-(7.20)
(1.44)
-(0.09)
(4.13)
-(0.18)

***

***
***
***

***

Event G3
(t-stat)
Coefficient
4.865
0.183
0.747
-0.504
0.012
-0.027
-0.379
0.009
-0.028
0.015
-0.256

(5.64)
(0.86)
(1.75)
-(1.54)
(1.16)
-(3.38)
-(4.63)
(1.52)
-(1.27)
(3.26)
-(0.61)

1,339
0.068
0.033
1.76%
6.09%
2.57%
Adjusted R2
S.E. of regression
3.416
3.623
2.724
DW stat
1.895
1.921
1.850
F-stat
3.391 ***
9.673 ***
4.531 ***
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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***
*

***
***

***

Event G4
(t-stat)
Coefficient
2.889
-0.128
-0.282
0.113
0.021
0.013
-0.284
0.007
-0.022
0.010
0.254

(3.12)
-(0.50)
-(0.53)
(0.26)
(2.11)
(1.31)
-(3.31)
(0.98)
-(0.77)
(1.69)
(0.45)

0.015
0.77%
3.400
1.956
2.034 ***

***

**
***

*
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HAS THE THREAT OF A TAKEOVER IMPROVED THE MANAGEMENT
OF TARGET FIRMS?
AN ANALYSIS OF FIRMS IN WHICH M&A CONSULTING, JAPAN’S
FIRST HOSTILE BIDDER, ACQUIRED STAKES
Timothy A. Kruse*, Kazunori Suzuki**
Abstract
This paper examines the new development of hostile takeovers and shareholder activism in Japan.
The hostile bidders claim that the threat of takeover which they pose on the management of a poorly
managed company is not only to their benefit, but also to that of the target company in general,
because the management will run the company better to maximize its value. Nearly a decade having
passed since the first-ever hostile TOB attempt in Japan by M&A Consulting (MAC), an investment
fund led by Mr. Yoshihiro Murakami in January 2000, we examine the stock price and operating
performance of the companies whose shares were bought by the MAC. We find that the shareholders of
the target companies indeed enjoyed large positive abnormal returns in the two years following the
news. We report, however, that their operating performance declined over the four fiscal years
following such news. There is little evidence so far that the threat of a hostile takeover improved the
actual operating performance of the target firm.
Keywords: Hostile Takeover, Corporate Governance
*Xavier University, Department of Finance, Williams College of
Business, 3800 Victory Parkway
Cincinnati, OH 45207-5162, U.S.A.
kruset@xavier.edu
**Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 61 Kirkland Street,
Cambridge, MA 02138-2030, U.S.A.
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42-8, Ichigaya-Honmuracho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162-0845, JAPAN
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1. Introduction
In January 2000, the investment fund M&A
Consulting (MAC hereafter) run by Mr. Yoshihiro
Murakami, a former METI (Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry) bureaucrat, launched the first-ever
hostile tender offer bid (TOB) in Japan for Shoei Inc.
Although unsuccessful, the TOB attempt alerted
Japanese managers of a new era of corporate
governance. In particular, poor performance of a
public company might result in the ousting of its
incumbent management through a hostile takeover.
The MAC-Shoei case was the first of many
hostile TOB and shareholder activism events at listed
companies. These events have sparked a heated
argument regarding the virtue of the threat of hostile
takeovers and shareholder activism. Some observers
claim the threat of a hostile takeover is an important
aspect of corporate governance. They believe that
when the incumbent management of a listed company
cannot manage the company well, potentially more
adept new management will replace it through a
hostile takeover. Also, the threat of a hostile takeover

will exert pressure upon the existing management to
perform better. For example, the increase in the payout
to fend off potential bidders might also bring a
positive effect on the management of the company,
since a payout increase results in the reduction of
agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986).
Others believe the pressure from the threat of
hostile takeovers might force the management to
become short-sighted, sacrificing long-term growth to
maximize the short-term performance. Besides, once
the battle over the corporate control has started, there
is a concern that management may concentrate too
much on defensive strategy and will not be able to
make decisions on the day-to-day operations of the
company. Japanese managers are generally very
skeptical about the effectiveness of a hostile takeover
in Japan.65
Naturally, hostile bidders have stressed the virtue
65

For example, refer to the discussion by the CEO of
Canon Inc., Mr. Fujio Mitarai during the Nikkei Corporate
Governance Symposium, which appears in July 22, 2005
edition of Nikkei Newspaper.
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of the threat of a hostile takeover, claiming that it is
not only to the benefit of the bidder and other
shareholders, but also to the target company in general
because it will precipitate improvements in the overall
management and governance of the target firm. Mr.
Murakami of MAC was the first Japanese investor
who repeatedly claimed such benefit. 66 Currently, a
similar battle is being waged regarding hedge fund
activism in the United States.
The effectiveness of the threat from an activist is
particularly relevant in Japan as many companies
identified as potential hostile targets hold a large
amount of cash beyond their need for the future
investment. In fact, HSBC Securities reports that as of
2000, there were 21 companies whose market
capitalization was less than the net cash on their
balance sheets.67 Moreover, as of March 2004, more
than 40% of Japan‘s 3000 listed companies had a
market capitalization less than the book value of their
equity.68
Traditionally sheltered from the threat of a
hostile bid through inter-corporate shareholdings,
management of Japanese listed companies are
generally unprepared about protecting its corporate
control
rights.
As
companies
sell
their
cross-shareholdings, many are now vulnerable to other,
more-active, shareholders who are taking their place
(see Kuroki, 2003, for a description of the unwinding
of the cross-shareholdings). As of March 2008, foreign
investors owned about 25% of all Japanese shares, an
increase from 9.8% of 10 years ago. 69 The recent
hostile attempts prompted management to implement
defenses. With a support from the economic ministry
(METI), the use of a poison pill has been legalized in
Japan.70
In addition to implementing legal defenses
against potential hostile bids, some companies adopt
corporate financial policy to deter hostile takeovers.
The most common measure has been to increase the
payout (either dividends or share repurchases) to
existing shareholders hoping to raise share prices and
discourage potential bidders.
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine
the consequences of the threat of a potential hostile
takeover. We attempt answer the following questions.
How active are funds such as MAC? Do shareholders
respond positively to the announcement of a MAC
purchase of an ownership position (indicating the
66

For example, refer to an article on January 25, 2000
edition of Nikkei Newspaper.
67
As reported in the Financial Times, January 24, 2000,
page 27.
68
Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2004, page A1 using data
from PacificData.
69
As reported by the Stock Ownership Distribution Report
by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
70
The Japanese Commercial Law has a principle that all
shareholders must be treated equally. Therefore, the issue
of warrants or convertibles that exclude a hostile bidder
(which is also a target‘s shareholder) was considered to go
against the principle, if not illegal.
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market believes the acquisition will bring about
performance improvements)? Do MAC targets exhibit
improvements in either share price or operating
performance? By answering these questions, we hope
to investigate the relative strength of the acquirers‘
arguments.
We examine a sample of firms which had public
announcements of significant positions by MAC
during 2000 to 2002. Although MAC launched only
one hostile TOB, the companies whose shares were
purchased by MAC after the failed TOB against Shoei
regarded themselves as a potential target of a hostile
TOB. Some of these companies increased payout to
prevent a launch of a hostile takeover, others fought
with the MAC over the management policy through a
proxy contest. In any case, all companies felt the
pressure from the shareholding of the MAC.
Murakami was welcomed by Japanese investors as a
corporate reformer providing discipline and changes
to the management of companies with prolonged poor
performance. At its peak in March 2006, MAC
maintained more than 400 billion yen (4 billion US
dollars) of assets under its management.
We examine the abnormal equity returns earned
by the target companies surrounding the appearance of
MAC as a major shareholder. We also examine
changes in operating performance following MAC‘s
acquisition. A typical long-term study based on
operating performance requires 4 to 5 years of
accounting data after the event occurred. Since MAC
sold its stakes by the end of 2006, it is reasonable to
assume that its influence also disappeared by fiscal
year 2007. Between the first wave of MAC‘s share
purchases that occurred between 2000 and 2002, and
its closure at the end of 2006, we can find the 4 year
post-event window of accounting data availability. 71
We find that shares of companies whose shares
had been purchased by the MAC performed
significantly better than the market. We report,
however, that the operating performance of the targets
following the event is worse than that of their industry
peers. Our results show that although the threat of a
potential hostile takeover benefited the hostile bidder
and the shareholders of the targets, we have no
evidence of the improvement in operating
performance of the target companies. Although we do
not have sufficient sample size to claim our results are
definitive, our research poses some skepticism over
the benefit of the emergence of hostile bidders as
―corporate reformers.‖
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides additional background on hostile takeovers
and shareholder activism. In Section 3, we briefly
describe the case of the first hostile TOB against Shoei
Company in the year 2000 by MAC. In Section 4, we
explain the objective of our research, sample firms,
71

The next wave of hostile TOBs and the emergence of
activist funds occurred after 2003, so that we do not yet have
sufficient sample size or data points to analyze the operating
performance of targets of other activist funds than MAC.
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and research methodology and describe our sample.
In Section 5, we report the results of our event studies
on abnormal share returns and abnormal operating
performance. Section 6 summarizes our findings and
concludes.
2. Background
Hostile raiders, or activist funds, are ―vultures and
hyenas‖ according to Masao Yamaguchi, the executive
director of Teikoku Hormone Manufacturing
Company.72 Mr. Yamaguchi made this comment after
the Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund, a U.S. based
investment partnership purchased a stake of just over
5% in his company. Steel Partners had just made the
news by launching a double hostile TOB against Sotoh
Company and Yushiro Chemical Industries. Mr.
Yamaguchi added ―When we operate the company, we
are not only looking at stockholders, we look at
employees and creditors and everybody.‖
Historically, these attitudes have ensured that
hostile takeovers would rarely be attempted in Japan
(see Kester, 1991 for example). However, economic
conditions in the 1990s and the ongoing deregulation
of Japanese financial markets, particularly in the form
of dismantling of inter-corporate shareholdings paved
a way for a possible hostile takeover bid for publicly
traded Japanese companies.
Soon after the TOB for Shoei, there were three
additional attempts of hostile TOBs targeting four
public companies.73 While none were successful, the
whole TOB process was dramatically portrayed in the
media. For example, one Japanese news magazine ran
the headline, ―U.S. Fund On Wild Rampage.‖ 74 In
addition, the fight over control of Nippon
Broadcasting Inc. between Fuji Television Network
and Live Door Inc. may be classified as another
hostile takeover attempt against a listed Japanese
company. However, in this case Live Door used a
regulatory loophole and avoided the TOB procedures.
More recent examples abound between 2006 and
2007.
Many companies have taken steps to protect
themselves from this new threat. First, with the
blessing of METI, many firms have adopted poison
pills. Also, firms are changing their financial policy to
make themselves less attractive to would be raiders. In
particular, they are using some of their cash reserves
to increase payouts in the form of dividends and/or
share repurchases. This strategy has the added benefit
of potentially increasing share prices.
In theory, raising the payout in itself does not
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Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2004, page A1.
Early examples of hostile TOB‘s other than the one
against Shoei are; (1) against Sotoh Company and Yushiro
Chemical Industries by Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund
in December 2003, and (2) against Japan Engineering
Consultants by Yumeshin Holdings Co., Ltd. in July 2005.
74
As reported by the Wall Street Journal, April 15, 2004,
page A1.
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necessarily increase shareholders‘ wealth. Miller and
Modigliani (1961) show that in a perfect capital
market, dividend policy is irrelevant to shareholders
because an increase in dividend will be met with an
offsetting change (fall) of share prices. A share
repurchase does not change the wealth of remaining
shareholders as long as the repurchase is made at the
ongoing market price. Obviously, the payout policy is
not irrelevant because there is no ―perfect capital
market‖ in a real world. The tax effect and the
signaling effect under asymmetric information are
examples of factors that ensure that payout policy is
relevant to existing shareholders.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is an
ongoing debate regarding the value of outsider
pressure on companies in the form of hostile takeover
attempts and shareholder activism. Proponents argue
the pressure is forcing management to do a better job
of managing their companies. Also, companies are
returning more cash to their shareholders. However,
others claim the raiders and activists have a short term
focus and do not have the necessary experience to
manage the target firms. In the end, they argue the
targets are worse off.
Recently, hedge funds have become very active
in the United States. Studies of this activism find
significant abnormal returns of roughly 5 to 11% in
the period surrounding the 13D filings, indicating the
acquisition of a 5% ownership stake. (see Brav, Jiang,
Thomas, and Partnoy, 2008, Clifford, 2008,
Greenwood and Schor, 2009, and Klein and Zur,
2009). However, is less clear that the activism always
enhances value. Specifically, the returns are greatest
when the desired outcome is the sale of the target
company and are not always significant given other
activism goals. Greenwood and Schor (2009) focus on
the impact of the sale of the target firms on
performance. They report the abnormal returns in both
the short and long terms are significant only if the
target firm is put into play and ultimately acquired.
A primary goal of our study is to investigate
whether a active raider will be able to bring about
performance improvements at Japanese targets.
3. Information about MAC and Shoei
Company
On January 24, 2000, M&A Consulting, (MAC), a
private investment fund led by a former MITI
bureaucrat, Mr. Yoshiaki Murakami, launched the
first-ever hostile tender offer bid (TOB) in Japan
against Shoei Company, a firm then listed on the
second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE).
Shoei was founded in 1931 as a silk manufacturer with
the help of Yasuda Bank. Yasuda subsequently
changed its name to Fuji Bank and then merged with
other two major banks to create the Mizuho Financial
Group. As Japan‘s economy grew, silk manufacturing
became unprofitable and Shoei evolved into a real
estate company. Its primary source of revenue is real
estate based rental income, which accounts for about
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two-thirds of total revenue. Also, the company
manufactures electronic and construction parts.
Shoei belongs to the Fuyo Group, one of the six
bank-centered keiretsu groups, and its CEO at the time
was a former Fuji Bank employee, Mr. Tanehiko
Kamiura. Its largest shareholders at the time of the
TOB included member companies of Fuyo Group,
namely Canon Inc. (with a 19.5% stake), Yasuda Fire
& Marine Insurance (10%), Yasuda Life Insurance
(6%), Fuji Bank (5%) and Yasuda Trust Bank (5%),
which in total accounted for 45.5% of outstanding
shares. Mr. Murakami apparently came to know Shoei
through his contact with Canon, Shoei‘s largest
shareholder. In 1999, Mr. Murakami unsuccessfully
tried to buy Canon‘s Shoei position; after collecting
about 2 percent of Shoei‘s shares, he reportedly had a
meeting with a board member of Canon in November
1999 suggesting a possible hostile TOB.
Mr. Murakami‘s TOB was for one hundred
percent of Shoei‘s shares at the price of ¥1,000. The
closing share price of Shoei on the previous trading
day was ¥800, indicating an offered 25% premium.
The deadline of the TOB was set to be February 14.
On January 25, the day after TOB announcement,
Shoei‘s board members issued a recommendation to
the shareholders that they were against the bid,
claiming that they would increase shareholders‘ value
more than Mr. Murakami would. The TOB received
huge media coverage in Japan, because it was the
first-ever hostile bid in the sense that the board
member of a target firm officially declared that they
were against it. Major shareholders including Canon
and other members of Fuyo Group quickly announced
that they were reluctant to accept the deal because the
bidding price was too low. In fact, because Shoei‘s
large real estate holdings were valued far more than
their book value, the company‘s liquidation value
would have been at least ¥2,000 per share.
Shoei‘s share price soared to ¥1,280 immediately
after the announcement (see Exhibit 1) and the highest
closing price during the offer period was ¥1,302 on
January 27. The market had anticipated an increase of
the bid price, which never materialized. The offer
expired on February 14 and Mr. Murakami could buy
only 6.52% of Shoei‘s total shares. After the failure of
the hostile bid, Mr. Murakami continued to own the
shares that he bought through the TOB and requested
that the management of Shoei take measures to
increase its value. Shoei‘s share price stayed around
¥1,000 throughout the remainder of 2000 (see Exhibit
2).
On February 22, 2001, Shoei announced that it
would increase its dividend for the fiscal year ending
December 2000 to ¥14 per share, an increase of ¥6
over the previous year. In March 2001, Mr. Kenji
Watanabe, another former Fuji Bank employee,
replaced Mr. Kamiura as a CEO. Unlike Mr. Kamiura,
who was reluctant to talk with Mr. Murakami, Mr.
Watanabe started to implement drastic changes that
reflected his orientation toward shareholders. Mr.
Watanabe quickly introduced an employee stock
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option program and appointed external board
members. In July and August 2002, Shoei repurchased
its shares in an effort to increase its payout to equity
holders. Mr. Murakami sold his shares to Shoei in
response to the repurchase offer. Shoei sold the shares
they repurchased through a secondary equity offering
in March 2003, which led to the increased number of
shareholders and consequently paved the way for a
listing on the first section of the TSE.
As for Shoei‘s share price, it increased to around
¥1,400 after Mr. Watanabe‘s succession in 2001. It
further increased to about ¥1,600 following the
announcement of the listing on the TSE first section in
2003 (see Exhibit 2). In contrast to the rapid rise in
share price, Shoei‘s operating performance improved
rather slowly. Table 1 shows Shoei‘s sales, operating
profit and operating profit margin (over sales) between
1995 and 2006. Because it manufactures electronic
parts, its sales were affected by the silicon cycle, but
even on the operating profit margin basis, the real
improvement in performance was not realized until
2004, by which time MAC had already unwound its
investment in Shoei.
In the years after its Shoei acquisition, MAC
acquired significant stakes in an additional 27
companies, reaching the peak of its power in early
2006. Then in 2006, MAC experienced a rather abrupt
downturn and subsequent dissolution. In June 2006,
Murakami was arrested, allegedly having been
involved in insider trading of Nippon Broadcasting
System, one of MAC‘s portfolio companies. While the
case is still being fought in the higher court, MAC
dissolved itself shortly after Murakami‘s arrest and has
sold off all of its stakes by the end of 2006.
4. Shareholder Gains and Operating
Performance
4.1. Research Objectives
Following MACs failed hostile TOB for Shoei in early
2000, many Japanese managers became concerned
about the potential threat of a hostile takeover. In
fact, MAC invested in many listed companies other
than Shoei following the failed TOB attempt.
Japan‘s Securities and Exchange Law (SEL) stipulates
that if a person or a firm owns more than 5 percent of
the outstanding shares of a listed company for the first
time, he (or it) must report a change in his ownership
to the Ministry of Finance and the stock exchange
within 5 calendar days, or at the end of every quarter
in the case of a financial company or an investment
fund. Subsequently, increases by more than or equal to
1 percent of the company's outstanding stocks, must
be reported as well (Article 27-25 of the Securities and
Exchange Law). These reports are called ―A Report
of Large Shareholdings,‖ or Kabushiki Tairyo Hoyuu
Hokokusho. Upon submission of a Report, it
immediately becomes available to the public on the
Internet through the TD (Timely Disclosure) Net
system run by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Thanks to
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the TD Net, the name of companies whose shares are
owned by the hostile bidder became public knowledge
to the market. We also search the database to identify
the date that such report of shareholdings about a
certain firm was submitted.
We are interested in how the threat of a hostile
takeover affects share prices and operating
performance of the potential targets. We hypothesize
the share prices of the target firms will increase at the
disclosure of the shareholding information of the
hostile bidders. It is well documented in the U.S. that
the share price of a target of a takeover goes up by
more than 40 percent on average (see Bruner, 2002,
for a survey of the takeover literature). Although MAC
has not launched any TOBs since its first attempt
against Shoei, the mere threat raised by their
acquisition of a stake might be sufficient to provide
abnormal returns to potential targets. Furthermore,
the target management sometimes increased the
payout to shareholders, either by increases in dividend
and/or share repurchases, which may be met with the
positive share price reaction. We conduct a simple
event study to examine the abnormal returns to the
targets‘ shares generated by the announcement of a
stock acquired by MAC.
The second subject of interest, which, we believe,
is more important, is whether the potential threat of a
hostile takeover of these companies resulted in an
improvement of their operating performance. If the
market is efficient, a rise in share price should be
followed by the actual performance improvements by
the targets. If this is indeed the case, it will support
the hostile bidders‘ argument that the threat of a
hostile takeover serves as a governance mechanism
prompting the target companies to be operated more
efficiently. Otherwise, we can infer that the threat
benefits the targets‘ shareholders in the short run, but
does not necessarily lead to the increase in the
companies‘ operating cash flow in the long run, and
that the market was too optimistic about the future
operating performance improvement of target
companies. This outcome is consistent with the
common argument that shareholder activists are not
always experts at managing their target firms.
4.2. Data and Methodology
We collect data on the MAC‘s targets from TD Net
Database, the Nikkei Telecom Database and the
Nikkei NEEDS Database to examine abnormal returns
from the potential target companies. As we explained
before, we searched TD Net to identify the name of
the companies whose shares were purchased by MAC,
and the date on which Report of Major Shareholdings
was submitted to the stock exchange by MAC. In
some cases, newspaper articles report lists of
companies purchased by the MAC prior to the
submission of Report. We collect such articles from
Nikkei Telecom Database, which permits searches of
articles appearing in four newspapers published by
Nihon Keizai Shimbun.

Our event date is the earliest of the following
three dates; (1) the date on which a Report of Large
Shareholdings was submitted, (2) the date on which an
article appeared in one of the Nikkei newspapers, or
(3) the annual yuuka-shoken hokokusho was submitted
to the relevant stock exchange. The above search
identified 27 companies, including Shoei, whose
shares were purchased by the MAC between 2000 and
2004. Since we analyze the long-term operating
performance of target companies, we have limited our
sample to non-financial firms and the events to those
occurred between 2000 and 2002 to make four-year
post-event accounting data available before the
dissolution of MAC in late 2006. Our final sample
consists of 21 observations.
We calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal returns
around the event date (e.g., the report submission date).
Our benchmarks are the TOPIX Index, a value
weighted index of all stocks listed on the First Section
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and returns on a control
firm that we identify below. We subtract the return
on the TOPIX Index and the control firm from our
sample‘s buy-and-hold returns. Since the TOPIX
Index does not take dividends into account, we report
abnormal returns calculated excluding dividends. We
note this will bias away from finding abnormal returns
as many of the sample firms increased their payouts
following MACs acquisition of shares.
We have assigned a control firm (benchmark) to
assess the relative operating performance of our
sample firms. Following by Barber and Lyon (1996),
control firms operate in the same industry as that of
our sample firms and exhibit similar operating
performance (return on asset) in the pre-event year
(year −1). We use ROA (operating profit over the
book value of the total asset) as our performance
measure.
4.3. Descriptive Statistics
We describe the characteristics of our sample in this
subsection. Table 2 presents the summary of our
sample firms. The 21 firms have an average market
capitalization of 31,505 million yen (the median is
21,696 million yen), which is a little larger than the
average market capitalization of the Second Section of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. MAC held an average
stake of 5.86% of the sample firms. The average cash
holding balance relative to the book-value of total
assets in the year before the event was 15.1 percent,
but varied from a minimum of 2.2 percent to a
maximum of 89.1 percent. The average of the same
ratio of cash holding balance for all firms on the First
Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is about 13
percent in the Year 2000.
Table 3 shows the composition of the sample by
industry. Trading, service, and engineering companies
together account for more than half of our sample.
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5. Results of Event Studies
5.1. Share Price Performance
Table 4 reports the announcement effects of MAC‘s
purchase of shares in terms of the buy-and-old
abnormal returns (BHAR) over those of the TOPIX
Index and of a control firm.
Our results show that the average abnormal
returns around the announcement date (days 0 to +2)
is positive but not statistically significant. The
long-term BHAR against TOPIX is significantly
positive before the event (days −120 to −1),
suggesting some run-up before the event. Because a
looser disclosure rule is imposed on an investment
fund like MAC to submit Report of Large
Shareholdings only on quarterly basis, and because
some of the event dates arise from the appearance of
an article in the newspaper or when an annual 10K
report was submitted, the market might have already
known about the purchase of the MAC by the event
date. The significant positive pre-event returns might
well indicate the leak of information.
In terms of the post-event BHARs, we find that
the target firms of the MAC significantly
out-performed TOPIX Index over one year (~+250
days) and two years (~+500 days) after the news of
the purchase by 15 to 20 percent. However the
BHARs are not significant in any of the periods when
we use a control firm as the benchmark. The latter
results may be because of the spillover effect from the
information that MAC targeted our sample firms.
Our control firms share the industry and the
characteristics of our sample firms, so they could have
been regarded as a potential target for the future
hostile activity, resulting in their share prices to be bid
up in line with those of our sample firms. Admitting
the weak robustness of our results as above, we report
that MAC generally earned higher returns than the
market in general.
5.2. Operating Performance
We show the operating ROA of our sample firms in
Table 5. Panel A reports both the average adjusted and
control firm adjusted ROA across all sample firms
around our event year. Note that in year –1, the control
firm adjusted returns are closest to zero due to our
method of choosing control firms.
The unadjusted and control firm adjusted returns
declined during the 10 years around the event. The
unadjusted ROAs barely change in the years following
the event, while the control firm adjusted ROAs are
significantly negative in years +2 to +4, suggesting
that ROAs of control firms have improved after the
event.
Panel B examines the changes of ROA of each
sample between Year –5 and +4 and Year –3 and +3.
The decline of both adjusted and unadjusted ROA is
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significantly negative cross-sectionally between Year
–5 and Year +4. Overall our results suggest that MAC
was unable to bring about improvements in operating
performance at its target firms. If anything,
performance deteriorated.
6. Conclusion
We examine the share price and operating
performance of companies whose shares were
purchased by MAC following MACs hostile TOB of
Shoei in January 2000. We find that the shares of our
sample firms show significant abnormal returns over
two years after the purchase became publicly known.
On the other hand, we have shown that the raw ROA
and control firm adjusted ROA declined following the
MAC‘s purchase. The average control firm adjusted
ROA becomes significantly negative after 2 years and
on following the event.
Our sample size is limited, but at least we have
shown that the first hostile TOB attempt followed by
the threat of hostility by the first-ever activist fund in
Japan has resulted in decent investment returns for the
fund, but not in the improvement of the target‘s
operating performance. Managers of the target
companies frequently complain that outside activists
do not have the necessary expertise to understand the
business of the target. Moreover, many managers will
see the effort as a threat to their jobs or autonomy. As
a result, it is likely that the target management will
resist making the changes proposed by the activists at
all costs, devoting his time to defending his position
rather than to managing his company‘s operations.
Anecdotal evidence supporting this claim is
provided by the case ofTokyo Style Co., one of our
sample firms. Tokyo Style‘s management fought back
most fiercely against Murakami involving several
lawsuits. The adjusted and the unadjusted ROA of the
company at year +4 are −5.7 percent and 0.8 percent,
respectively, which are below the mean and the median
of our sample. More recent attempts by other activist
funds in Japan, such as Steel Partners Japan Strategic
Fund (SPJSF) that adopted similar activist strategies as
MAC since 2003, will provide an opportunity to
examine the robustness of our results within a few
years. In the meantime, our preliminary investigation
of other activist funds implies that a similar result may
emerge.
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Table 1. Sales, Operating Profit, and Operating Profit Margin of Shoei
Sales and operating profit are reported in millions of yen.
FY

SALES

1995/12
1996/12
1997/12
1998/12
1999/12
2000/12
2001/12
2002/12
2003/12
2004/12
2005/12
2006/12

OP. PROF.
/SALES
10.4%
8.3%
9.6%
14.1%
13.6%
12.7%
11.9%
10.6%
11.1%
22.1%
20.5%
35.8%

OP. PROFIT

10,104
8,072
8,812
7,280
5,880
7,475
4,908
7,702
8,100
9,101
13,707
16,904

1,046
671
850
1,029
801
953
585
820
898
2,014
2,813
6,044

Table 2. Summary Statistics of Sample Firms
Event Year
2000
2001
2002
TOTAL

# of
Firms
5
15
1
21

Avg. Mkt Cap.
(in Million Yen)
17,213
37,693
10,150
31,505

Avg. % of Hldg.
by MAC
6.44%
5.94%
1.73%
5.86%

Avg. % of Cash
to Total Assets
4.73%
17.76%
27.57%
15.12%

Table 3. Sample by Industry

Industries
Textile
Pharmaceuticals
Non-Iron Material
Transportation Machinery
Other Manufacturing
Engineering
Trading (Wholesale)
Retailing
Service
TOTAL

2
1
2
1
1
4
5
1
4
21

Table 4. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Stock Returns (Excluding Dividends)
The table reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the TOPIX Index over the pre-and post-event
period. ―*‖ and ―**‖ denote the significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Days (Event
Date=0)
-120～-1
0～+2
0～+60
0～+120
0～+250
0～+500
-120～+500
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Raw BH Return
Mean

Median

7.38%
3.76%
1.04%
-3.07%
-3.47%
10.09%
15.82%

10.13%
-0.30%
0.00%
-2.46%
-1.73%
9.83%
10.79% *

Adjusted BH Return
Against TOPIX
Against Control Firm
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
18.80% **
4.09%
3.33%
5.69%
14.40% **
24.14% **
41.55% **

24.53% **
-0.12%
-2.19%
0.82%
15.85% *
15.89% *
33.47% **

-10.38%
3.98%
-1.94%
-4.44%
0.96%
-16.89%
-23.65%

17.98%
0.00%
-8.44%
-5.70%
11.16%
-4.45%
10.64%
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Table 5. Absolute and Relative Operating Performance of Sample Firms
Median pre- and post-merger unadjusted and control firm adjusted operating returns for 21 firms. ROAs are the
operating profit divided by the book value of assets for the previous year. Control firm is chosen to be the one in
the same industry as that of the sample firm, and must be the closest in ROA in the year –1. ―*‖ indicates
significance at the 5 percent significance level.
Sample firms
mean
median
Panel A – ROA for year relative to event:
–5
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
Panel B – Change in ROA between:
-5 to +4
-3 to +3

6.25%
6.15
4.43
1.84
1.15
1.32
2.34
1.79
2.30
1.98

-4.27*
-1.21

3.49%
3.15
2.94
2.64
2.14
1.31
1.45
1.79
1.57
1.82

-2.67*
-0.70

Control firm adjusted
mean
median
2.21%
1.65
0.42
-0.53
-0.17
-1.35
-1.15
-2.55*
-2.48*
-4.03*

-0.37%
-0.17
0.46
0.27
-0.01
-0.76
-0.22
-1.99*
-1.31*
-1.45*

-6.36*
-2.77

-3.19*
-2.16
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Faculty, Denmark. The author was a member of the Danish Committee to Modernise Company Law. The Committee was
dissolved after handing down its report and consequently all comments are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Committee.
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1. Introduction
Company law in the European Union is rapidly
changing. Recent years have seen company law
reform in large Member States such as the United
Kingdom,75 Germany76 and France.77 In the Nordic
region, the Companies Acts of Finland 78 and
Sweden79 were extensively reformed in 2006 and now
it is the turn of Denmark. This paper will present the
background to the proposed reform of Danish
company law and provide an overview.
2. Background to the reform
The present Danish legislation on limited liability
companies is contained in two separate acts, one on
75

For an insider‘s view of the 2006 reform, see P. Bovey, A
Damn Close Run Thing – The Companies Act 2006
(Legislative Comment), Stat. L. R. 2008, 29(1), 11 – 25.
76
Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur
Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen;the law entered into force on
1 November 2008. See M. Beurskens & U. Noack, The
Reform of German Private Limited Company: Is the GmbH
Ready for the 21st Century?, 9 German Law J. No 9, Special
Edition (available on-line on www.germanlawjournal.com).
77
Loi de modernisation de l’economie; the law entered into
force on 6 August 2008. For a comment on the reform in
German, see C. Klein, Frankreichs kleine und mittlere
Unternehmen sollen gestärkt werden, RIW 11/2008 770 773.
78
Act (624/2006) on companies; the law entered into force
on 1 September 2006.
79
Act (2005:551) on companies; the law entered into force
on 1 January 2006. For an insider‘s view, see R. Skog, The
New Swedish Companies Act, Die Aktiengesellschaft 7/2006
238 - 242.
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public limited companies (aktieselskab, A/S) and one
on private limited companies (anpartsselskab, ApS).
The distinction was introduced into Danish law in
connection with the accession to the then European
Economic Community in 1973. Until then, Danish
company law only had one form of limited liability
company, the A/S. Denmark introduced the ApS to
emulate the distinction found in German law between
the public company (Aktiengesellschaft, AG) and the
private company (Gesellschaft mit Beschränkter
Haftung, GmbH), each regulated by a separate act.
This distinction was deemed necessary as the 2nd
Company Law Directive on capital80 that reflects the
German doctrine on the protection of capital in a
limited company to protect its creditors (kapitalschutz)
applies only to public limited companies.
The A/S Act of 1973 has been amended several
times, the last major reform being Act No 1060/1992.
In 1996, the ApS Act, which also dated from 1973,
was reduced considerable in an attempt to avoid
unnecessary legislation. However, following the 1996
reform the users of the ApS Act had to look to the A/S
Act for guidance in the absence of specific provisions
in the ApS Act, and although some of the more
important parts have since been reintroduced into the
80

Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December
1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection
of the interests of members and others, are required by
Member States of companies within the meaning of the
second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of
the formation of public limited liability companies and the
maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to
making such safeguards equivalent. Later amended by
Directive 92/101/EEC and, more substantially, by Directive
2006/68/EC.
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ApS Act, it is still insufficient on its own.
In October 2006, the Minister of Economic and
Business Affairs appointed a committee to advice on
the modernisation of Danish company law. The
mandate of the committee was to provide a flexible
legislation allowing for new technology and to avoid
over-implementation of EU law unless it was
considered necessary for the protection of important
vested interests. The Committee was quite large,
consisting of 27 members including representatives of
all major interests in Danish business life and the
relevant public authorities. Its secretariat was vested
with the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency
that is the principal public authority in respect of
company law. Although the Committee also comprised
three university professors it was not intended to be
engaged in an academic enterprise exploring various
possibilities within company law but to produce a
draft bill that would likely pass the legislative
procedure. The Committee fulfilled these expectations
and published a 1270 pages long Green Paper in
November 2008 including a draft bill with
comments.81 After a brief public hearing, a proper bill
was put before Parliament in March 2009, 82 where it
had its first hearing out of three on April 14 and is
expected to be passed within the end of the current
session in June.
This lack of a greater academic discourse and the
speed by which it was presented to Parliament has
been the subject of some criticism especially among
company law scholars excluded from the process. It is
true that more academic scrutiny may have enhanced
the product. On the other hand it is noteworthy that the
Committee availed itself of the extensive literature
from the other recent European reforms and as such
was in no need of inspiration and the considerable
width of the represented interests ensured that the
necessary political compromises that inevitably trump
academic propositions were reached during the
Committee‘s tenure enabling a result that perhaps is
more viable than a drawn out procedure would have
produced.
3. The overall structure of the Act
The bill before Parliament closely resembles the draft
presented by the Committee and as such reference is
made both in commentary part of the bill itself and in
this paper to the comments made by the Committee in
its Green Paper to the various provisions.
The experience of the 1996 reform of the ApS
Act had convinced the Committee that it was
necessary either to expand that Act considerably, to
avoid the need for references to the A/S Act, or to
combine the two acts.83 Since a combined act for both
public and private limited liability companies is
81

Cf. Green Paper (Betænkning) No. 1498/2008 on
Modernising Company Law.
82
Bill No. L 170 (Parliamentary session 2008/09).
83
The 1996 reform is discussed in paragraph 2 above.

well-known in several Member States, e.g. the United
Kingdom and in the Nordic region, Finland and
Sweden, and taking into consideration that the
difference between public and private limited
companies is diminishing,84 the new act will cover
both company forms. In this way certain provisions
that would only be binding on public companies will
either be a default solution for private companies,
allowing the shareholders to decide otherwise, or an
inspiration for them to follow the same procedure as a
public company would be obliged to do. In this way,
guidance is offered for private companies without
compromising their greater freedom to choose
differently.
4. Corporate governance
To a considerable degree the Nordic countries share a
common understanding of company law, notably in
respect of corporate governance. 85 All five Nordic
countries, comprising the three EU Member States of
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, and the EEA Member
States of Iceland and Norway, still share the same
corporate governance model known as the dual
executive system originally introduced into Danish
law in 1930.
This could be viewed as a hybrid between the
one-tier system known in the United Kingdom with
its board of directors and the two-tier system known in
Germany with its distinction between a supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat) and a management board
(Vorstand). In the Nordic system the general meeting
of shareholders appoints a board of directors
(bestyrelse), which hires a board of managers
(direktion). 86
Collectively, these two executive
organs are referred to as the management and share
responsibility for their governance of the company.
This may appear to be a two-tier system, but it is more
closely related to the one-tier system. First of all, the
board of directors is the superior executive organ and
although it is also vested with the obligation of
supervising the board of managers, it is itself engaged
in management in a way that is irreconcilable with the
role of a German supervisory board and more
resembles the distribution of responsibilities between
executive directors and outside directors in the English
one-tier system. Second and equally like the English
system, it allows for double mandates, i.e. a person
can serve as a director and as a manager at the same
84

The distinction between public and private companies is
inapt as a public company does not have to be public, have
more shareholders, or in any other way be larger than a
private company. A more relevant distinction seems to be
between a publicly traded company, i.e. listed companies,
and other limited companies.
85
See in general J. Lau Hansen, Nordic Company Law,
DJØF Publishing (Copenhagen, 2003), Chapter III.
86
One small difference is that in Finland, Norway and
Sweden the board of managers usually comprises only the
CEO, whereas in Denmark and Iceland it is a collective
organ that can comprise more than one manager.
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time comparable to the English notion of an executive
director. Third, the system is strictly hierarchical with
the shareholders in general meeting as the supreme
decision makers and is as such more vested with the
shareholder value approach than the stakeholder
approach normally associated with the two-tier system.
In fact, due to the widespread occurrence of dominant
shareholdings even in publicly traded companies, the
hierarchical nature of the Nordic system is more
pronounced than in most other shareholder value
jurisdictions, e.g. the UK and the US, which tend to be
more a managerial controlled system than a
shareholder controlled system.
As the international debate has so far proven
unable to point to one system as being superior to the
others, the Committee concluded that it was better to
offer a freedom of choice to the shareholders of each
company between the one-tier and the two-tier model
as a supplement to the existing Nordic version of the
one-tier model, which would leave the ultimate choice
of governance model to the shareholders. Although the
new act will offer a choice between one-tier and
two-tier models, both models are curtailed by certain
requirements mandated by law to provide good
corporate governance. A manager may simultaneously
serve as a director, but the majority of the board of
directors may not consist of managers, nor can a
manager chair the board of directors. 87 Thus, the
powerful position of an American CEO chairing the
board of directors or a French PDG is not available.
Section 111 of the new act offers a choice
between the one-tier model and the two-tier model.
The two-tier system is a novelty in Danish company
law and consists of a supervisory board appointed by
the shareholders in general meeting and a management
board hired by the supervisory board. A manager
cannot be member of the supervisory board but has the
right to participate in its meetings unless the
supervisory board decides otherwise ad hoc.88 The
management board is the only executive organ and the
supervisory board lacks executive powers.
Whereas the two-tier system closely resembles
its German origin, it becomes clear upon closer
inspection that the one-tier model is divided into three
different versions, which are already part of existing
Danish company law but have been spelled out more
clearly in Section 111:
(i)
A solitary board of managers, however, this is
only available for private companies.89
87

National corporate governance codes applying the
comply-or-explain principle may further strengthen this
division between directors and managers. The Danish code
recommends that managers do not serve as directors in
publicly traded companies. However, even if the CEO is not
a director, he or she may attend the meetings of the Board of
Directors unless the Board decides otherwise ad hoc.
88
This is to overcome the problem of communication
between management and supervisors that appears to inflict
the German system.
89
The new Finnish Companies Act of 2006 (footnote 4
above) provides this choice for public limited companies as
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(ii)

A board of directors and a board of managers,
where all the managers are hired among the
directors. This resembles the one-tier system
known in English law. Although technically it
does comprise two independent boards with
different powers and corresponding obligations
the dual capacity of the directors cum managers
veils the distinction.
(iii) A board of directors and a board of managers,
where some or all of the managers are hired
from outside the board of directors. This is the
present Nordic model and is expected to
continue as the preferred model of choice.
To emphasise the position of the shareholders as
the supreme decision-makers, at least the majority of
the board of directors or the supervisory board must be
appointed by the general meeting and may be
dismissed by it at will.90
Besides reducing the
incentive for Danish nationals to avail themselves of
the freedom to choose another company law regime
than Danish law when forming a limited company
afforded by the case law of the EC Court of Justice,
the freedom to choose between different corporate
governance systems is believed to offer an incentive
for foreign companies to establish a subsidiary in
Denmark as they will be able to chose a corporate
governance model familiar to them.
To strengthen this incentive and to induce more
foreign direct investment by individual investors as
well as active participation in the management of
Danish companies, the company will be able to decide
in its Articles of Association that the company
language shall be English or Scandinavian, in which
case all members of the board including employee
representatives would be obliged to speak the
preferred language. 91 Even without an express
provision in the Articles, the company can submit
public documents, e.g. its annual accounts, to the
Danish Commerce and Companies Agency in English
or Scandinavian, thus avoiding the expense of
translation. Any language can be used at the general
meeting of shareholders as long as simultaneous
translation into Danish is provided, and if a simple
majority of shareholders so decide, the meeting can be
held in English or Scandinavian without translation.
As Danish company law has made on-line
participation by shareholders in the general meeting
legal since 2003, this possibility of conducting the
well.
90
Employees may have a right to appoint directors,
however such directors must form a minority of no more
than 1/3 of the board. On co-determination, see paragraph 5
below. Although rare in practice, the Articles of Association
may provide for the right of others, e.g. the original founder
of the company, to appoint directors. Nonetheless, the
majority of directors must be appointed by the shareholders
in a general meeting which will appoint the whole board if
nobody else has a right to appoint.
91
The three Scandinavian languages of Danish, Norwegian
and Swedish are closely related but different. A speaker may
decide which Scandinavian language to speak.
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general meeting in English and relying on documents
and accounts in English would benefit foreign
investors that could actively participate via electronic
means without being physically present.
5. Co-determination
As the law stands, if a Danish company has employed
on average 35 or more persons within the last three
years, the employees or their unions may call for a
referendum of the employees as to whether they
should elect representatives to sit on the board of
directors. If a majority is in favour, the employees
have a right to appoint at least two directors to the
board of directors or a higher number equal to half of
the rest of the board, i.e. one third of the total number
of directors. Employee representatives on the board
will thus always constitute a minority. A director
appointed by the employees is on par with all other
directors on the board in respect of rights, obligations
and payment, and an employee director may be
disqualified ad hoc, as in the case of any other director,
if that director has a substantial conflict of interest
with regard to a particular matter so that the matter
must be decided in his absence.
This system, which is viewed as favourable by
both employer and labour organisations, is continued.
However, some procedural requirements will be
relaxed in the new act, making it easier to decide on
employee representation and if the employees cannot
provide the number of candidates to fill the seats
available to them, they may settle for a lower number.
The present system only applies to employees in
Denmark, but under the new act the general meeting
of shareholders may decide to expand the system to
cover all its employees globally. If the company has
employees in Denmark, however, they are entitled to
at least one seat, and two seats if they form more than
10 per cent of the work force.
6. Minority protection
Danish company law already provides considerable
protection of minority shareholders and this regime is
continued in the new act. Each shareholder has a right
to suggest issues for the agenda of the general meeting,
may participate in the general meeting personally or
by an attorney, may vote by proxy, may speak at the
general meeting and put questions to the management
in respect of any item on the agenda or in the annual
accounts. Shareholders holding more than 5 per cent
of the capital may call for an extraordinary general
meeting to be convened.92 Shareholders holding more
than 10 per cent may require the appointment of an
additional auditor by the Commerce and Companies
Agency, and shareholders may by simple majority
decide an examination of the company‘s accounts, and
if the request is supported by shareholders holding
92

The present threshold is 10 per cent. A company‘s own
shares are not counted when calculating these figures.

more than 25 per cent an examination may be ordered
by the courts. Specific provisions, known as general
clauses because in essence they codify broad
principles, prohibit the majority of a general meeting
from making decisions that may unjustly benefit
certain shareholders or others to the detriment of the
company or other shareholders, and equally they
prohibit directors and managers from a similar abuse
of their powers.
7. Capital
It is apparent from its Green Paper, that the Committee
was in favour of affording wide discretion on the
company and its shareholders qua investors in
deciding how to organise the capital structure of the
company unless the protection of creditors warrants
otherwise. This, the Committee believed, was
supported by experience and also in line with the
development in other Member States and visible in the
relaxation of the 2nd Company Law Directive by the
reform in 2006. 93 Consequently, the Committee‘s
proposal provided a very flexible regulation of capital.
However, due to criticism in the media which argued
that it would be irresponsible to abandon the stricter
regime of the existing legislation, the bill presented
before Parliament was less liberal in a few areas.
The present legal minimum of DKK 500,000
(EUR 67,120) for public companies in share capital
will be maintained, although it is considerably above
the EUR 25,000 required by the 2nd Company Law.
The bill would reduce the legal minimum for a private
company from DKK 125,000 (EUR 16,780) to DKK
50,000 (EUR 6,712). 94 Upon subscription, the
shareholders must pay in at least DKK 50,000 but
only 25 per cent of any additional capital. 95
Outstanding capital can be called in with 2 – 4 weeks
notice from the management and shareholders who
fail to pay loose their voting rights on all shares in the
company including fully paid in shares. A shareholder
may at any time volunteer to pay in the outstanding
amount and may opt to do so in case of a transfer of
shares as the obligation to pay rest on both the seller
and any prospective buyers of the shares.
The requirement for a minimum share capital in
private companies and a minimum ratio of paid in
capital are the two only major areas where the bill
departs from the draft proposed by the Committee.
The Committee had suggested that the legal minimum
for a private company should be abandoned and that
the minimum ratio of paid in capital should set in only
93

See footnote 6 above.
The requirement for a legal minimum share capital
follows from Article 6 of the 2nd Company Law Directive,
but only applies to public limited companies. However,
Danish law has applied a similar requirement to private
companies.
95
This requirement follows from Article 9 of the 2nd
Company Law Directive. Again, it only applies to public
companies, but would in the new act apply to private
companies as well.
94
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above the minimum threshold applicable to public
companies of DKK 500,000, which would effectively
have made it possible for a private company to have a
guaranteed capital if it was kept below DKK 500,000.
The reasoning was that the minimum share capital was
so small that it was of no use as a protection of the
creditors while proving an obstacle to new small
entrepreneurs trying to set up a company. Furthermore,
the Committee found it sufficient that both directors
and managers are personally liable for maintaining at
all times a sufficient level of capital for the company
to meet its obligations and pointed to the similar trend
in Germany and France and the new proposal for a
European Private Limited Company. 96 However, this
point was seized upon by the media which found it to
be too risky in light of the present economic crisis.
That a relaxation of an unnecessary capital
requirement may actually help business in times of
crisis as was the reasoning behind the German and
French reforms was mostly ignored. By reducing the
minimum share capital the bill has minimised the
nuisance for small entrepreneurs. However, at the first
hearing before Parliament, a majority appeared to be
against lowering the minimum share capital for private
companies and favoured maintaining it at DKK
125,000. It is yet uncertain whether the bill will be
amended in this respect. If it is, it will greatly enhance
the attractiveness of foreign private companies with no
or less onerous requirements for share capital that the
Committee tried to counter. The new act would
introduces non-par value (npv) shares, which are
already known in Finland and Sweden, as a
supplement to traditional shares with a nominal value
and a company may choose freely between the two
forms of shares. In respect of voting rights attached to
shares and other arrangements pertaining to control of
the company, the Committee took note of the ISS
report of 2007 which was unable to conclude that
control-enhancing mechanisms would reduce the
profitability of a company. 97 In the absence of clear
empirical evidence that certain control arrangements
may damage a company, the Committee decided to
leave this for the existing and future shareholders to
decide freely. The present restriction on voting
differentiation, that differences in voting rights of
shares representing the same capital may not exceed 1
– 10, will be abolished in the new act, leaving it to the
company and the investors to decide.
As the law stands today private companies may
issue voteless shares, which was possible also in
public companies until the A/S-act of 1973. However,
in the new act both public and private companies may
issue such shares and there is no requirement that they
should yield a minimum dividend or otherwise enjoy a
96

See the Commission‘s Proposal for a Council Regulation
on the Statute of a European Private company, COM(2008)
396.
97
ISS, Sherman & Sterling, ECGI, Report on the
Proportionality Principle in the European Union, 18 May
2007.
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preferential standing as the discount expected at
subscription and in later transactions compared to
similar shares with voting rights is considered amble
protection of the shareholders who prefer to acquire
these shares.
8. Protection of capital
In the opinion of the Committee, the most important
safeguard for the creditors of a limited liability
company is the obligation of the directors and
managers to ensure that the company is adequately
funded at all times and the personal liability which
that obligation entails on each member of the
management. Consequently, the Committee proposed
to introduce into Danish law some of the relaxations
of the formal requirements for the protection of capital
that have been allowed at EU level by the reform of
the 2nd Company Law Directive in 2006.98
According to the new act, public and private
companies will be allowed to acquire their own shares
and the present 10 per cent threshold is abandoned.
The most important safeguard is the requirement that
only free reserves may be used to acquire the shares.
Since these reserves may be paid out by the company
as dividends, it is obvious that creditors are not put at
any additional risk by abandoning the 10 per cent
threshold. By the same reasoning, the provision of
financial assistance for the acquisition of shares in the
company, which is presently absolutely prohibited,
will be allowed but only by payment from the free
reserves available for dividends. As additional
safeguards, a decision to provide assistance must be
put before the general meeting of shareholders, the
management must explain why the decision is deemed
to be in the interest of the company and the company‘s
shares must be acquired at market price. In the first
hearing before Parliament, a majority also favoured
that a declaration should be issued by the company‘s
auditor. In the Committee, a minority presenting
auditors had made such a suggestion, but a sizeable
majority had declined, fearing that it would entail
further costs to the company and in stead making it
optional for the company. After the publication of the
Green Paper, the auditors lobbied considerably for this
proposition in the media, apparently with success.
In Danish law, the ban on providing financial
assistance is accompanied by a ban on lending to
shareholders. In contrast to the ban on financial
assistance, the ban on lending has no basis in the 2 nd
Company Law Directive and was introduced into
Danish law as a response to earlier cases of abuse.
Similar prohibitions are found in the laws of other
Nordic countries, but the ban in Danish law is the
most wide-ranging of these. Inspired by the reform of
the ban on financial assistance, the new act will permit
lending to shareholders under conditions similar to
those for offering financial assistance and with the
further requirement that the financial status of the
98

See footnote 6 above.
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shareholder should be assessed. Again, a majority in
Parliament may be in favour of mandating a
declaration issued by the auditor of the company.

representation and minority shareholders that have
opposed the transfer may call for their shares to be
redeemed, which are provisions already known from
the regulation of cross-border mergers and divisions.

9. Publicity
11. Conclusion
The new act will introduce a public register of
shareholders with holdings above 5 per cent to be
maintained by the Danish Companies and Commerce
Agency and accessible on-line at all hours without
charge. For publicly traded companies disclosure of
major shareholdings is mandated by EU law, 99 but
publication will apply to all companies, including
private companies, as it will be helpful for society in
general to know of major shareholdings even in small
and non-public companies, and it may also benefit
public prosecutors when investigating economic
crimes, e.g. money laundering.
10. Transfer of seat
Cross-border mergers and divisions are already
provided for in Danish law, but the new act will
further make it possible for a company to move its
registered seat in or out of Denmark, if that is
acceptable to the other Member State affected by the
move.100 The registered seat of a company provides
its link to the Member State and thereby determines
the applicable company law.101 A company moving its
registered seat out of Denmark will cease to be
Danish. 102 Conversely, a company moving its
registered seat into Denmark will become a Danish
public company (A/S) or private company (ApS) and
may have to increase its share capital and otherwise
conform to Danish company law. The move itself will
not affect the company and it will remain the same
legal person after the move as before. Certain
safeguards are provided for to secure employee
99

On the obligation to disclose major holdings in publicly
traded companies, see Article 9 of Directive 2004/109/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December
2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in
relation to information about issuers whose securities are
admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending
Directive 2001/34/EC.
100
On cross-border mergers, see the judgment of 13
December 2005 by the EC Court of Justice in Case C-411/03,
SEVIC Systems, [2005] ECR I-10805.
101
Cf. Judgement of 28 January 1986 by the EC Court of
Justice in Case 270/83, Commission v France, [1986] ECR
273 at Para. 18.
102
It should be noted that Denmark does not apply the
Sitztheorie previously applied in German law prior to the
judgement of 5 November 2002 by the EC Court of Justice
in Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v Nordic Construction
Company Baumanagement GmbH, [2002] ECR I-9919, and
as such a company may freely move its administrative seat
or main business out of Denmark without loosing its Danish
nationality. However, the registered seat may not be moved,
which was upheld by the EC Court of Justice in its
judgement of 16 December 2008 in Case C-210/06,
Cartesio.

The Committee‘s proposal for a new companies act
was an attempt to introduce a whole new legislation,
completely rearranging the existing legislation,
combining two different acts into one, abolishing well
known caveats once thought necessary and
introducing a flexibility viewed by some as daring.
The purpose was to provide a companies act that
would bring Danish law at least on par with the best of
other Member States in the European Union.
Although the new act envisaged by the bill now
before Parliament may appear unfamiliar when
compared to the existing legislation, it may be argued
that it is more a collection of what has already been
done in Denmark or elsewhere. Indeed, if the new act
is passed as is expected, not a single Danish company
will have to change its statutes as the bulk of changes
consist of options not presently available. It may even
be argued that it does not provide true innovation as it
might have done had it been submitted to a more
prolonged and academic procedure with open hearings
and public debates in lieu of the horse-trading done by
the Committee‘s members. That, however, may turn
out to be its major strength. By accepting almost all of
Committee‘s proposals in its bill, the Government
appears to have judged it has sufficient backing
among the leading actors of the Danish business
environment that formed the Committee to make it a
viable reform. The anxiety displayed by the legislators
at the first hearing of the bill in Parliament may result
in an abandonment of the proposed relaxation of the
capital requirements applicable to private companies.
If that happens, the new act will probably fail to
prevent the increased use of foreign private companies
with more lenient capital requirements that the
Committee sought to achieve. Despite this failure,
which appears to be more a failure of nerve than a
long term policy choice, the new act will provide a
flexibility that brings it on line with the most modern
companies acts in most other respects.
Since nothing human is ever perfect, and since
the upheaval of reform is in itself a major obstacle to
success, perhaps this carefully negotiated reform will
succeed in providing a companies act at the forefront
of company law in the European Union as envisioned.
New amendments will probably be necessary within a
few years, e.g. in respect of the minimum share capital
requirement for private companies or in respect of
new financial instruments that have survived the
present crisis and proved their value. The new act then
will not be a monolith to be left untouched for
generations to come, but a sound foundation for
keeping up with the rest.
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